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I. INTRODUCTION
This article examines the problem of balancing several core interests:
society's interest in eliminating unfair employment discrimination
including discrimination on the basis of religion; an employee's interest
in seeking, obtaining, and holding employment free from unfair
discrimination; and an employer's interest in the employer's free exercise
of religion, including using religious criteria for employment decisions.
Also implicated are issues concerning both public and private tolerance of
religion, issues concerning the relationship of the state to the individual in
religious freedom, and employee interests in associating with employees
with similar religious mind-sets. I suggest that most issues of this sort be
resolved through a practical approach not dissimilar to that advanced for
disability-related employment disputes under the Americans with
Disabilities Act.' For those issues which cannot be resolved through such
pragmatic means, the law and courts must get involved. As I explain at
some length below, I propose that even in formal legal fora such problems
should not be decided by relatively rigid application of formulaic rules.
Instead, they should be decided through carefully nuanced consideration
of the seemingly imprecise principle of accommodation tempered by and
informed by the principles and ideals of tolerance, equality, neutrality, and
inclusion.
The role of religion in modem political and social development has
taken many forms. Fundamentalist religious movements have gained
prominence in many predominantly Islamic countries, and in the case of
Iran, have led to a repressive theocracy. Religious strife has torn apart
Lebanon, has repeatedly flared in India, has created destructive, sectarian
strife in Sri Lanka, and has plagued Northern Ireland for centuries. Israel
has significant regional problems largely, though not solely, because Israel
is a Jewish state in an Islamic region.
1. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 12101-213
(1988 & Supp. II 1990); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (1995) (Reasonable
Accommodation); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 App. § 1630.9; infra parts mH.B.2., IV.
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The United States is no stranger to religion as a social and political
force. 2 Many of the early European colonizers crossed the Atlantic

driven largely by religious motives. 3 Most of the colonies established

state religions. 4 Others, such as Maryland, which still uses the motto
"The Free State," supported religious freedom, although they too had
many oppressive laws.'
After independence and during the process of ratification of the
Constitution, the failure of the Constitution to address the role of the state

in religion was one of the key concerns of the state ratifying conventions. 6
Ultimately, the Bill of Rights was adopted and the prohibition of
governmental establishment of religion and the protection from
infringement on the free exercise of religion were enshrined in the First
Amendment. 7

2. See SYDNEY E. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
(1972); HENRY F. MAY, IDEAS, FAITHS AND FEELINGS: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN
INTELLECTUAL AND RELIGIOUS HISTORY 1952-1982 (1983); CHRISTOPHER F. MOONEY,
PUBLIC VIRTUE: LAW AND THE SOCIAL CHARACTER OF RELIGION (1986).
3. See WILLIAM L. MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY: RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC (1986).
4. For example, Virginia was Anglican and, except for Rhode Island, the
Congregational Church was the state church throughout Puritan New England. See, e.g.,
Laura Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of the Religious and the Secular: A
Foundational Challenge to FirstAmendment Theory, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 837,
879-91 (1995). See generally FORREST MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE
INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 42-45 (1985); LEo PFEFFER, CHURCH,
STATE, AND FREEDOM (1967).
5. See, e.g., Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 4, at 885-86 (discussing one Maryland
statute that imposed the death penalty on anyone who, inter alia, engaged in blasphemy
or denied the existence of Jesus Christ); see also Kenneth Lasson, Free Exercise in the
Free State: Maryland's Role in the Development of FirstAmendment Jurisprudence, 18
U. BALT. L. REv. 81, 82 (1988) (describing religious discrimination in Maryland,
including penalties for blasphemy).
6. See Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 4, at 885-86, 891-93, 919-24 (esp. note
276, at 892) (describing the debates surrounding the adoption of the U.S. Constitution);
see also Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1947)
(discussing Virginia's enactment of the Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty in 1785-86,
which embodied the same objectives as the First Amendment); Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 162-64 (1878) (discussing the religious debates surrounding the
adoption of the Constitution and several state proposals for amendments). See generally
MILLER, supra note 3.
7. U.S. CONST. amend I. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.").
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In modem times religion continues to affect our political lives. As
recently as 1960 many political pundits were concerned about whether the
United States could or should have a Catholic as President.8 Even in
1991 the issue of Clarence Thomas's ability to judge the abortion issue
free from domination by the Pope was raised after his nomination to the
United States Supreme Court. 9
Religious leaders have figured
prominently in the civil rights movement. For example, Martin Luther
King, Jr. was a Christian minister. The Black Muslim movement, with
its conversion of many African-Americans to Islam and the creation of a
new sect of Islam, The Nation of Islam, continues in both guises as a
religious, social, psychological, and in many instances, a political
force.' 0
Some evangelical Christians have created right-wing
organizations such as the Moral Majority and the Concerned Women of
America with overtly political agendas." Evangelical Christians have
sponsored a candidate for the Republican Party nomination for

President. 12
Religious beliefs continue to inform our positions on many of the most
difficult issues of the day. Although most of the social and political issues
surrounding religion, as well as most of the reported religion cases,
involve either the very public spheres of education 3 and governmental
involvement in the promotion of religion, 4 or deep moral and ethical
issues such as abortion" and the right to die,' 6 a number of cases and
8. Michael Barone & Katia Hetter, The Lost World of John Kennedy, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., Nov. 15, 1993, at 39.
9. Lucy Howard & Ned Zeman, Wild at Heart, NEWSWEEK, July 15, 1991, at 4.
10. See MALCOLM X & ALEx HALEY, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X
(1965).
11. David Von Drehle, Coalition Reaching to the Middle, WASH. POST, Aug. 15,
1994, at Al.

12. Pat Robertson, a televangelist, ran unsuccessfully for the Republican nomination
in 1988. T.R. Reid, 'InvisibleArmy' Won Few Battles; Robertson, Followers HadLittle
Clout at Polls, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 1988, at A3.
13. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (involving the right of
members of the Old Order Amish religion to be exempt from compulsory school
attendance laws because enforcement would pose a grave danger to their religous
beliefs).

14. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (concerning the
display of a Christian nativity scene and a Chanukah menorah on public property).
15. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
16. In re Storar & Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d 363 (1981) (discussing the view of the
Catholic church that permits the termination of "extraordinary life support systems when
there is no reasonable hope for the patient's recovery").
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a variety of issues have surfaced in that most amoral (and all too
frequently immoral) realm-the marketplace.
The importance and inseparability of religious and ethical values in the
pursuit of a livelihood are not just positions of people on the fringe; not
only the Amish and certain others of conscience believe in finding an
ethical way to make a living.17 Living well by doing good is the goal of
many.' 8 The scandals on Wall Street19 and in the savings and loan
institutions graphically display the results of separate weekday dog-eatdog, marketplace amorality and Sunday morning charity-for-all. °
Significant problems with legal, political, and practical dimensions
arise when employers self-consciously carry not only their mores and
morality to their workplaces, but also bring their religious beliefs and
practices. Frequently, the explicit goal of such employers is to create a
business environment infused with the employers' own religious beliefs
and practices. To an outsider the stamping of the corporate culture with
the imprint of religious beliefs and practices appears unnecessary and
irrelevant to the "business of business"-the pursuit of commercial
gain." To an employee the work environment can appear unnecessarily
uncomfortable or even hostile.
The following questions help focus the problem: Is a belief in god or
a particular set of religious beliefs a legitimate prerequisite for commercial
employment? Or more broadly considered: Can or should society decree
that secular, commercial job performance cannot be measured by spiritual
criteria? Or add working society's interest into the mix: Does society
have a legitimate interest in furthering non-discrimination on behalf of
17. See Laura S. Underkuffler, "Discrimination"on the Basis of Religion: An
Examination of Attempted Value Neutrality in Employment, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV.
581, 581 n.l (1989) (quoting Matt Moffett, Fundamentalist ChristiansStrive to Apply
Beliefs to the Workplace, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 1985, at 33).
18. Andrea L. Woolard, Funds with Social Themes: Investing Principalin Your
Principles, CHRIsTIAN Sci. MoNrrOR, Aug. 14, 1986, at 19.
19. See, e.g., Steve Coll & David Vise, Inside Milken's Empire: TranscriptsInside
Green Tree Case Offer Rare Look at Drexel, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 1987, at H1
(discussing Michael Milken's involvement in the junk bond market and "questionable
corporate takeover practices").
20. This statement does not imply that all of the people involved are hypocrites.
Many are not religious and others may believe in separating parts of themselves from
other parts for various settings. See Michael J. Sniffen, High Conviction Rate in S&L
Cases, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 13, 1995, available in WESTLAW, Allnews
Library, 1995 WL 4414159 (discussing the Justice Department's recent convictions of
over 2000 people who were involved in major financial fraud schemes).
21. E.g., Brown Transp. Corp. v. Commonwealth of Pa., 578 A.2d 555, 561 (Pa.
1990) (describing employee's complaint as based, in part, on the belief that "religion
should not be part of business affairs").
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employees to limit private citizens from organizing workplaces in
accordance with religious norms?'

The problem arises most acutely when an employer makes

employment decisions based upon the compatibility of the employee's

religious beliefs with those of the employer.'

Such actions may well run

afoul of the Civil Rights Act of 196424 as well as many state and

municipal human rights laws.'

The problem arises in a more subtle

form where there are no overt or well-defined acts of discrimination, but
where the employee feels so uncomfortable in the religiously-infused work
environment that he or she claims that the work environment itself is
discriminatory.'
(In this latter instance the claim may resemble coemployee sexual or racial hostile environment cases.)27 The question is:
Should the First Amendment's right to free exercise of religion shield
employers from discrimination claims based on a difference of religious
conviction between employer and employee?
The issue is complicated by the fact that both the employer and the
employee have the right to exercise their religious beliefs and that one or
the other must either give way completely or one or the other or both
22. I owe a debt to Prof. McConnell for part of this formulation of the core issue.
23. E.g., Minnesota v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844, 846 (Minn.

1985), dismissedfor lack ofjurisdiction, 478 U.S. 1015 (1986).

24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
25. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (Deering 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 89-1703
(Harrison 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (West 1995); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296
(McKinney 1993).
26. See Turner v. Barr, 806 F. Supp. 1025, 1027-28 (D.D.C. 1992); Meltebeke v.
Bureau of Labor and Indus., 903 P.2d 351 (Or. 1995).
27. See Ball v. City of Cheyenne, 845 U.S. 803 (1993) (sexual harassment within
police department); Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 60 (1986) (bank
employee claiming sexual harassment by supervisor); Meininger v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc.,
No. 93-4166-RDR, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1434, at *4 (D. Kan. Jan. 6, 1995) (sexual
harassment by co-employees); Crissman v. Healthco Int'l, No. 89-C8298, 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13167, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 1992) (sexual harassment by male sales
representatives toward female representatives); Sims v. Montgomery Cty. Comm'n, 766
F. Supp. 1052 (M.D. Al. 1990) (claims of racial and sexual harassment in sheriff's
department); Barrett v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 584 F. Supp. 22, 23-24 (D.N. 1983) (sexual
harassment by co-employees); Colorado Div. of Empl. & Training v. Hewlett, 777 P.2d
704, 706 (Co. 1989) (harassment by co-workers concerning illicit relationships between
employee's husband and other employees).
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The variability of
must give way partially through accommodation.'
employees further complicates the analysis. For example, an employee
who desires a religion-infused workplace would not be able to find one if
there were no religiously-organized workplaces. Further complicating
matters are the dual interests of the community and the state in things
religious and things commercial. That is, there are other interests
involved in addition to those of the employer and employee-the interests
of the community as expressed through the acts of the state.
More abstractly, these interests can be grouped as those of the
individual (employer or employee) and those of society (community and
state). From this perspective, this article is in part an elaboration of the
premise that the claim for social harmony and the claim for individual
privacy and independence are in a necessary dialectical tension, with
neither being primary nor superior to the other and with neither being
sufficient alone to develop principled, consistent jurisprudence of First
Amendment religious freedom.2 9 The employer and employee are
essentially making individual claims which are both at loggerheads with
each other and are, taken together, potentially in conflict with the
community's interest in social harmony. Taken to an extreme, where a
single person can nullify the effect, as to that individual, of general
society-building actions, the primacy of that individual's claim results in
a unit veto. Taken to the other extreme, primacy of the community's or
state's claim results in tyranny by the majority. Thus, the employer could
effectively veto the effect of the state's antidiscrimination laws by simply
asserting a right to be exempted from their reach. Or the employee could
be a tool of the majority by enforcing a claim for special treatment under
the antidiscrimination laws in a way that would not respect the legitimate
interests of the employer. These assertions of individual rights could
exacerbate declining social harmony. Hence we see the dialectical tension
between the individual-rights-based approach and the social-harmony
approach.
28. Some courts have articulated the need for mutual accommodation for employees

seeking accomodation of their religious needs. E.g., Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827
F.2d 1081, 1084-85 (6th Cir. 1987); Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141,

145-46 (5th Cir. 1982).
29. See Ashby D. Boyle II, Fear and Trembling at the Court: Dimensions of
Understandingin the Supreme Court'sReligion Jurisprudence,3 CONST. L.J. 55, 57-60
(1993) (analyzing the relationship of religious autonomy and social coherence in religious
jurisprudence). A thorough exploration of the issues involving community in politics and
the importance of community in preserving social harmony can be found in AMATAI
ETzIoNI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE
COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA (1993).
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This dialectical tension can be resolved by applying foundational
principles of respect for equality and human dignity.3" If we treat each
other with equal respect and if we recognize each person's claim to human
dignity, then we are bound to act in a way which legitimates both the
individual interest as well the group interest in social harmony.
Respecting equality and respecting the inherent human dignity of each
person perforce leads to social harmony through tolerance rather than
through hegemony. That is, one can have a shallow, enforced social
harmony through hegemony (for example, Yugoslavia under Marshall
Tito), but such harmony is frail because it is shallow. Harmony built on
tolerance is stronger and more resilient. One cannot claim that the United
States has always been-or even that it has ever been-a model of
tolerance; certainly one cannot claim that it is a repository of social
harmony, narrowly conceived. But through all of the struggles and
missteps and disharmony, there is a general sense of social cohesion and
a willingness to return to the principles of equality and tolerance of
differences.
In this article the foundational principles of respect for the equality
and dignity of each person are given practical voice by analyzing the
tough problems of religious employment discrimination through discourse
framed3' or given shape by the principles of tolerance, inclusion,
neutrality, equality, and, most importantly, accommodation. This article
adopts neither the extreme approach of complete governmental detachment
from regulating things religious nor the approach of active government
advocacy of either religiousness or non-religiousness.32 Instead, this
30. See RONALD DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUsLY 182, 272-78 (1978).
Dworkin ultimately finds equality to be the underpinning for the jurisprudential validity

of fundamental rights. Id. My purpose here is not to engage in the debate among those
on the Dworkin side and those on the side of positivists like H.L.A. Hart. My point is
that using the foundational principle of respect for the equal claim to human dignity of
each person one can craft a workable approach to the problem of employment
discrimination on the basis of religion. In this article I am taking a largely functional
approach to the problem and I use certain principles ofjurisprudence in this instrumental

fashion. See discussion infra part Mfi.
31. See Steven D. Smith, Free ExerciseDoctrine and the Discourse of Disrespect,
65 U. CoLo. L. REv. 519, 526 (1994) [hereinafter Smith, Free Exercise Doctrine]
(discussing the framing of analysis through the words and approaches chosen to discuss
a problem).

32. For a brief summary of the contours of the various approaches see Rodney K.
Smith, Conscience, Coercion and the Establishmentof Religion: The Beginning of an
End to the Wanderings of a Wayward Judiciary?,43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 917,919-27
(1993) [hereinafter Smith,. Conscience, Coercionandthe Establishmentof Religion]. See
generally Symposium, Religion and the Public Schools After Lee v. Weisman, 43 CASE
W. RES. L. REV 699, 700 (1993) (explaining that views expressed at that particular
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article advocates an approach under which governmental action is
characterized by tolerance, inclusion, and neutrality and under which
governmental action in the form of law seeks to further tolerance,
inclusion, and equality in society, primarily through laws based on and
interpreted in accordance with the five principles enumerated above, with
particular emphasis on accommodation.
Accommodation is particularly relevant to religious employment
discrimination because such discrimination is fundamentally different from
other types of employment discrimination, such as racial and sexual
employment discrimination. One difference arises from the importance of
the interests sought to be protected. The employer's desire to conduct its
business as it sees fit is not of the same magnitude as either the
employee's right to be free from race-based or sex-based discrimination
or as society's interest in social justice. The balance in such cases is easy
to strike in favor of the employee because there is no constitutional right
or human right which extends to the extent of denying another's humanity
on the basis of sex or race.33 That is, there is no right which permits or
even requires discrimination on those bases which would countervail the
employee's non-discrimination right.' However, the balance is less easy
to strike where the conflict is between the exercise of religious beliefs by
the employer on the one hand and by an employee on the other. The
religious freedom interests of the employer and the employee are both of
the first magnitude. In such situations, either the employer or the
employee or both will have their religious beliefs offended or religious
practices restricted.
A second, deeper difference arises from the nature of religious
discrimination as distinct from status-based discrimination. Religious
discrimination is often based upon a difference of belief, unlike
discrimination based on race, sex, color, national origin, age, and
disability, which are based not on beliefs, but on attributes dependent upon
one's birthright. Discrimination based on belief is different from that
based upon birthright because beliefs and concepts are a matter of choice.
symposium ranged from "strict separationist to staunch accommodationist").
33. In a subset of the gender and racial discrimination cases, the constitutional right

of free speech may well be implicated. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1800-06 (1992) (discussing the
problem of drawing the line between permissible, protected speech (including religious
speech) and harassment). In such cases, there are concerns similar to those developed
in this article regarding freedom of religion. In such cases, the interest in equality in
employment based upon birthright characteristics would be sufficiently compelling to
overcome the free speech claim.
34. The availability of the extremely rare sex change operation is not really

germane.
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A person cannot convert to being of Native American or African
American or European American origin nor to the opposite sex. But a
person can choose to convert to Christianity, Buddhism, or Islam merely
by a genuine declaration of intent.
Our society places freedom of thought and expression as protected
interests of the highest order. Society is to be ordered and truth is to be
ascertained through the tugs and shoves of thoughts in the marketplace of
ideas.35 Rational and even irrational discourse is encouraged. People
are taught to think for themselves, to accept little as true merely because
someone says it is true. When a society encourages vigorous religious,
philosophical, and political discourse, prohibiting people from making
decisions based on belief, regardless of the source of that belief,
unavoidably creates intellectual dissonance. Consequently, an employer
who wants to act on his or her moral and religious convictions, but is
prevented from doing so, has a complaint of some legitimacy. If we as
a society encourage diversity, encourage inclusion, encourage independent
thought and evaluation of ideas, and even reward experimentation in
various approaches to commerce, then placing limits on those aspects of
life in which ideas play a formative role creates a conflict of priorities.
Discrimination based on differences in ideas seems contrary to some
fundamental aspect of our society. Indeed, notions of equality and of
according every person equal dignity seem to be offended by such
discrimination. But those same notions also seem offended by restrictions
on a person's actions when those actions are driven by conscience.
Consequently, employers who do not separate their religious beliefs and
actions from their employment practices challenge the underlying policies
of the Civil Rights Act. For them the Act's shield against religious-based
discrimination becomes a sword of discrimination cutting down the
employers' rights (and those of like-minded employees) to free exercise
to make room for the employee's rights.36
The main purpose of this article is to develop an approach which
treats seriously the religious claims of an employer who engages in what
would normally be considered a secular commercial enterprise, but who
claims that he or she is required by his or her religious beliefs to operate
35. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
36. The problem primarily considered in this article is not that of religious
employers such as churches and religion-affiliated schools. Special statutory provisions
which have been interpreted by the courts mark the bounds of permissible discrimination
by such institutions. See discussion infra part IV.C (highlighting some of the relevant
matters concerning such employers).
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the business in accordance with those religious convictions. 37 To explore
this issue fully, this article has been structured as follows: First, a fairly
complete background section covers the basics of Title VII law and
summarizes the jurisprudence of the First Amendment's religion clauses.
Then in the subsequent sections the proffered solution of accommodation
is developed and explained, and finally tested. The article concludes with
general observations about the topic and the broader issues of freedom of
religion.
The core of the proposed approach is that cases should be decided less
through application of rigid rules in a mechanistic, syllogistic fashion and
more on the basis of discourse framed by direct consideration of the
seemingly imprecise principle of accommodation tempered by and
informed by the principles and ideals of tolerance, equality, neutrality, and
inclusion.3" This approach is a three-legged stool. One leg is the idea
that the way we think about a subject, the way we corral its boundaries,
the way we frame the discourse about it, affects the result. My extension
of this idea is to adopt an approach which explicitly recognizes this theory
and to use it in deciding what factors to use to frame the discourse.39
The second leg is Dworkin's rule/principle dichotomy. I argue below that
rules do not work in this area, or at least not for the particular problem
I am examining, and that using principles will produce better results. The
third supporting leg is provided by fundamental legal and extra-legal
values of equality, tolerance, community, and respect for human dignity.

37. A related issue concerns secular employers who accommodate religious
expression by employees despite other employees being offended by it. This class of

employers is considered infra part IV.A, but these employers are not the main focus of
this article. The plight of the religious employee, which is the flip-side of the topic of
this article, is considered in David L. Gregory, Government Regulation of Religion
Through Labor and Employment DiscriminationLaws, 22 STETSON L. REv. 27 (1992)
(arguing that current law, especially the duty of religious accommodation under Title VII,
does not adequately protect employees).
38. As further developed infra in part II, generally, there is a near identity of
neutrality and equality in the religious freedom setting. The ideas of accommodation,
tolerance and inclusion are close kin. At core, the approach turns on implementing the

principle of accommodation. But accommodation, standing alone, is not sufficient. The
other principles operate to keep the accommodation idea within bounds.

39. See discussion infra part III.A.
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II. BACKGROUND

A. Analytic Frameworkfor Employment Discrimination Claims
In response to the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s,
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 40 In the course of
passing the bill, Congress declared that the elimination of discrimination
is a national goal of the highest priority. 4 This attitude has historically
Even as the Supreme Court
been shared by the Supreme Court.4'
retreated from its long-standing role as champion of civil rights,43 it has
continued to pay lip-service to "a firm national policy to prohibit racial
segregation and discrimination."'
Although the primary target of the act was the elimination of racial
discrimination against African-Americans,45 it was more broadly drafted
to prohibit discrimination not only on the-basis of race and color, but also
The act contains
on the basis of religion, sex, and national origin.'
several sections addressing discrimination in various aspects of public
endeavor including education, places of public accommodation4 1 (e.g.,
restaurants and hotels), and employment.49
Discrimination in
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1988). Many states and municipalities enacted similar
legislation thereafter. See Underkuffier, supra note 17, at 589-90 n.38, for a list of state

employment discrimination statutes. Although this article considers only the federal act,
the considerations are generally the same under state statutes and local ordinances.
41. See S. REP. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 11, 24 (1964).
42. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974) (discussing the
availability of forums for employment discrimination claims as consistent with
Congressional intent to place discrimination as the "highest priority"); see also EEOC
v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1280 (9th Cir. 1982) (emphasizing
Congressional intent in Title VII to eliminate discrimination as the "highest priority").
43. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
44. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 593 (1983).
45. The history of the statute is quite interesting. In one of the most curious
developments in Congressional legislation ever, the amendment to add sex as a category
on which discrimination would be prohibited was introduced for the purpose of defeating
the bill. The senator who introduced the amendment incorrectly thought that no one
would ever vote for such an "obviously absurd" provision. Elizabeth Roth, Sex
Discrimination: The Civil Rights History of Sex: A Sexist, Racist, CongressionalJoke,
A.B.A. L. PRAC. MGMT., Sept. 1993, at 26, 28.
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-2 (1988).
47. Id. § 2000d.
48. Id. § 2000a.
49. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1) & (2).
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employment is controlled by Title VII of the Act which expressly prohibits
private employers from discriminating on the basis of a person's "race,
Later statutes prohibit
color, religion, sex, or national origin.""
employment discrimination on the basis of age"' and disability.5 2
1. Legal Theories to Prove Employment Discrimination
To accomplish the aim of eliminating unlawful discrimination "root
and branch," 3 the courts early on developed two primary theories for a
Title VII claimant: (1) disparate treatment, and (2) disparate impact of
otherwise neutral policies or practices.' 4 A third significant theory stems
from workplace harassment or the existence of a hostile work
50. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), provides:
(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise, to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national

origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
In 1972 Title VII was amended to apply to federal, state, and local employers. Pub. L.
No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, 111.
51. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994).
52. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12,101 (1994).
53. Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cty., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968).
54. There are other means of proving an employment discrimination case. As stated
by Justice Stevens in his dissent in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642

(1989):
Although disparate impact and disparate treatment are the most prevalent
modes of proving discrimination violative of Title VII, they are by no means
exclusive. See generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 13-289 (2d ed., 1983) (four chapters discussing
"disparate treatment," "present effects of past discrimination," "adverse
impact," and "reasonable accommodation" as "categories" of discrimination).
Cf. [Wards Cove, supra at n.4 (referring to a sort of "separate but equal" type
of discrimination)]. Moreover, either or both of the primary theories may be
applied to a particular set of facts. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 336 n.15 (1977).
Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 668 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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environment.' 5 Although this theory is analytically a subset of the
disparate treatment theory (forcing an employee to work in a hostile work
environment treats one differently with respect to the "terms and
conditions of work"), it has sufficiently special attributes to be legitimately
treated as a separate theory. An additional theory is available to a person
claiming religious discrimination-the claimant can assert that the
employer failed to accommodate his or her religious beliefs or
practices. 56
a. Disparate Treatment
In a disparate treatment case the employee claims that he or she was
treated less favorably than others because of his or her statutorily
protected status, that is, his or her race, sex, color, religion, or national
origin.'
A disparate treatment case can be proven through direct,
positive evidence of discriminatory intent, e.g.: "I would never hire her
because she is a Buddhist," or indirectly through presumptions and shifts
in the burden of proof. Cases involving direct evidence of discriminatory
intent are both relatively rare and relatively easy, at least analytically.
Cases in which clear, direct evidence of proscribed intent does not exist,
and in which the indirect means of proving intent must be used, are more
common and are analytically more complex.
In disparate treatment cases in which intentional discrimination is
proven by indirect means, the Supreme Court has allocated the burdens of
production and persuasion between the employer and employee as
follows:" First, the employee must present evidence of her prima facie
case of disparate treatment. This typically requires showing that the
employee has not received employment for which she was qualified while
the employer has elevated another, seemingly less qualified person of a
different group within the subject category, e.g., race, to the position.
Such proof raises the presumption that the employer's treatment of the
claimant was different and was due to a prohibited motive. Once an
employee meets this burden of production, the burden of production shifts
55. E.g., Harris v. Forklift System, 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993); Hall v. Gus Constr.
Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988) (harassment based on gender held to be
unlawful discrimination); Weiss v. United States, 595 F. Supp. 1050, 1056 (E.D. Va.
1984) (ongoing pattern of religious slurs constitutes harassment and unlawful employment

discrimination).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (Supp. V 1993).
57. E.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973) (refusal
to rehire allegedly based on racial discrimination).

58. See, e.g., Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53
(1981); McDonnellDouglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03.
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to the employer to establish a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
action taken. If the employer meets its burden, then the burden of
producing evidence shifts back to the employee who must then produce
evidence that the employer's defense is either a pretext or is
discriminatory in its application. The ultimate burden of persuading the
trier of fact that unlawful discrimination occurred is on the employee
throughout the case. 9
One can also prove disparate treatment indirecty through statistics.'
The rationale is that where there is a pattern and practice of exclusion of
qualified candidates on the basis of a prohibited characteristic (e.g., race),
the employer can legitimately be held to have an improper intent. That
is, the inference that such an employer approved of or at least accepted the
59. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186-87 (1989); Burdine, 450
U.S. at 252-53; McDonnellDouglas, 411 U.S. at 802. In one aberrant case, St. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2748 (1993), the Supreme Court held that a
claimant could lose the case despite meeting his or her rebuttal burden of proving that
the employer's proffered reason was a pretext. The Court held that although the reason
given by the employer was not the real reason, the finder of fact could still find that the
burden of persuasion with respect to the whole case had not been met. Thus an
employee can lose a case where (1) the employee meets the burden of producing
evidence that he or she has been treated differently; (2) the employer merely produces
any evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory business reason; and (3) the employee
proves that the employer lied to the court. Meeting the initial burden of production
permits an inference of disparate treatment, but, in the face of the employer's production
of any evidence of an excuse for the treatment, even a pretextual excuse, the trier of fact
can still find a failure of proof of discrimination. Id.
Comparison to a situation in which the employer fails to produce any evidence of
a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason helps illuminate the rather bizarre result in St.
Mary's Honor Center. If the employer does not present any evidence, the finder of fact
could still decide that despite the claimant having met his burden of producing evidence
on each element of the prima facie case, the claimant did not persuade the finder of fact
that the evidence shows that intentional discrimination was more likely than not the
reason for the employer's action. But in cases where an employer presents a reason
which the finder of facts disbelieves and finds pretextual, then there is logically only one
remaining reason for the employment decision-the improper motive. This situation is
also to be distinguished from those where the finder of fact cannot choose between the
employer's explanation and the claim of pretext; such cases are run-of-the-mill instances
of claimants failing to meet their burden of persuading by a preponderance of the
evidence that the employer acted improperly. The St. Mary's Honor Center case is
almost certainly an anomalous one.
60. InternationalBhd. of Teamstersv. United States, 431 U.S. 324,340 n.20 (1977)
("Since passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the courts have frequently relied upon
statistical evidence to prove a violation ....

In many cases the only available avenue

of proof is the use of racial statistics to uncover clandestine and covert discrimination by
the employer."); see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08
(1977); EEOC v. 0 & G Wire Forms Specialty Co., 38 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 1994).
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discriminatory result is strong enough to impose liability for intentional
discrimination.
b. Disparate Impact
The second main theory for proving employment discrimination,
disparate impact, is more controversial than the disparate treatment theory
because an employer can be found liable for seemingly neutral practices
which have a discriminatory effect on grounds prohibited by the statute.
Part of the fear is that this theory may induce employers to improperly use
quotas, despite the explicit statutory prohibition of using quotas, 6 in
order to avoid a claim that some unknown practice has a disparate impact.
Targeting employment policies 'which have the effect of discriminating
illegally, not just employment policies which are intended to discriminate
on unlawful grounds, places an affirmative duty on employers to avoid
discrimination. In contrast, under a disparate treatment theory, the
employer is under a negative duty to not intentionally discriminate against
an employee on improper grounds.
Like disparate treatment claims, disparate impact claims use a burdenshifting approach to proving the claims. However, both (i) that which
must be proven and (ii) the burdens which are shifted (production and
persuasion) differ. The specific means of proving the claim has varied in
recent years as a result of court decisions and Congressional amendments
to the statute. Until 1989 a claimant in a disparate impact case could
establish a prima facie case by presenting evidence that facially neutral
employment practices or policies had a significant adverse impact on a
protected class.62 The challenged employment practices did not need to
be isolated, identified, and specifically tied to the discriminatory impact;
proof of questionable employment practices and a general proof of the
causal link was enough.'
In practice the adverse impact was often
proven by statistical evidence that a particular protected group was underrepresented on the job in light of the relative availability 64of qualified
people in the applicant pool in the relevant geographic area.
Once the claimant set forth his or her prima facie case, the burden of
production shifted to the employer. However, rather than proving a
legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the employment decision (as in
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(g) (1988).
62. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (holding that faciallyneutral ability test which operated to exclude minority employees from promotions, and
which was unrelated to job performance, is prohibited by Title VIE).
63. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 672 (1989) (Stevens, J.,

dissenting).
64. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430-32.
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disparate treatment cases), the employer was required to justify the
challenged employment practices by showing that the practice had a
manifest relationship to the employment position in question and that the
practice was justified by business necessity.'
Next, the employee, as in disparate treatment cases, was given the
opportunity to refute the employer's defense. However, rather than
showing that the defense was a pretext for discrimination, the claimant's
burden was to show that other non-discriminatory practices would satisfy
the employee's interests.' s The law recognized that even modestly
sophisticated businesses seeking to discriminate could easily develop some
seemingly neutral screening test to function as basis for discrimination; the
courts simply would not allow such a subterfuge to work. In fact, under
the disparate impact theory, the motivation of the business is not relevant
and even if the business was not seeking to use a test as a subterfuge, a
test with a discriminatory impact is still subject to challenge.
Unlike the employer's burden in disparate treatment cases, which was
merely a burden of production, the business necessity defense placed the
risk of non-persuasion on employers so that employers had to prove that
the qualification had a significant relationship to the particular employment
position.67 The employer's burden was more than trivial; mere assertion
that a requirement applied to all employees for the position on an equal,
non-discriminatory basis was not enough. Indeed, the core part of
disparate impact cases typically surrounded the business necessity issue.
As stated in Griggs, "[t]he touchstone is business necessity."6" In one
post-Griggs decision the Supreme Court held that the job requirement had
to be "essential to job performance. "69 Several other cases noted that the
otherwise neutral requirement had to have "a manifest relationship to the
employment." 7' In short, the putative business requirement had to be
truly necessary for the business to conduct its business, not merely
convenient. 7'
In 1989 the Supreme Court dramatically narrowed the availability of
the disparate impact theory by requiring not only that the claimant prove
the imbalance between the workforce and the qualified applicant pool and
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446-47 (1982); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
Id. at 431.
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977) (height and weight

requirements for prison guards not essential for job performance).
70. Teal, 457 U.S. at 446; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432; see Moody, 422 U.S. at 425
(employer's burden to prove its "tests are 'job related'").
71. See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 331-32.
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prove in general the suspect employment practices, but also that the
employee identify and prove a specific hiring practice which directly
caused the imbalance.'
The claimant was required to discover and
prove precisely how the discrimination occurred by isolating the specific
factor or factors which led to the discriminatory impact. That is, among
the manifold factors which led to the employment decision, the employee
had the burden of identifying which one caused the wrongful effect.
Except in the clearest cases, such a burden would be almost
insurmountable. A determined and modestly clever employer could all too
easily avoid liability simply by adopting complex set of requirements and
criteria for employment which included a large degree of subjective
elements. As scofflaw employers became more sophisticated, the law
became less favorable to the injured supplicant.
Wards Cove went even further to eviscerate the disparate impact
theory in procedural and substantive ways. Procedurally, the employer's
burden was reduced from needing to persuade the finder of fact that the
requirement or practice was manifestly job-related, and was necessary to
the operation of the business, to a burden of justifying its employment
practices merely by producing evidence that "a challenged practice serves,
in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer. "7
Substantively, the business necessity defense was reduced to one of mere
business justification on any non-insubstantial grounds.74 "Necessity"
became a "legitimate goalol" and "manifestly or significantly related to job
performance" became "serves, in a significant way . . . . "75 The
requirement did not need to be necessary for the business; the requirement
merely had to serve a legitimate goal, any legitimate goal. The change
from a burden of persuasion to one of mere production had the effect of
forcing the claimant to prove a negative, that is, to prove the lack of a
business justification, as soon as the employer presented any evidence of
its justifications.
The Supreme Court reduced the availability of the disparate impact
claim even further by changing the requirements of the claimant's rebuttal
case regarding proof that the putative justification was pretextual. 6
Under pre-Wards Cove disparate impact law, the key method of proving
pretext was to show that other non-discriminatory practices which would
meet the employers' goals existed, but had not been adopted. However,
under Wards Cove the employee was required to show not only that the
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650 (1989).
Id. at 659.
Id. at 658.
Id. at 659-61.
Id. at 660-61.
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non-discriminatory practices would be effective, but also that they would
"be equally effective as [the employers'] chosen hiring procedures in
achieving [the employers'] legitimate employment goals. "I In evaluating
the effectiveness of the alternative policies, "the cost or other burdens of
proposed alternative selection devices are relevant."78 The claimant was
required not just to prove an effective, viable alternative, but that the
alternative would be just as effective and just as inexpensive.
In 1989, Congress set to work to overturn Wards Cove and a number
of other Supreme Court cases in the area of civil rights.79 On November
21, 1991, after two years of rancorous wrangling between the Democratic
Congress and Republican President, Congress passed and President Bush
One of the specific purposes of
signed, the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
the Act as stated in the Act itself was "to codify the concepts of 'business
necessity' and 'job related' enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio."81 Another express purpose was to
recognize explicitly the validity of and to codify the process of proving
disparate impact claims' which had been, until the 1991 Act, merely the
result of shifting court interpretations of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The 1991 Act amends Title VII by adding a comprehensive new
subsection regulating disparate impact claims. " Basically, the Act
restored the law to the pre-Wards Cove standards and burden shifting
process, though exactly how it did so is more than a little torturous.
Furthermore, some of the differences from prior law may or may not be
substantive, depending upon how the courts implement them.
Under new 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k), an employee can prove a prima
facie case by demonstrating' either that a particular employment practice
has caused a disparate impact on employment of members of the protected
group to which the claimant belongs, or that the employer's decisionmaking process cannot be separated for analysis with the consequence that
the claimant can treat the decision-making process as a single employment
77. Id. at 661.
78. Id. (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co., 487 U.S. 977, 998

(1988)).
79. In 1990, Congress enacted legislation to modify several of the 1989 holdings of
the Supreme Court, but President Bush vetoed it.
80. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
81. Id. § 3(2).

82. Id. § 3(3).
83. Id. § 105(2) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 by adding subsection (k)).
84. "Demonstrate" is a term of art under the act and is defined to mean "meeti] the
burdens of production and persuasion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m) (Supp. V 1993).
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practice.' If the employee establishes his prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the employer to demonstrate "that the challenged practice is job
related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity."86 Significantly, the statute does not define "job related" and
"business necessity" other than to refer to the law prior to Wards Cove.'
Whether the courts will latch onto the phrase "consistent with" as a means
of reducing the seriousness of the business necessity term remains to be
seen.
The Act also allows a disparate impact claim to be proven using the
pre-Wards Cove "alternative employment practice" theory. In essence the
employee can overcome an employer's proof of job-relatedness and
business necessity by proving pretext, that is, by proving that an
alternative policy or practice could be adopted which would accomplish
the same goal and that the employer refuses to adopt it.' This provision
also explicitly articulates the intent of Congress that the law be returned
to its pre-Wards Cove state with the additional consequence that the
employee need not prove that the alternative would be equally effective
and economical; he or she just needs to prove that it would accomplish the
employer's*goal.
c. Hostile Work Environment
The third main theory for proving employment discrimination cases
is based on employer or co-employee harassment which creates a hostile
or abusive work environment. As noted above, analytically these cases
are a subset of a disparate treatment claim because the employee is
claiming that the employer has treated the employee differently than other
employees with respect to the work conditions experienced by that
employee. That is, by allowing co-employees to harass the claimant or by
permitting the continuation of a work environment hostile to a person with
the claimant's protected characteristics, i.e., gender, race, national origin,
etc., the employer has treated the claimant differently in an unlawful
manner. Nonetheless, the harassment claim is sufficiently distinct from
the other disparate treatment cases to warrant its own category.
The harassment theory was fully recognized in 1986 when the
Supreme Court held that "a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII
by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or
85. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i), (k)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. V 1993).
86. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
87. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i), (k)(1)(c).
88. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) & (k)(1)(c). The opacity and convoluted structure of
the Act can only be understood as the result of necessity borne of grudging compromise
between Congress and the President.
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abusive work environment." 9 In so holding, the Court cited with
approval older lower court cases imposing liability for hostile
environments created by harassment on the basis of race, 90 national
Other federal courts had previously explicitly
origin,9 ' and religion.'
approved such claims.93
A few
In general the harassment must be severe or pervasive.'
not
are
jokes"
"practical
or
language
of
hurtful
discrete episodes
sufficient. Harassment is to be determined from the totality of the
circumstances.9' To prove religious discrimination on the basis of a
hostile environment, an employee must establish: (1) that the employee
suffered intentional discrimination because of his religion; (2) that the
discriminatory conduct was pervasive and regular; (3) that the
discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff's terms and conditions
of employment; and (4) that the discrimination would detrimentally affect
a reasonable person of the same religion in that position. 96
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has issued
regulations governing harassment based on national origin 97 and
gender. 98 The EEOC recently attempted to develop and issue guidelines
for harassment on all of the statutorily prohibited grounds, including
religion, but was forced to withdraw them in large part because of the
89. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).

90. Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514-15
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977).

91. Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1977).
92. Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
93. E.g., Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971) (permitting claim based
on discrimination due to national origin); Weiss v. United States, 595 F. Supp. 1050

(E.D. Va. 1984) (allowing a status-based claim arising from religious harassment).

94. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993); Dillon v. Frank,

1992 WL 5436 (6th Cir., Jan. 15, 1992); Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890
F.2d 569, 577 (2d Cir. 1989); Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 897-98 (1st
Cir. 1988); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1413 (10th Cir. 1987); Scott v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 212-13 (7th Cir. 1986).

95. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370.
96. See id.; Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67; Goldberg v. City of Phila., No.
CIV.A.91-7575, 1994 WL 313030 (E.D. Pa., June 29, 1994).

97. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 29 C.F.R. §
1606.8 (1992).

98. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11
(1992).
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problem of treating religion the same as status-based discrimination in the
harassment-claim setting. 9
The harassment which causes the hostile environment must affect a
"term, condition, or privilege" t°° of employment. As noted by the

Court:
the language of Title VII is not limited to "economic" or
"tangible" discrimination. The phrase "terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment" evinces a Congressional intent "'to
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women'" in employment.' 0 '
The Court emphasized that not all harassment is severe enough to
support a Title VII claim; employers need not provide pristine work
environments. Occasional offensive comments by coworkers are not
enough; the harassment must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter
the condition of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working
environment.'"'"
The claims contemplated by the Court and the
successful claims presented to various lower courts have tended to involve
egregious, pointed comments and epithets and practical jokes which
continued for a significant period of time. The incidents noted in those
cases tended to constitute both the proof of and the content of the abusive
environment. No showing of intent by the employer to create such an
environment was needed. (Naturally if an employer intentionally created
a racially charged environment or sexually offensive atmosphere, such
actions would now be per se violations of the law.) Though the effect on
the claimant is supposed to be significant before a claim succeeds, as a
practical matter, a specific improper animus lowers the threshold and
makes the claim easy to decide.

99. EEOC Proposed Rules, Guidelines on Harassment Based on Race, Color,
Religion, Gender, National Origin, Age, or Disability, 58 Fed. Reg. 51266 (1993)
(intended to have been codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1609). See David E. Anderson, A 2nd
Look at Faith on the Job: Foes of EEOCPlanHail Votefor Revision, WASH. POST, July
7, 1994, at B7.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).

101. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64 (quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978) (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444
F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971))).
102. Meritor,477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th

Cir. 1982)).
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d. Accommodation of Religious Needs
The fourth theory relevant here-the duty of employers to
accommodate their employees' religious needs-applies only with respect
to religious-based discrimination. The original wording of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 prohibited employment discrimination on the basis of
religion without defining religion and without further clarification of what
religious discrimination entailed. 0 3 Although the legislative history is
not helpful on this point, it is probable that religion was originally seen as
a status, like race or sex, and the problem of discrimination based upon
belief or religious needs was not well thought through.
In 1970 the Sixth Circuit interpreted religious discrimination in
employment to require merely treating employees the same without regard
to religion."° The Sixth Circuit noted that since the requirement that
employees work on Sundays was generally applicable to all employees
regardless of the employees' religious beliefs, it did not discriminate
against any employee's religion. 05 Consequently, the court held that an
employer had no duty under Title VII to accommodate an employee's
religious prohibition against working on Sundays." 6 The United States
Supreme Court affirmed the holding by an equally divided court."°
This holding had the potential to limit a Title VII religious discrimination
claim to situations of discrimination based only on religious affiliation or
status (and possibly religious beliefs) to the exclusion of claims based on
practice. Essentially, employers had a negative duty of not discriminating
against employees based on religion, but no affirmative duty to
accommodate the religious needs of employees. Indeed, the employer
who accommodated an employee's particular religious needs would be
discriminating in favor of that employee and this was deemed to be just
as prohibited as discrimination against an employee.
In response to Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Company, Congress
amended Title VII to reach not only religious affiliation or status, but also
beliefs and practices by adding the following definition of religion to the
Act:
The term "religion" includes all aspects of religious
observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer
103. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1966).
104. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an
equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
105. Id. at 330.
106. Id.
107. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 402 U.S. 689, 689 (1971).
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demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an
employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or
practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's
business.'08
This amendment was the first legal recognition that religion-based cases
needed to be treated differently from other cases. The normal duty under
Title VII is not to treat employees differently in an adverse manner based
on the listed characteristics. But, as a result of the amendment, an
employer has an affirmative duty to treat certain employees differently,
and some would argue favorably, by accommodating their religious needs.
Thus an employer has a duty to discriminate in favor of certain employees
by granting an employee special treatment because of the employee's
religious practices, that is, to accommodate the employee's special
religious needs.
The distinction between the normal requirements of Title VII and this
new duty is not merely the difference between essentially negative duties
(do not treat differently) and an essentially affirmative duty (take steps to
avoid discriminatory effects); the distinction is that the employer must, in
certain cases, actually discriminate on the basis of a protected
characteristic.
The duty to provide a work environment free of
harassment effectively places on the employer a duty to take affirmative
steps to prevent and if discovered, eradicate, such harassment. 9
Similarly, the disparate impact theory in effect imposes on employers an
affirmative duty of vigilance not to have practices which have a
discriminatory effect. However, neither of these duties require an
employer to act in favor of any person or group. Instead, they merely
require an employer to refrain from acting to the detriment of a protected
group or require an employer to take steps to see that no protected group
is illegally disadvantaged.
The difference drawn above is not one of divergence of the aims and
purposes of Title VII, but of the means to accomplish those ends. The
underlying principles are the same, but the rules are different. For
example, accommodating a sabbatarian furthers the aims of equality and
non-discrimination by permitting a sabbatarian access to jobs which would
otherwise not be available to him or her, thereby placing him or her on
an equal footing with other applicants. The religious accommodation
108. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. V 1993).
109. Id. Treating the failure to accommodate as a type of disparate treatment does
not change the essential fact that the statutory prohibition of discrimination based on race
or sex does not contain such a requirement, though one could argue that failure to
accommodate the special needs of a pregnant woman would constitute disparate treatment
based on sex.
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approach is fundamentally consistent in another respect as well: all
employees are treated equally with respect to non-discrimination and the
duty to accommodate. Thus on the level of abstraction of underlying
principles, the legal rules are in accord with each other.
Cases based on the duty to accommodate religious belief and conduct,
as distinguished from those based purely on religious status, have further
refined the method of proving religious employment discrimination." 0
To establish a prima facie accommodation case the claimant must show (1)
that an employment policy conflicts with an employee's religious practice;
(2) that the religious practice is required by the employee's bona fide
religious belief; (3) that the employer has been made aware of the conflict;
and (4) that the employee has been refused employment or otherwise
suffered adverse consequences because of his noncompliance with the
employer's requirement."'
Once the employee establishes these elements, the burden shifts to the
employer to show that it "made good faith efforts to accommodate [the
employee's] religious beliefs and, if those efforts were unsuccessful, to
demonstrate that [it was] unable reasonably to accommodate [the
Under the express
employee's] beliefs without undue hardship.""'
language of the statute, the hardship must be to the "conduct of the
employer's business," not to the exercise of the employer's faith."'
The extent of hardship to the business that must be shown is minimal.
More than mere inconvenience or some modest hardship is required-the
hardship must be "undue"-but the hardship to the employer need not be
onerous. 4 The test is whether the employer would suffer "more than
a de minimis cost" by accommodation. "I Despite the minimal showing
required by an employer to defeat an accommodation claim, the
accommodation requirement does impose some burden on an employer and
110. E.g., EEOC v. Townley Eng'g and Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 614 n.5 (9th Cir.

1988). Although the courts refer to it as a three-part test, the first element is actually
two: (1) there must be a conflict between the employment policy and the employee's
religious practices, and (2) the employee must show that the religious practice is based
upon a bona fide religious belief. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2 (1995).
111. See Townley, 859 F.2d at 614 n.5; Turpen v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R.,
736 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1984); Brown v. General Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956 (8th Cir.
1979); Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 589 F.2d 397, 401 (9th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979); see also EEOC Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2 (1980).
112. Anderson, 589 F.2d at 401; see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,
432 U.S. 63, 74 (1977).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. V 1993).
114. Trans World Airlines, 432 U.S. at 84.

115. Id.
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does favor the employee's rights over the employer's rights, at least to the
extent of prohibiting utterly arbitrary discrimination against any person
based solely on the employee's religious beliefs and practices." 6
e. Defenses
The primary defenses against discrimination claims are (1) that the
employer denies wrong-doing;" 7 (2) that the action taken was a business
necessity (for disparate impact claims); (3) that the employer's attempted
accommodation was reasonable (for religious accommodation claims); and

(4) that the disputed employment requirement is a bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ). The defense of denial is self-explanatory.

The

current formulations of the defenses of business necessity" 9 for disparate
impact claims and of reasonable accommodation"

for religious

accommodation claims were outlined above. The defense of bona fide
occupational requirement remains to be examined briefly.
The defense of a BFOQ originates in the statute itself.'' Under the
BFOQ defense an employer may consider religion, sex, or national origin

(but not race or color) when one of those characteristics is necessary for
proper performance of the job.

extremely

narrow

discrimination.""

exception

This defense has been treated as "an

to

the

general

prohibition

on

Examples of the proper use of the BFOQ doctrine

include a requirement that Catholic priests be Catholic men, and can
116. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. §
1605.2(e) (1995).
117. Although this defense is simply a denial of the plaintiffs claims, the 1991 Civil
Rights Act provides that "if the [employer] demonstrates that a specific employment
practice does not cause the disparate impact, the [employer] shall not be required to
demonstrate that such practice is required by business necessity." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(k)(1)(B)(ii) (Supp. V 1993). This curious provision seems to imply that the employer
could have the burden of proving that the challenged practice does not cause the
discrimination, despite the clarity of placing the overall burden of proving discrimination
on the claimant.
118. See supra note 59 (discussing an unusual twist of what ultimately was a denial
type of defense turning on the burden of persuasion on the prima facie case not being met
by the claimant, despite the claimant proving the employer's proffered reason was
pretextual).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 61-66. The defense of business necessity
does not exist for disparate treatment claims. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(2) (Supp. V.
1993).
120. See supra text accompanying notes 103-07.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (Supp. V. 1993).
122. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977).
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extend to such positions as teachers at religiously affiliated schools.'"
Requiring locker room attendants to be the same sex as the users of the
locker is a BFOQ,' 24 although requiring journalists who conduct postgame interviews in locker rooms to be male is not.' 25 There are very
few occupations where religion can be treated as a BFOQ under the
current law.
2. Uniqueness of Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Religion
As noted above, discrimination based on religion has some important
similarities to, but even more critical differences from, employment
discrimination based on race, sex, color, national origin, age and
disability. Some of the consequences of these distinctions have been
specifically addressed by statute while others have not been fully dealt
Two such distinctions, the
with either by statute or case law.
accommodation claim and religious qualifications as a BFOQ, were
discussed above. The balance of this section will more closely consider
the uniqueness of religious discrimination both in concept and in practice.
The central similarity between employment discrimination based on
religion and other employment discrimination is that some religious
discrimination can be based on the status of being identified with a
particular religion or sect. Such religious discrimination often is very
close kin to other status-based discrimination, i.e., discrimination based
on sex, race or national origin. In most commercial settings the standard
disparate treatment and harassment theories present no particularly
troublesome problems when applied to discrimination based on an
However, for some
employee's religious affiliation or status." 2
123. See Pime v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 803 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding
Jesuit university could limit hiring in certain positions to members of that order); cf.
EEOC v. Kamehameha Schools/Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding
a school could not legally honor a conditional bequest which required hiring exclusively
Protestant teachers).
124. See Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1087 (8th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 966 (1980).
125. See MARIAH BURTON NELSON, THE STRONGER WOMEN GET, THE MORE MEN
LOVE FOOTBALL: SEXISM AND THE AMERICAN CULTURE OF SPORTS 228-58 (1994).
126. Accommodation theory does not really apply to status-based discrimination
since, by definition, such discrimination is based solely on status, not on the need to
accommodate any religious needs. Of course, in practice-based claims, the cases would

not be so pure, and a Jew requiring a day off for Chanukah would arguably have both
a status-based claim and a practice-based accommodation claim.
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religious employers running commercial businesses even these status-based
claims raise problems of conflicting religious rights. '27
A potentially troublesome aspect of status-based discrimination claims
relates to the applicability of a disparate impact theory when that theory
depends upon statistics. A statistical approach does not work effectively
where there are many protected groups. Where many discrete groups
exist, how does one define the relevant group to assess whether there has
been a statistically significant disparate impact on that group?"
Does
one look to broad religious categories or to denominational affiliation?
Does one use a quota system, e.g., so many employees must be Catholic,
Lutheran, Presbyterian, Baptist, Anglican, Eastern Orthodox, Orthodox
Jew, Conservative Jew, Reform Jew, Sunni Muslim, Shia Muslim, Sikh,
Evangelical Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, New Age, Wiccan, Secular
Humanist, agnostic, and atheist? 29 The point is that this approach is
less useful in religion claims than in some other types of claims.
Another important distinction between religious discrimination and
other types is that religious discrimination may be based not on religious
affiliation or status per se, but rather on the employee's religious
practices. An employer who does not discriminate against present or
prospective employees based upon their religious affiliation could still
discriminate against them based upon inconvenient (to the employer)
religious practices. Even a generally applicable, neutral job requirement
such as working on Sunday could in effect prohibit sabbatarians from
being employed. 3 ' Similarly, a restaurant which requires men to have
short hair, which requires men to be clean-shaven, and which prohibits
headgear would not hire Sikhs or Orthodox Jews.' 3' In its pure form,
this sort of discrimination is not based on any antipathy toward the beliefs
or affiliation of the employee; rather it is simply the result of a failure to
accommodate religious practices. This sort of discrimination is a clear
target of the duty to accommodate.
Another and more profound distinction between status-based
discrimination (race, color, sex, national origin, age, disability) and
ability-based discrimination (age, disability) on the one hand and religious
discrimination on the other hand is that religious discrimination can occur
solely because of an incompatibility of constitutionally protected beliefs or
ideas. For example, a Christian employer could refuse to promote a
Christian employee based on theological disputes on the inerrancy of the
127. See infra part IV.B.
128. The potential problem also exists with respect to national origin.
129. See infra part IV.A.
130. See Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
131. See EEOC v. Sambo's of Ga., Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86, 88 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
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Bible, on the propriety of divorce, on the authority of the Pope, etc. This
sort of discrimination is based not upon an unavoidable status which is an
accident of birth such as race, color, sex, or national origin, or the result
of natural processes such as aging or the result of disability whether
congenital or the result of some post-natal illness or trauma; it is based on
choice. That is, people can choose what to believe and can change their
beliefs.
Care must be taken to understand the distinction between status-based
discrimination and belief-based discrimination rooted in the individual
ability to choose and to avoid certain specious similarities. For example,
a supervisor may exclude women as a group from being mechanics and
may assert that the decision is based on his "belief" that women belong
in the home, not doing a dirty, technical job. But such an action
ultimately is not based on a belief per se nor based on a difference in
belief between employer and employee, but rather, it is based on an
unavoidable status: sex. One may believe that a particular attribute such
as sex, race, or national origin may carry with it certain limitations, but
the personal belief and the employment action are ultimately based on a
birthright status, not on chosen ideas. In such cases the employer's
personal beliefs are not being disciplined; rather, it is actions based on
those beliefs that are being sanctioned. The supervisor can continue to
believe what he likes, but cannot act on those beliefs. In contrast,
discrimination based on religious beliefs is discrimination based on a
difference of opinion between the employer and the employee, not on the
difference in religious status. The fact that one's beliefs about another's
status is the psychologically motivating force for the action does not
transmute status-based discrimination into belief-based discrimination.
Conversely, since the nature of religious belief is such that it
ultimately drives both practices and religious affiliation, any religious
discrimination is, in the final analysis, based on belief. But focusing on
this underlying unity distorts the very real distinctions among
discrimination based on religious status, on religious practices, and on
religious beliefs. Employment actions taken on the basis of differences in
philosophy, differences in approach to life, and differences in religious
belief are qualitatively different from those taken on mere status and may
be easier to justify. Indeed, all employers have some value system, some
guiding principles by which they run their businesses, and they have some
right to pursue these ends as well. 112

132. See Underkuffler, supra note 17 (offering a sophisticated discussion of the
futility of pursuing policy to create value-neutral work environment).
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B. Freedom of Religion
The First Amendment declares that Congress 33 "shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. . . ."'s
Freedom of religion has two parts:
(1) the
establishment side, the freedom from compulsion to affirm or practice or
support any particular religion or religion at all,' 35 and (2) the free
exercise side, the freedom to136believe, and within limits, to practice, one's
own religion or nonreligion.
This section describes the basic contours of the current law of freedom
of religion and casts those contours onto a theoretical and historical
landscape. This section begins with a nod to the intractable problem of
defining what religion is. Then Reynolds v. United States3 and some
of the historical context surrounding the genesis of the religion clauses are
outlined. This section concludes by extracting from some of the major
religious freedom cases the relevant principles of accommodation and
neutrality (or as I generally broaden it, equality) which underlie decisional
rules such as the least restrictive alternative test. Other ideas used in
religious freedom analysis such as separation, tolerance, and coercion are
highlighted in the cases.
1. What Is Religion?
Just what is to be considered religious for first amendment purposes
is one of the more vexatious religion-related problems which has plagued
the Court.3 8 In various contexts the Court has wrestled with this
problem with only limited success. Many commentators have sought to
develop intellectually honest, fair, consistent, and practical definitions
capable of generally consistent and fair application.' 39 In the main, they
133. The restriction also applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
134. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
135. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (describing the language
of the Establishment Clause and its function).
136. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct.
2217, 2222 (1993) (holding laws restricting practice of Santeria religion unconstitutional).

137. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
138. For additional discussion of this problem see Underkuffler-Freund, supranote
4, at 846-73.
139. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Religion"in the FirstAmendment, 1982
U. ILL. L. REV. 579 (1982); Carl H. Esbeck, A Restatement of the Supreme Court'sLaw
of Religious Freedom: Coherence, Conflict, or Chaos?, 70 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 581,
610, 612-13 (1995); Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and
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have failed."4 Nonetheless, some working definition is required if for
no other reason than cases presented to the Court need to be decided., 4
In its earlier jurisprudence the Supreme Court viewed religion
theistically. For example, in 1890 the court wrote that "[t]he term
'religion' has reference to one's views of his relations to his Creator, and
to the obligations they impose of reverence for his being and character,
and of obedience to his will."' 42 Later, in 1931, the Court stated that
DoctrinalDevelopment: Part L The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1381 (1967); Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in ConstitutionalLaw, 72 CAL.
L. REV. 753 (1984); Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarificationof the
Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233 (1989); Michael W. McConnell, Religious
Freedom at a Crossroads,59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 172-75 (1992); Timothy L. Hall,
Note, The Sacred and the Profane:A FirstAmendment Definition of Religion, 61 TEX.
L. REV. 139, 143 (1982). Cf. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Madison's Wager: Religious
Liberty in the ConstitutionalOrder, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 347, 352 (1995) (taking selfdescribed "definitional agnosticism" approach to problem). As noted by Professor
Underkuffler-Freund, "[tihe fundamental problem in the Court's [separationist] approach
has been recognized by the Court itself: that the religious and the secular, as a theoretical
and practical matter, are hopelessly intertwined." Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 4,
at 873 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673-74 (1984)).
140. The efforts made to develop a definition of religion have been critiqued. See,
e.g., Anand Agneshwar, RediscoveringGod in the Constitution, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv.295
(1992); George C. Freeman, lI, The Misguided Searchfor the ConstitutionalDefinition
of "Religion," 71 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1983); Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas,
Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 231 (1994)
("[p]robably no such definition [of religion] is possible").
141. Working definitions are rarely found in court decisions. More frequently
courts use the term "religion" without further definition. This omission is caused in part
because the religiousness of the questioned conduct is not often at issue. See, e.g.,
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
Frankfurter warned of the one problem with defining religion in his dissent in West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 658 (1943), in which he noted
that when the Court decides what is and what is not religion, it treads into the minefield
of establishing religion. Stephen Carter used a working definition of religion as "a
tradition of group worship (as against individual metaphysic) that presupposes the
existence of a sentence beyond the human and capable of acting outside the observed
principles and limitations of natural science, and, further, a tradition that makes demands
of some kind on its adherents." STEPHEN L. CARTER, CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 17 (1993). Another
working definition is that which Professor Underkuffler-Freund derives from her
examination of the intellectual history of the period around the formation of the
Constitution. She defines religion for First Amendment purposes as "the search for
transcendent, moral principles." Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 4, at 961.
142. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890) (upholding laws restricting bigamy
and polygamy).
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"[t]he essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties
superior to those arising from any human relation."143
By 1961 the Court held that nonbelievers and believers in non-theistic
religions are entitled to First Amendment free exercise protections to the
same extent as followers of theistic religions.'" The Court stated in a
now famous footnote that "[a]mong religions in this country which do not
teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God
are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and
others."'" In effect, freedom of religion means freedom of conscience,
not just freedom to choose among various Christian sects.
Four years later the Court struggled with the problem of what is a
religion in a statutory context arising out of claims by conscientious
objectors to the Vietnam War.'" A person claiming to be exempt from
military service because of his religious beliefs had to establish that his
belief was sincere and meaningful and that it "occupies a place in the life
of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God...
"" While the first part of what the objector needed to establish was
simply genuiness, the second part ventured into the land of distinguishing
religion from non-religion. The Court expanded on this functional test of
religiosity as requiring that the belief be "based upon a power or a being,
or upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is
ultimately dependent."148 Though at first blush this test seemed to be
a throwback to theistic religions, the careful wording of "based upon a
. 143. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931) (Hughes, C.J.,
dissenting) (challenging the Court's decision to deny naturalization to conscientious
objector).
144. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (denying the constitutionality of state
oath of office requiring declaration of belief in God).

145. Id. at 495 n.11.
146. Since the Court was interpreting a statute, extension of the definition used by
the Court in the conscientious objector cases to First Amendment interpretation is
problematic. The Court could very well use one definition for constitutional purposes
and another for statutory interpretation. Nonetheless, at some point, any definition would
be constrained by establishment and free exercise concerns. Too restrictive a definition
might be seen as establishment, favoring one religion or one type of religious experience
over another and might exclude people claiming spiritual, religious motivations and thus
impinge on free exercise. Too broad a definition may include conduct not protected by

the First Amendment and may also run into establishment problems. Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). On balance, a broader approach seems more likely to pass

muster than a narrower definition. This fascinating issue is not central to this article and
need not detain us longer. See infra note 158 (regarding EEOC regulation defining
religion).
147. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965).

148. Id. at 176.
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power .. or upon a faith" permits inclusion of a broad range of beliefs,
including Buddhism and Taoism in particular.
The Reynolds'
conception, 4 9 built on Jefferson's writings, that what was protected was
conscience, 150 was becoming more prevalent, though the Court had still
not abandoned the need for some separate conception of religion (as
distinct from philosophy or ethical beliefs) however ill-defined.
The Court's tests, howsoever vague and imprecise, still seem to
require some element of wonder and power beyond the senses. A purely
rational, philosophical ethical system, regardless of how moral and central
to a person's life would appear not to meet the definition. This limitation
was explicitly articulated in 1972, in Wisconsin v. Yoder' where the
Court considered whether the First Amendment permitted the Amish to
not comply with Wisconsin's compulsory education requirements. Writing
for the majority, Chief Justice Burger wrote:
A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be
interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education
if it is based on purely secular considerations; to have the
protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in
religious belief. Although a determination of what is a
"religious" belief or practice entitled to constitutional protection
may present a most delicate question, the very concept of ordered
liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own
standards on matters5 2 of conduct in which society as a whole has
important interests.
Chief Justice Burger went on to distinguish a claim of exemption made on
the basis of a "subjective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary
secular values accepted by the majority"' from those of the Amish who
base their claim on religious tenets. The Court used Thoreau's choice to
remove to the isolation of Walden Pond as an example of what would not
be protectible under the First Amendment religion clauses because his
"choice was philosophical and personal rather than religious, and such
belief does not rise to the demands of the religion clauses.""
149. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d. 324 (6th Cir. 1970).
150. This is the exact point made by Professor Underkuffler-Freund. She proposes
extending this focus from a definition of religion to being a central, if not the central,

tenet of religion clause interpretation. Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 4, at 961-88.
151. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
152. Id. at 215-16 (footnote omitted).

153. Id. at 216.
154. Id.
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Because the nature and content of religious beliefs are not subject to
external tests of logic or reasonableness, courts have in general limited
their inquiry into the genuineness of the professed beliefs without inquiry
into the validity of the source or religiosity of them.'
The "religious
beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to
others in order to merit First Amendment protection."156 Nonetheless,
there are limits. If an assertion is "bizarre or incredible, ""' then at
some outer limit the assertion may not be protected.
Detecting religions created for pretextual reasons, such as avoiding
58
taxes, is not really the problem; they are easily and regularly exposed. 1
The ability to expose fraud is different from the ability to say what a
religion is or is not. One concerns genuineness of belief; the other
concerns content.
At present, there is no simple test for determining what is and what
is not religious for First Amendment purposes, unless one considers
"under all the circumstances" a simple test. The requirements of
otherworldliness and a belief in the existence of a god are nearly gone, but
vestigial elements of wonder and a place of centrality in one's life like that
of Christ to Christians remain.' 59 Neither faith in reason nor subjective
judgments about what constitutes a good, virtuous life are enough. When
pressed, the Court has looked to the existence of an organized group,
reliance on a religious text, and a belief that the actions being taken are
155. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217,
2225 (1993); Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 833 (1989);
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714-15 (1981).
156. Church of the Lukumi BabaluAye, 113 S. Ct. at 2225 (quoting with approval

Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714).
157. See Frazee, 489 U.S. at 834 n.2.

158. E.g., First Libertarian Church v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 396 (1980).
159. Though not controlling for First Amendment analysis, the EEOC Guidelines
contain the following definition of what is meant by a religious practice or belief: "[T]he

Commission will define religious practices to include moral or ethical beliefs as to what
is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious
views." 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1995). Whether this interpretation would be followed by

a court construing a Title VII religious discrimination case, in light of the constitutional
religious clause jurisprudence, is problematic. It is not at all clear that Congress
intended religion, as used in Title VII, to be broader than the First Amendment. Indeed,
the evidence is contrary to the special treatment afforded traditional religious institutions.
It also seems unlikely that Congress intended to grant employees unlimited abilities to

exempt themselves from business requirements they do not like by simply claiming an
ethical or philosophical basis for disagreement. See supra note 145 (noting similar
problems with respect to the conscientious objector statute).
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compelled by external doctrine, not merely chosen for philosophical
reasons.160
The issue of what is a religion is primarily one of theoretical interest
in Title VII religious discrimination cases. In the cases decided to date the
legitimacy of the beliefs, both as to genuineness and religiosity, have
either been conceded by all sides, or have not been otherwise seriously in
question. Although one can conceive of an employee claiming that a
secular company's entire business philosophy creates an oppressive,
discriminatory environment (for example, one can imagine a socialist
employee in a cutthroat capitalist company being very uncomfortable), it
is hard to imagine either that the Title VII prohibition of employment
discrimination based on religion was intended to protect an employee's
assertion of non-religious, value-based discrimination, or that the religion
clauses would protect the employer who might wish to assert in its defense
to such a claim that its success depends upon establishing one corporate
culture or another.'61 Thus, for most employment settings, defining
what is a religion is not yet a significant practical problem.
2.

A Slice of History

In constitutional religious jurisprudence, after deciding whether the
claim is religious rather than philosophical or secular, 62 the focus shifts
to defining the scope of free exercise and the limits of the reach of the
governmental action based on establishment concerns. Before reviewing
the current confused state of affairs, some history is appropriate.
The seminal freedom of religion case is Reynolds v. United
States. 3 In Reynolds a devotee of the Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints, commonly known as the Mormon Church, was, as then
required by church doctrine for those who could afford it, a
polygamist."' 4 In its capacity as the legislative body for the territory
(Utah was not yet a state), Congress had enacted a law which prohibited
polygamy. The issue was whether Congress could so restrict the exercise
of religion, i.e., whether Congress could constitutionally restrict religious
adherents from taking specific actions where those actions were driven by
genuine religious beliefs. The Court concluded that Congress could
160. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216-17 (1972).
161. For a description of a particular corporate culture, see John Burges,Life After

Perot: For EDS the Times Are Great, Even in the Shadow of the Billionaire Founder,
WASH. PosT., May 31, 1992, at H1.
162. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107
Stat. 1488, does not attempt to define religion. Laycock & Thomas, supra note 140.
163. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).

164. Id. at 161.
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constitutionally prohibit polygamy, regardless of the religious beliefs and
practices of any particular sect to the contrary.1'5
In reaching its decision, the Court reviewed the history of the religion
clauses, including, in particular, the antecedent legislative fight in Virginia
and the positions of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. The Court
concluded that from its inception the free exercise right deprived Congress
"of all legislative power over mere opinion, but.., left [it] free to reach
actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good
order."" The Court noted that what the framers were most careful to
preserve was freedom of conscience, the freedom to believe whatever one
wished. 67 The Court quoted with approval language from the preamble
of a Virginia bill establishing freedom of religion that "to suffer the civil
magistrate to intrude his powers into the field of opinion, and to restrain
the profession or propagation of principles on supposition of their ill
tendency, is a dangerous fallacy which at once destroys all religious
liberty," and "that it is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil
government for its officers to interfere when principles break out into
overt acts against peace and good order."1' 6 The court added that "[i]n
these two sentences is found the true distinction between what properly
belongs to the church and what to the State."' 6 9
The Court also quoted at length a letter Jefferson wrote in reply to a
letter to him by a committee of the Danbury Baptist Association:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely
between man and his God; that he owes account to none other for
his faith or his worship; that the legislative powers of the
government reach actions only, and not opinions-I contemplate
with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people
which declared that their legislature should "make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof," thus building a wall of separation between
church and State. Adhering to this expression of the supreme
will of the nation in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see
with sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments which
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 166-67.
Id. at 164.
Id.
Id. at 163 (quoting 12 Hening's Stat. 84).

169. Id.
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tend to restore man to all his natural rights, convinced he has no

natural right in opposition to his social duties.17

The Reynolds' Court treated this statement as authoritative and held that
"Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but

was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or

subversive of good order. " " And again: "Laws are made for the
government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious
belief and opinions, they may with practices. " " The law barring
polygamy was a proper, constitutional "law of the organization of society.
S. ., 17 The Court refused to follow the path advocated by Reynolds
because "[t]o permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of
religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit
every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only
in name under such circumstances."'74
The Reynolds Court thus took a pragmatic approach to resolving the
inherent problems of church and state and developed four core guidelines
which govern the area even today: Congress cannot coerce or burden
belief; it cannot establish religion; but it can regulate conduct and actions
for the general good of society; and there is to be a "wall of separation"

between the religion and government. 175

170. Id. at 164 (quoting 8 JEFFERSON'S WORKS 113). Jefferson's prediction of the
natural evolution of religion as marching in phase with the development of concepts of
social justice and duty has not proven to be the case-not everyone believes in the same
natural rights or in the relationship of those rights to social duties. Jefferson's prescience
assumed that religious development would proceed along certain rational lines in
harmony with the rational precepts of democracy. Such has not been the case. Regular
conflicts between religious belief and practice on the one hand and social duty on the
other still exist.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 166.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 167.
175. The validity of this separationist approach as a matter of historical accuracy
has been questioned by Prof. Underkuffler-Freund, who makes a strong case for the
proposition that the aim of the religion clauses was to protect freedom of conscience by
protecting individuals and groups from burdens and control by government. She argues
that the original understanding was that religion should only be interfered with in cases
presenting "particular extremity or danger." Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 4 at 891956, 967. Professor Michael W. McConnell also challenges the current approach,
though he reaches somewhat different conclusions. He finds that the law should grant
exceptions for religious activity from otherwise neutral, generally applicable laws.
Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and HistoricalUnderstandingof Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1453-55 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Origins].
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The Reynolds opinion also speaks to the principles central to my
approach. The principle of tolerance for differing opinions was both
explicitly stated,' 76 though not using the term "tolerance" and implicitly
addressed in the Court's review of beliefs that may be held regarding
actions which may be proscribed."7 The Court noted that polygamy,
sati (the universally banned practice of a Hindu widow burning herself on
her husband's funeral pyre), and human sacrifice all fell within the
category of ideas which cannot be proscribed, but the actions taken in
furtherance of them can be.' 8 These same examples illustrate that the
idea of accommodation of practices was inherent in the case, but it was
not fully developed using this term. The Court did establish that there
was some outer limit to accommodation of practices, which in the
Reynolds case was polygamy, beyond which free exercise would not shield
actions from government regulation or proscription.
As time passed and additional cases came to the Court, the problems
of separating conduct from belief and of government infringement on
religious conduct became more subtle than the outright banning of
polygamy. For example, by 1940, the Free Exercise Clause was
explicitly held to limit Congress' ability to infringe or burden religious
actions as well as beliefs and speech about those beliefs.'
The state
was not only to tolerate and accommodate religious beliefs, but also had
to accommodate religious practices.
The pace of federal development of the jurisprudence of the religion
clauses was dramatically spurred by a series of Supreme Court rulings in
the 1940's which incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment the First
Amendment guarantees of free exercise'10 and non-establishment,' 8'
which moved toward the idea of the least restrictive alternative test,'"
and which moved toward the compelling state interest test."n
176. In referring to the defendant's belief that the law ought not to have been

enacted, the Court wrote: "[i]t matters not that his belief was a part of his
religion: it was still belief, and belief only." Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 166.
179. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-4 (1940).
180. See id. at 296.
181. See Everson v. Board. of Educ. of the Township of Ewing, 330 U.S.
182. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303-4 (holding that a state cannot "unduly
exercise of religion).
183. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.

professed

1 (1947).
infringe"
624, 639

(1943) (noting that religious practice rights are "susceptible [to] restriction only to

prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the State may lawfully protect").
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In Cantwell v. Connecticut,"8 the Court ruled that the arrest and
prosecution of Jehovah's Witnesses for soliciting donations without proper
permits impermissibly limited their rights to free exercise of their religion.
Because Cantwell, like Reynolds, articulates many of the tensions which
still exist in the area today, I will quote liberally from the opinion. The
Court acknowledged the double aspect of the religious freedom guarantee
when it wrote:
On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the
acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship.
Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious
organization or form of worship as the individual may choose
cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the
Thus the
free exercise of the chosen form of religion.
Amendment embraces two concepts-freedom to believe and
freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things,
the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for
the protection of society. The freedom to act must have
appropriate definition to preserve the enforcement of that
protection. In every case the power to regulate must be so
exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe
the protected freedom. No one would contest the proposition that
a State may not, by statute, wholly deny the right to preach or to
disseminate religious views. Plainly such a previous and absolute
restraint would violate the terms of the guarantee. It is equally
clear that a State may by general and non-discriminatory
legislation regulate the times, the places, and the manner of
soliciting upon its streets, and of holding meetings thereon; and
may in other respects safeguard the peace, good order and
comfort of the community, without unconstitutionally invading the
liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."8
Under the Connecticut statute only religious or charitable solicitors
were required to obtain permits. The religious nature of the applicant was
determined by a low-level administrator. The Court wrote that "[s]uch a
censorship of religion as the means of determining its right to survive is
a denial of liberty protected by the First Amendment and included in the
liberty which is within the protection of the Fourteenth."' 86
In considering the state's argument that it had an interest in protecting
its citizens from fraudulent schemes, the court wrote:
184. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
185. Id. at 303-4 (footnotes omitted).

186. Id. at 305.
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Even the exercise of religion may be at some slight inconvenience
in order that the State may protect its citizens from injury...
1
The State is likewise free to regulate the time and manner
of solicitation generally, in the interest of public safety, peace,
comfort or convenience. But to condition the solicitation of aid
for the perpetuation of religious views or systems upon a license,
the grant of which rests in the exercise of a determination by state
authority as to what is a religious cause, is to lay a forbidden
burden upon the exercise of liberty protected by the
Constitution. 1m
The Court held that the Jehovah's witness who was convicted of
breach of the peace was doing what he was lawfully entitled to do since
he "was upon a public street, where he had a right to be, and where he
had a right peacefully to impart his views to others."' 89
[W]e find only an effort to persuade a willing listener to buy a
book or to contribute money in the interest of what Cantwell,
however misguided others may think him, conceived to be true
religion.
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief,
sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man may
seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his
own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to
exaggeration, to villification of the men who have been, or are,
prominent in church or state, and even to false statement. But the
people of this nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in
spite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are,
in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right
conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy.
The essential characteristic of these liberties is, that under their
shield many types of life, character, opinion and belief can
develop unmolested and unobstructed. Nowhere is this shield
more necessary than in our own country for a people composed
of many races and of many creeds. There are limits to the
exercise of these liberties. The danger in these times from the
coercive activities of those who in the delusion of racial or
religious conceit would incite violence and breaches of the peace
in order to deprive others of their equal right to the exercise of
their liberties, is emphasized by events familiar to all. These and
187. Id. at 306.
188. Id. at 306-307.

189. Id. at 308.
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other transgressions of those limits the States appropriately may
punish.19°
In Cantwell, the principles of tolerance and accommodation, and in a
more hidden way, equality, drove the law. The government may restrict
exercise by reasonable regulation of time, place, and manner, but the
"shield" of the Free Exercise clause is to protect the "unmolested"
development of "many types of life, character, opinion, and belief."191
The reference to events in fascist Germany ("those ... in the delusion of
racial or religious conceit")" 9 to illustrate the need for the Court to
support the "equal right to exercise" clearly signals both an appeal to
equality of treatment and to the premise and promise of tolerance.
The second major case constituting the religion-clauses revolution of
the 1940's is West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette. " In
Barnette, another Jehovah's Witness sought to be exempted from pledging
allegiance to the flag. In holding that the Free Exercise Clause required
exempting them, the Court wrote: "[these rights] are susceptible of
restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which
the State may lawfully protect. " " This formula, obviously borrowed
from the then-current "clear and present danger" test of free speech
jurisprudence, ultimately became the compelling state interest test. 9 5
The principles of tolerance and accommodation are evident in much
of the opinion's reasoning. For example, the propriety of accommodation
underlies the following analysis by the Court:
The freedom asserted by these appellees does not bring them
into collision with rights asserted by any other individual. It is
such conflicts which most frequently require intervention of the
State to determine where the rights of one end and those of
another begin. But the refusal of these persons to participate in
the ceremony does not interfere with or deny rights of others to
do so. Nor is there any question in this case that their behavior
190. Id. at 310.

191. Id.
192. Id.
193. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
194. Id. at 639.

195. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 205 (1972) (holding that a state's
interest in universal education is not free from a balancing process when it impinges on
other fundamental rights); Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (holding South
Carolina's Compensation Act, which made a claimant ineligible for benefits if she failed
to accept available suitable work, abridged plaintiff's First Amendment freedom because

her faith did not allow her to work Saturdays).
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is peaceable and orderly. The sole conflict is between authority
and rights of the individual.' 96
Similarly, the principle of tolerance of diversity is expressed in the
following passage:
Nevertheless, we apply the limitations of the Constitution with no
fear that freedom to be intellectually and spiritually diverse or
even contrary will disintegrate the social organization. To believe
that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are
voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to
make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to
free minds. We can have intellectual individualism and the rich
cultural diversities that we owe to exceptional minds only at the
price of occasional eccentricity and abnormal attitudes. When
they are so harmless to others or to the State as those we deal
with here, the price is not too great. But freedom to differ is not
limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere
shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ
as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it
is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein.
If there are any circumstances which permit an
exception, they do not now occur to us. 97
9 another case
In United States v. Ballard,"'
of the 1940's revolution,
the Court explicitly recognized that freedom of religion really extends to
freedom of thought and belief in many guises:

Freedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious
belief, is basic in a society of free men. It embraces the right to
maintain theories of life and of death and of the hereafter which
are rank heresy to followers of the orthodox faiths .... Men may
believe what they cannot prove .... Religious experiences which
are as real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others.
196. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 630. I would note in passing that the issue considered
in this article does involve exactly the sort of intervention by the state to determine
.where the rights of one [employer] end and those of another [employee] begin."

197. Id. at 641-42.
198. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
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Yet the fact that they may be beyond the ken of mortals does not
mean that they can be made suspect before the law. 199
Here again, we see the Court being very careful to accommodate and even
to protect beliefs. And once again, working just beneath the surface of
the language are the principles of tolerance and of a sort of spiritual
equality.
In 1947, in Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of
Ewing,20 the Court, as it had in Reynolds seventy years earlier,
undertook a detailed evaluation of the historical context of the
constitutional guarantees of religious freedom."0 This time, the Court
was faced with an establishment issue: Was the Establishment Clause
violated by the state's reimbursement to parents of costs of transporting
their children to religious schools on the same terms as it was provided to
public schools? Ultimately, the Court held in a 5-4 decision that the State
of New Jersey could reimburse parents for the cost of bussing students to
parochial schools.'
In reaching its decision, the majority took pains to summarize the
social conditions, starting with persecutions in Europe, which led to the
development of religious freedom guarantees. The Court noted that
colonial charters required the establishment of churches,' 3 and that in
keeping with the practice in Europe, including Great Britain, the colonies
taxed citizens to pay minister's salaries and to build and maintain
churches.
The Court then summarized Madison's Memorial and
Remonstrance in which Madison argued that no true religion needed the
support of law, that no person should be taxed to support the church, that
the best interest of society required that the minds of men be wholly free,
and that established religions always led to cruel persecutions.'
After reviewing this history, the Court, in essence, concluded that the
Establishment Clause was narrowly focused on keeping the government
out of religious matters directly through targeted programs, but that
indirect benefits of neutral, generally available benefits were not the target
of the Establishment Clause. The Court held that the provision of a
neutral government benefit, such as transportation to schools, to a
religious organization was not an unconstitutional establishment of religion
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 86-7.
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
Id. at 8-13.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 8-11.
Id. at 11-12. Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance is reproduced in its

entirety as an appendix to the decision. Id. at 63-72.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

even though the benefit helped the religious organization. The Court
noted in particular that the benefit went to the parents, not directly to the
schools. The Court wrote:
[The First] Amendment requires the state to be a [sic] neutral in
its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers;
it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is
no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor
them.
...

[The] legislation, as applied, does no more than provide

a general program to help parents get their children, regardless of
their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from accredited
schools.
The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and
state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could
not approve the slightest breach. New Jersey has not breached it
here.A
Two Everson dissenters took an absolutist position that taxation for the
assistance of parochial schools was establishment and that no tax or public
moneys could be used to support such institutions, even indirectly.M
The dissenters noted that private, for profit, non-parochial schools were
not provided with this benefit. Police and fire protection and the like
would be available everywhere, but support otherwise is not allowed. All
four dissenters, in the opinion written by Justice Rutledge, revisited the
For
history of the Establishment Clause and found different rules.'
them, the key starting point was that the Establishment Clause does not
merely prohibit establishing a state religion, but rather it prohibits "any
law respecting an establishment of religion."" 8 The dissent argued that
the subsidy of a religious organization would help establish religion and
that a law making such a subsidy, even an indirect one, would be a "law
respecting" the religious organization and would therefore be a "law
Since subsidizing
respecting an establishment of religion."'
transportation to religious schools was supporting religion, a point even
the majority conceded, the law was an unconstitutional one because it
"respected" or was concerned with helping a religious endeavor.
205. Id. at 18.
206. Id. at 20-21 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 29-33 (Rutleledge, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 31 (Rutleledge, J., dissenting).
209. See id. at 45 (Rutleledge, J., dissenting).
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The Everson Court also relied on principles of tolerance,
accommodation, equality, and neutrality. It held that the attenuated
subsidy preserved neutrality of the government with respect to religion.
This, along with the fact that the subsidy was available on an equal basis
to all such schools, not just those of one sect, was important in the Court's
reasoning.21 0 The need to tolerate and accommodate both religious
belief and exercise supported the Court's decision to allow payment for
transportation to parochial schools. Indeed, without these principles, the
statement by the Court that it is not breaching the wall of separation
between church and state seems disingenuous. There is certainly a tension
between the tugs of tolerance and the impulse to accommodate on the one
hand and the desire for clear separation on the other. In Everson, the
Court decided in favor of the accommodation.
The establishment problem presented in Everson is still very much
alive with the Court regularly struggling to distinguish between those
benefits which can be granted2 11 and those which cross the line.2 12
These establishment cases are easy prey for those who wish to illustrate
inconsistent, seemingly rudderless Court decisions.2 3 Nonetheless, the
Court has followed fundamental principles in its decisions in this field.
Even in cases where the liberal concepts of tolerance and accommodation
are unstated, they form part of the underpinning of the analysis.
Unfortunately for the sake of simplicity, clarity, and predictability, these
principles are broad and general, and cannot be applied in a mechanical,
syllogistic manner.
3.

Current Judicial Interpretation of the Religion Clauses

The principles of accommodation, tolerance, equality, and
v 2 1 4 are still used in free exercise and establishment analysis
neutrality
today. They are not the only principles used, but they are the ones most
210. Id. at 20-21 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
211. E.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills, 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2469 (1993) (permitting
state funding of an interpreter for a deaf student attending a parochial school, under The
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1994)).
212. E.g., School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 373-74 (1985)
(holding unconstitutional the provision of public employees to teach classes in private and
parochial schools).
213. E.g., Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 4, at 848-74 (highlighting many of the
difficulties in the current approach to the various strains of religious freedom cases).
214. Neutrality has a number of potential meanings. Here, I am adopting the broad,
simple meanings of neutrality as between religious and non-religious as well as neutrality
among religions; or perhaps more clearly, evenhanded treatment of the religions. See
discussion infra part ll.C.1.
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suitable for the problem addressed in this article. Other principles include
burden (for free exercise analysis), coercion (for establishment analysis),
and separation of church and state. Though not irrelevant for the problem
of religious secular employers,2 15 they are less central.
a. Free Exercise
A core concept in analyzing free exercise claims is the concept of
burden. From at least 1972 until 1990, free exercise challenges to the
application of laws, including generally applicable, religiously neutral laws
(such as social security), were to be tested by determining whether there
was a substantial burden on the exercise of religion, and if so, whether the
state had a compelling state interest at stake and had adopted the least
restrictive alternative to achieve that interest. 216 The effect of this test
was to give great weight to tolerating religious differences and
accommodating diverse beliefs and practices.
This test was modified in 1990 in Employment Division v. Smith, 2t7
a decision which has been roundly criticized by many scholars of the Free
Exercise Clause. 1 s Smith subjected neutral, generally applicable statutes
to a reasonableness test, while retaining the compelling state interest test
for laws which target religion.2" 9 The Court distinguished prior cases
which had required a showing of a compelling state interest by finding
other fundamental rights at stake such as First Amendment rights of
speech and press,' or by restricting the compelling state interest test to
the employment compensation cases in which it was most clearly
articulated.2'
The vitality of Smith is questionable. In 1993 Congress passed the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) m which in essence
215. See infra part IV.B.

216. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
217. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

218. E.g., McConnell, Origins, supra note 175, at 1453-55 (1990) (stating that
Madison believed freedom of religion to include exemption from generally applicable

laws in some circumstances). Many of the pieces criticizing the Smith case are noted in
James E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic
Assessment, 78 VA. L. REv. 1407, 1409 n. 15 (1992). For a contrary view, see Mark
Tushnet, The Rhetoric of Free Exercise Discourse, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 117 (1993).
219. Smith, 494 U.S. at 872-73.

220. Id. at 877.
221. Id. at 880.
222. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
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sought to restore free-exercise jurisprudence to the pre-Smith status by
codifying a version of those rules. The RFRA requires that whenever a
government action would "substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,"
the government must demonstrate that the burden furthers a compelling
state interest and that the requirement is the least restrictive means to
(The act specifically states that it does not
accomplish that interest.'
affect Establishment Clause jurisprudence.) ' 4
The burden on the claimant's religious practice must be
To be a substantial burden "[t]he burden must be more
substantial.'
than an inconvenience; the burden must rise to the level of pressuring the
adherent to commit an act the religion forbids, or preventing the adherent
from engaging in conduct that the faith requires."'
223. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1996).
224. Some courts have interpreted the RFRA to restore the First Amendment freeexercise law to pre-Smith jurisprudence. See, e.g., Droz v. Commissioner, 48 F.3d
1120, 1122 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying pre-Smith determinations to consider if Droz
was exempt from Social Security tax because of religious beliefs). Others have used a
two-part analysis under which the First Amendment guarantees and the RFRA claim are
treated as independentbases of analysis. See, e.g., American Life League, Inc. v. Reno,
47 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 1995) (the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act does not
violate the First Amendment right to free speech). One district court found the RFRA
unconstitutional on the grounds'of separation of powers. Flores v. City of Boerne, 877
F. Supp. 355 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (holding RFRA unconstitutinally changed the burden of
proof established by Smith(, rev'd, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that Congress
had acted within its enumerated powers in enacting the RFRA). Some commentators
have also proposed that the Act is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Daniel 0. Conkle, The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The Constitutional Significance of an
UnconstitutionalStatute, 56 MONT. L. REV. 39 (1995); Christopher L. Eisgruber &
Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious FreedomRestorationAct is Unconstitutional,69
N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (1994). The Montana Law Review published a symposium on the
RFRA. The James R. Browning Symposium for 1994, The Religious Freedom
RestorationAct, 56 MONT. L. REv. (1995). Since the focus of this article is on the
proper balance of the employer's interest, the employee's interest, and the community's
interest in the religious secular employer setting in light of Title VII and the religion
clauses, and not on the constitutionality of RFRA, this issue will not be pursued further
here. The approach I propose is different from Smith, RFRA, and pre-Smith law and
constitutes a proposed method of accommodating the interests involved. Hence, I am
effectively calling for a change in how the religion clauses are applied in the employment
setting. To the extent the RFRA conflicts with my approach I think it should be
modified, but that too is well beyond the scope of this article.
225. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a); see also Hernandezv. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680,
699 (1989); Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d 1039, 1041 (8th Cir. 1988) (challenged
governmental action must interfere with sincerely held religious beliefs).
226. Brown v. Polk County, 37 F.3d 404, 410 (8th Cir. 1994).
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Beyond this formulation there are many difficult problems with
deciding what burdens are substantial and no clear test or process for
deciding how to decide what substantial means or how it is to be
measured. For example, does one examine the burden from an outsider's
"reasonable" or "social" point of view or from an insider's subjective
point of view? How does one decide substantiality? Must it be central to
the religion? If so, how does one decide centrality?
b. The Establishment Clause
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is even more confused than that
of Free Exercise. To the extent legal tests and principles have been
enunciated, they are often pliable and molded to fit situations for which
they were never designed. Despite these limitations, and despite recent
decisions which muddy the waters even more, certain strands of ideas run
through many of the cases and may eventually be woven into new threads
and fabric.
Until such time as the Supreme Court weaves the
Establishment Clause cloth anew, we must finger only the threads and
strands.
Two major concepts in establishment jurisprudence are (i) separation
of church and state,' and (ii) governmental neutrality.' The state is
to be neutral toward religion and things religious are to be separated from
things political and secular. Even seemingly neutral laws may run afoul
of the establishment clause. Since 1971 the primary test of government
action under the Establishment Clause has been the three-prong Lemon test
under which an otherwise neutral government regulation (1) must have a
secular purpose, (2) must not have the principal effect of advancing or
inhibiting religion, and (3) "must not foster 'an excessive government
entanglement with religion.'" '
Alternatives have been proposed
ranging from encouragement of religion by the state, to neutrality in other
forms such as accommodation, to adoption of a coercion standard (if there
227. See Everson v. Board of Educ. of the Township of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 18

(1947) (holding reimbursment for parents to send kids to private parochial school not a
violation of the separation between church and state); Underkuffler-Freund, supra note
4, at 840-44.
228. Rosenbergerv. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995)

is the most current reaffirmation of the importance of neutrality. See infra text
accompanying notes 249-50, 256 & 258 for a discussion of Rosenberger.
229. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). As noted below, the Lemon test is not without
critics and is not consistently applied in establishment cases.
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is no coercion, then the state can constitutionally act)," and shifting the
focus from neutrality and separation to preserving freedom of
conscience.23
This debate was refueled by the Court in Lee v. Weisman 2 where
the Court held, in a 5-4 decision, that state-arranged prayers at graduation
ceremonies violated the Establishment Clause largely because of their
coercive nature and because of the stamp of governmental approval such
prayer signaled. 3 The argument was made that Lee v. Weisman
signaled the end of the Lemon test and a movement toward a combined
The argument was also made that Lemon
free-exercise/coercion test.'

in some form survived Lee v. Weisman, and that the pillars of separation
and neutrality, though not capable of clear, simple application would still

be the guiding concepts for courts and the public.

5

The Supreme Court breathed new life into Lemon test in 1993 when

it applied the test to rule in Lamb's Chapel v. CenterMoriches Union Free
School Districi26 that schools which otherwise make their facilities

available for use by the public could not constitutionally exclude religious
groups from using the same facilities for educational uses or for meetings

just because the group was religious.

7

The basis for the decision

230. For a brief summary of the debate, see Smith, FreeExercise Doctrine, supra
note 31.
231. Professor Underkuffler-Freund argues that underlying the current approach of
the Court is the concept of separation of the secular from the sacred, but that this
approach is not in accord with the original understanding of the First Amendment, and
is not the best approach to take. She advocates a focus on protecting freedom of
conscience as the central theme. Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 4, at 840-44, 961.
232. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
233. Several symposium issues of law reviews have been published in recent years
on religious freedom issues. Two of them are: Symposium, Religion and the Public
Schools After Lee v. Weisman, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 699 (1993) and Symposium,
New Directions in Religious Liberty, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1993).
234. T. Michael Stokes Paulson, Lemon Is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795
(1993). See also Smith, Free ExerciseDoctrine, supra note 31 (arguing that the Court's
use of the term "conscience" as opposed to "religion," in Establishment Clause analysis
marks a larger agenda for the Court to expand protection for religious and related
liberties).
235. Daniel 0. Conkle, Lemon Lives, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 865, 872-74
(1993).
236. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
237. Id. at 391. In his dissent, Justice Scalia provided, according to Justice Stevens,
a "divert[ing] . . . evening at the cinema" when he (Scalia) wrote of the majority

opinion's "invocation of the Lemon test" as follows: "Like some ghoul in a late-night
horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being
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appeared to be largely one of neutrality toward religion and treating
religious organizations the same as non-religious organizations; a species
of equality or equal protection, if you will.
However, even after Lamb's Chapel, Lemon is not all there is to
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. For example, in Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills School District,"s another 1993 case, the Court did not apply
it, despite Lemon being the basis for the lower court decision.73 9 In
Zobrest, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a school district
providing an interpreter for a deaf person attending a parochial school.
The law requiring provision of an interpreter, the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, 2' "neutrally provide[d] benefits to a broad
class of citizens defined without reference to religion" and thus was "not
readily susceptible to an Establishment Clause challenge just because [a]
sectarian institution may also receive an attenuated financial benefit."241
The Zobrest decision illustrates the application of principles of tolerance
and neutrality like Barnette fifty years before it.
The neutrality principle is one of the rudders currently steering the
Court through the religious freedom waters. In Board of Education of
Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet242 the Court held that the
Establishment Clause was offended when school district gerrymandering
created a special, separate school for a homogenous religious enclave.243
Such an action quite clearly promotes religion, and in Kiryas Joel, a
particular religion; it is not merely neutral toward it or tolerant of it. The
creation of the school district deviated from the Constitution's requirement
of neutrality by "delegating the State's discretionary authority over public
schools to a group defined by its character as a religious community, in
a legal and historical context that gives no assurance that governmental
power has been or will be exercised neutrally." 2'
repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once

again, frightening the little children and school attorneys of Center Moriches Union Free
School District." Id. at 392-94.
238. 113 S.Ct. 2462 (1993).
239. Id. at 2464-66.
240. Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175 (1970) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
§ 1400 (1994)).

241. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2466.
242. 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
243. Id. at 2483-84.
244. Id. at 2487. Kiryas Joel must be viewed as a setback for those advocating a
coercion test instead of a neutrality test. The principled approach proposed in this article
of deciding cases directly on the basis of principles of tolerance and accommodation
tempered by equality (neutrality) supports the result in Kiryas Joel.
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In addition to relying on the principle of neutrality in deciding Kiryas
Joel, the Supreme Court also explicitly called upon the principles of
tolerance and accommodation. In Kiryas Joel the Court highlighted
accommodation as a cardinal principle when it wrote as follows:
In finding that Chapter 748 violates the requirement of
governmental neutrality by extending the benefit of a special
franchise, we do not deny that the Constitution allows the state to
accommodate religious needs by alleviating special burdens. Our
cases leave no doubt that in commanding neutrality the Religion
Clauses do not require the government to be oblivious to
impositions that legitimate exercises of state power may place on
religious belief and practice. Rather, there is "ample room under
the Establishment Clause for 'benevolent neutrality [tolerance?]
which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship
and without interference;'" "government may (and sometimes
must) accommodate religious practices and . . . may do so
without violating the Establishment Clause."
The fact that
Chapter 748 facilitates the practice of religion is not what renders
it an unconstitutional establishment.
But accommodation is not a principle without limits, and what
petitioners seek is an adjustment to the Satmars' religiously
grounded preferences that our cases do not countenance. Prior
decisions have allowed religious communities and institutions to
pursue their own interests free from governmental interference,
but we have never hinted that an otherwise unconstitutional
delegation of political power to a religious group could be saved
as a religious accommodation.
Petitioners' proposed
accommodation singles out a particular religious sect for special
treatment, and whatever the limits of permissible legislative
accommodations may be, it is clear that neutrality as among
religions must be honored.24
In Kiryas Joel the Court avoided the conceptual dissonance which has
become the subject of much debate in the legal literature surrounding the
religion clauses-whether to premise analysis on coercion,2' on
245. Id. at 2492-93 (citations and footnotes omitted).
246. E.g., Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment,
27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933 (1986) [hereinafter McConnell, Coercion]. See generally
Smith, Free Exercise Doctrine, supra note 31.
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neutrality,247 or on accommodation 2 4 -by adopting a multi-factored
approach in which guiding principles, not syllogistic rules, played the
leading roles.
This same approach was reinforced in the 1995 case of Rosenberger
v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia.249 Rosenberger
presented the issue of whether a public university which funded various
student activities, including many publications, out of a student activities
fee could refuse to fund a religious publication on the grounds that the
Establishment Clause required it not to do so. The majority opinion in the
5-4 decision based its conclusion largely on the neutrality principle (in the
sense of evenhandedness.) After finding that the free speech clause was
being violated by denying access to the funding, the Court found that the
need to avoid an establishment clause violation was not a compelling
interest because there was no establishment clause violation. The Court
noted that "[a] central lesson of our decisions is that a significant factor
in upholding governmental programs in the face of Establishment Clause
attack is their neutrality towards religion." 0
4. The Principles
The Court has at times explicitly and other times implicitly used the
principles of accommodation, tolerance, and equality (in both its neutrality
247. E.g., Michael W.McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw.
U. L. REv. 146 (1986) [hereinafter McConnell, Neutrality]; Michael A. Paulsen,

Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal ProtectionApproach to Establishment
Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 311 (1986); Jay Alan Sekulow et al.,
Religious Freedom and the FirstSelf-Evident Truth: Equality as a Guiding Principle in

Interpretingthe Religion Clauses, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 351 (1995).
248. E.g., Ira C.Lupu, Reconstructingthe EstablishmentClause:The CaseAgainst
DiscretionaryAccommodation, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555, 567, 580 (1991) [hereinafter
Lupu, Reconstructing];Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. ,VASH.

L. REV. 743 (1992) [hereinafter Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation]; Michael W.
McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SuP. CT. Rv. 1 (1985) [hereinafter

McConnell, Accommodation]; Michael W.McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An
Update and a Response to Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 685 (1992) [hereinafter

McConnell, Accommodation Update]; see also Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive,
and DisaggregatedNeutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAuL L. REV. 993 (1990); Alan

Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J.
692, 727-37 (1968).
249. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).

250. Id. at 2521.
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and nondiscrimination guises) in deciding religion clause cases.?5 ' Laws
which violate these principles by targeting beliefs or practices based on

religion, or which treat various sects differently have been overturned.

2

As Justice Kennedy recently wrote: "The principle that government may
not enact laws that suppress religious belief or practice is so well
understood that few violations are recorded in our opinions. " ' Under
these principles the state is to allow freedom of belief, conscience, and
action, at least insofar as the actions taken in exercise of the religion do
not adversely affect the peace and the general welfare of society.4
Different groups in American history bring new challenges whether it is

Mormons asserting a right to polygamy, or Amish wanting to be exempt
from compulsory education, or conscientious objectors seeking to avoid

military duty, or religious objectors opposing taxation, or fundamentalist
Christians creating religious-infused work environments.

The literature points out, quite properly, that taken to extremes, the
approaches conflict with each other and can lead to untoward results.5

Neutrality can become hostility if it reaches out to stop any government

benefit for religion (tax exempt status or police and fire protection). 6
Coercion analysis can lead to all sorts of subtle and not-so-subtle
problems. The pledge of allegiance is coercive. Must it therefore be

banned? Or is accommodation enough to ameliorate the coercive effect?
Coercion analysis also flies in the face of the separation between church

and state. Accommodation can be a dragon with an endless appetite for
251. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (holding
airline made reasonable efforts to accomodate employee's request for days off for
Sabbath); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding
a state's law compelling flag salute and recitation of pledge of allegiance not within the
government's power).
252. E.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 629 (1978) (holding state law which
prohibited clergy from holding certain public offices unconstitutional); Fowler v. Rhode
Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69 (1953) (holding that a municipal ordinance, which, as applied,
prohibited preaching in a public park by Jehovah's Witness,' but permitted preaching
there by Catholics or Protestants, is unconstitutional).
253. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217,
2222 (1993).
254. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879
(1990) (noting that free exercise claims that challenge legitimate laws must fail);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878) (holding that practice of polygamy
is contrary to social order).
255. E.g., Smith, Free Exercise Doctrine, supra note 31, at 919-26; Lupu, The
Trouble with Accommodation, supra note 248.
256. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510,
2532 (1995) (holding that university's denial of resources to religious group violated
policy of nuetrality).
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permitting actions contrary to the common good, if taken to an extreme.
As stated in Reynolds, if each person can choose to obey or not obey laws
based on religious conviction, each person becomes a law unto himself,
in effect, a unit veto, and the social good suffers. 7 But, as exemplified
in 1995 in Rosenberger,58 in 1994 in Kiryas Joel,19 and two decades
earlier in Yoder,' ° the principles of equality (and its close relative
here-neutrality), tolerance, and accommodation can be used in a
sensitive, non-extreme way to accomplish sound, relatively consistent, and
principled interpretation of the freedom of religion clauses. 26' These
four principles plus the idea of inclusion are shown below to provide a
principled, sensible, and just approach to resolving the Title VII-Religious
Freedom tension. If these principles are used to interpret the religion
clauses, then the current tension and imbalance between Title VII and
religious freedom can be resolved.

III. A

PRINCIPLED APPROACH

Title VII seeks, in part, to protect employees from religious
discrimination. 6 2 The religion clauses seek to insure religious freedom
for citizens of the United States. Although both aim to further religious
freedom, Title VII as interpreted and applied by the courts has reduced the
religious freedom of the religious secular employer by effectively barring
the employer from using religious precepts with respect to employment
decisions. 63
The courts have extended the separationist approach
beyond separating government from religion u 4 to separating the sacred
from the secular in the workplace. The previous sections outlined the
257.
258.
259.
260.

Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167.
115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
406 U.S. 205 (1972).

261. This sort of fact-sensitive decision-making is explicitly called for by Justice
O'Connor in her concurrence in Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2525-28.
262. See generally The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e,
et seq. (1988)).
263. See infra Part IV.B for a discussion of several of the main cases illustrating
this point. One commentator argued that Title VII is also ineffective in protecting
employees. Gregory, supra note 37, at 28 ("Recent decisions have left the individual
religious employee, who is most often in need of effective protection against unlawful
discrimination in secular employment on the basis of religion, largely bereft of
constitutional and statutory safeguards."). Although the protection for the employee in
the pure secular employment setting could be stronger than it is, the religious secular
employer has no effective protection whatsoever.
264. See Underkuffier-Freund, supra note 4, at 848-74.
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contours of Title VII actions' and show the use of principled analysis
This section develops an
in cases involving the religion clauses.'
approach to the religious secular employer problem which, by relying on
some of the fundamental principles used by the courts and commentators
in the area instead of focusing on more technical, mechanistic tests, more

fairly balances

the competing interests of employer,

employee,

community, and state.
This section is organized as follows: First, two ideas of jurisprudence
which form part of the underpinning of the approach are developed.' 67
Then the several principles that I suggest should drive the analysis are
examined and explained."6 Alternative principles which could also form
a discursive framework for resolving the religious employment
discrimination cases are examined and the reasons for their rejection
explained. 9 Then the proposed approach is restated in a somewhat
more precise form.
A. JurisprudentialUnderpinnings
There are two main ideas of jurisprudence I am employing in my
approach to reconcile Title VII with the religion clauses. The first idea
is Ronald Dworkin's distinction between rules and principles. 70 The
second is the role of legal principles in framing discourse on social
concerns and how that framing itself controls, or at least contributes, to
the decision-making process.Y As stated by Steven Smith: "Even when
265. See supra part II.A.
266. See supra part II.B.
267. See infra part MI.A.
268. See infra part MLB.
269. See infra part Ill.C.
270. DWORKiN, supranote 30, at 22-3 1. This distinction is not accepted by every
legal philosopher and is a part of the larger debate involving Dworkin, Hart, and others.
E.g., Kent Greenawalt, Policy, Rights and Judicial Decision, 11 GA. L. REV. 991

(1977), countered by Dworkin in Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 30, at 294-330.
Whatever may be the ultimate verdict on the philosophical validity of this distinction, it
is a valuable description and is used here in a pragmatic, descriptive way. In any event,
my argument does not rest on agreeing with Dworkin or even with the distinction that
he makes and I adopt. The approach I am suggesting works the same whether one calls
the principles "rules," "principles," or "ideas," or whether one thinks of these things as
the same or as hierarchically different or, as Dworkin does, as logically different. The
point is that approaching the Title VII-Religion Clauses problem at this level of
abstraction is superior to the mechanistic, conclusory, rule-based level now used. Thus,
I am using the distinction in a functional, not theoretical way.
271. Smith, Free ExerciseDoctrine, supra note 31, at 526.
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it does not dictate the results in particular cases, legal doctrine has the
power to orient and direct the kind of discourse in which those cases are
debated and decided." 2'
I will argue that these two ideas are fully
compatible with each other, at least in this setting, and that they provide
a sound jurisprudential context to my proposal and that using the approach
of principled analysis rather than lower-level rule-based analysis is not
only effective, but reflects more accurately what is actually done and what
should be done in deciding such fundamental issues.
Dworkin carefully distinguishes rules from principles. The core
distinction he makes is as follows:
The difference between legal principles and legal rules is a
logical distinction. Both sets of standards point to particular
decisions about legal obligatiqn in particular circumstances, but
they differ in the character of the direction they give. Rules are
applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion. If the facts a rule
stipulates are given, then either the rule is valid, in which case
the answer it supplies must be accepted, or it is not, in which
case it contributes nothing to the decision.
But this is not the way . . . principles . . . operate ...
[Principles] do not set out legal consequences that follow
automatically when the conditions provided are met.'
According to Dworkin rules are at least theoretically complete.274 One
could list all the possible rules and all the possible exceptions to them, and
then apply them in a mechanistic fashion using basic syllogistic reasoning.
However, principles are of a different nature. They provide guidance and
are formulations of ideas which influence a decision, but cannot be applied
in a mechanistic way, and can never be completed by listing exceptions.
Dworkin used the following example to illustrate his central distinction:
In 1889 a New York court, in the famous case of Riggs v. Palmer
[115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889)], had to decide whether an
heir named in the will of his grandfather could inherit under that
will, even though he had murdered his grandfather to do so. The
court began its reasoning with this admission: "It is quite true
that statutes regulating the making, proof and effect of wills, and
the devolution of property, if literally construed, and if their force
and effect can in no way and under no circumstances be
272. Id.

273.

DWORKIN,

274. Id. at 24.

supra note 30, at 24-25.
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controlled or modified, give this property to the murderer." But
the court continued to note that "all laws as well as all contracts
may be controlled in their operation and effect by general,
fundamental maxims [principles] of the common law. No one
shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage
of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity,
or to acquire property by his own crime." The murderer did not
receive his inheritance. 5
Dworkin then proceeds to show how the principle of not profiting from
one's own wrong is hardly a rule. For example, adverse possession
violates this principle as does permitting an employee to keep his new
salary when that employee breaks an employment contract and goes to
work for another employer at higher pay.276 These counter-examples do
not negate the principle nor are they "exceptions" to the rule. Dworkin
further stated:
A principle like 'No man may profit from his own wrong'
does not even purport to set out conditions that make its
application necessary. Rather, it states a reason that argues in
one direction, but does not necessitate a particular decision....
All that is meant, when we say that a particular principle is a
principle of our law, is that the principle is one which officials
must take into account, if it is relevant, as a consideration
inclining in one direction or another.'
Considered in light of Dworkin's distinction, the concepts of
tolerance, inclusion, accommodation, neutrality and equality are
principles, not rules. 8 That is, one cannot say that there is a set of
standards, facts, or legal elements for these ideas which, when found to
exist, require one result or another. Tolerance is not self-defining and is
susceptible to no final or complete enumeration of factors or elements that,
when satisfied, means toleration exists. Accommodation, as a principle,
has the same quality. While we should accommodate diversity and
religious practice as much as possible, one cannot clearly state all of the
275.
276.
277.
278.

Id. at 23 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 25.
Id. at 26.
See discussion infra part III.B.
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factors to be used in deciding when an appropriate level of accommodation

has been accomplished. 9
Of course neutrality and equality are quintessential principles. 0
True neutrality is an impossible goal; to do nothing is to do something,
and doing something will invariably involve excluding or including one
group or another."' Equality simply cannot be captured in any test
capable of syllogistic application.'
Inclusion, the final principle I propose adding to the analysis is, like
tolerance, perhaps less a legal principle than a societal aim or moral

attribute. But in the Dworkian typology it functions in this setting like a
principle, i.e., it points one in a direction but does not compel any

particular result.'
Principles function both as the substantive law that justifies the

decision and as discourse-framing concepts. The selection of principles
determines what the focus of the debate will be. They may not determine
the result in the same way that decisional rules do, but they are applied to
the situation to assess the merits of it. While rules are more of a

template, principles are more of a lens through which one views the
problem. Principles by their very nature force consideration of interests

and policies and typically involve weighing competing concerns more than
279. See Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, supra note 248; McConnell,
Accommodation, supra note 248; McConnell, Accommodation Update, supranote 248.
One should be careful to note the distinction between accommodation as a principle and
accommodation as a decisional rule with relatively discrete standards and tests, which is
the way it is used in Title VII religious discrimination actions. "Accommodation" used
as decisional rule states that an employer has a duty to accommodate the religious needs
of employees. The standard is whether the accommodation would impose more than a
de minimus cost on the employer. If so, then the accommodation need not be done. But
note that one can (and I argue one should) still use the principle, the idea, to help decide
whether the employer has done enough. See, e.g., EEOC v. Townley Eng'g and Mfg.
Co., 859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1988). That is, the fuzzy standards and ideas surrounding
a principle can be considered when determining whether the rule-the standard-has been
met.
280. See generally McConnell, Neutrality, supra note 247; Michael A. Paulsen,
Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal ProtectionApproach to Establishment
ClauseAdjudication, 61 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 311 (1986); Jay Alan Sekulow, et al.,
Religious Freedom and the FirstSelf-Evident Truth: Equality as a Guiding Principle in
Interpreting the Religion Clauses, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 351 (1995).
281. See Edward B. Foley, Political Liberalism and Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence,43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 963, 972 (1993).
282. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510
(1995) (explaining how equality is a guiding principle).
283. See Sheila Foster, Difference and Equality: A Critical Assessment of the
Concept of "Diversity," 1993 Wis. L. REv. 105 (1993).
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deterministic rules which dictate results. Once one decides which
principles are relevant, the bounds of the discourse are framed, howsoever
unclear or elastic the edges of that frame may be.
A sporting analogy may help make the idea of the discourse-framing
attribute more clear. If one decides to create a game with rules which
state that a round ball is to be used, that players are prohibited from
touching the ball with their hands or arms, and that the aim is to get the
ball in the opponent's goal, the game will necessarily take on certain
characteristics. That is, these rules will help define the game. If we treat
the characteristics of the location of play as variable, the game will change
even if all of the rules stay the same. For example, in soccer, the size of
the field dramatically affects the game. Outdoor soccer on a wide, long
field has a pace and openness different from the same game played
indoors on a carpeted hockey rink. Throw-ins, long kicks, passing, bankshots, and such are all changed by the nature of the field of play. In the
rule-principle analysis the principle is the field of play. The principles
help define the game and the nature of the game changes according to the
set of principles in which we place the rules.'
If we were to decide that principles of coercion or of encouragement
should guide interpretation of the religion clauses, we would find a very
different field than if accommodation, tolerance, and neutrality were
One could permit a non-coercive burden under one
selected.'
approach but find it lacking in tolerance and neutrality under the other.
For example, requiring an employer to accommodate an employee's
religious needs could coerce the employer to act contrary to the
employer's religious beliefs. If coercion were the polestar of free exercise
analysis, the employee's accommodation claim could fail against an
employer's first amendment challenge based on the coercion principle.
But a sense of evenhandedness or neutrality could lead to a different result
under which both employer and employee interests must be
accommodated. The current approach of separating secular and religious
and favoring employees over employers leads to a
endeavors'
284. I am proposing to use principles both in this discourse-framing sense and as
the actual, direct decisional bases of the decisions. That is, I urge direct application of
the principles. Thus the entire analysis moves to the higher plane of discourse and
analysis based on principles, interests, and policies rather than on lower level rules.
285. Professor Underkuffler-Freund outlines some of the possible differences in
results that may arise if one were to move from the separation model to the freedom of
conscience model she proposes. See Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 4, at 961-85. A
similar result could be found here.
286. Underlying Title VII is the idea that religion does not belong in the workplace,
i.e., that secular endeavors can and must be separated from sacred. This fallacy
permeates the jurisprudence of the religion clauses. See Underkuffler-Freund, supra note
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discounting of the employer's interest in favor of the employee's interest,
even when that interest is merely a freedom from exposure to religion.
Thus we find a symmetry between Dworkin's rule-principle dichotomy
and Smith's discourse-based analysis. As Smith notes, discursive analysis
does not render doctrine irrelevant.'
Doctrine, in the form of both
rules and principles, has "the power to influence the direction and the
terms of the discourse in which legal issues are framed and resolved."U8
That is, the words we choose to discuss the topic affects the way we
discuss and think about the topic. Smith examines the Court's decisions
and decision-making processes in religion cases and concludes:
If one approaches these disparate approaches with formalistic
expectations, then one is likely to read them as adopting a
"compelling interest" balancing test, with two kinds of
qualifications [i.e., carelessness in application and exceptions]..
. . Conversely, from a less formalistic perspective this
codification will seem to be an imposition upon the cases.
Balancing language will appear to be merely one feature in the
Court's rhetorical repertoire ....
It need not follow from this less formalistic reading that the
decisions, taken as a body, were incoherent. In fact, a consistent
theme runs through the decisions: the state has a constitutional
duty-albeit not an absolute duty-to accommodate the practice
of religion. 9
Smith's analysis then reaches a conclusion similar to mine developed in
the previous section, 2' though his is cast in somewhat different
language: Accommodation is a central principle of religion clause
jurisprudence.
And even further, and even closer to Dworkian
terminology:
[I]f one emphasizes the discursive quality of doctrine over its
power to dictate results through sheer logic, this formalist
objection to a doctrine framed in terms of accommodation loses
much of its force. To be sure, doctrine imposing a non-absolute
duty of accommodation cannot logically determine the results in
particular cases. But then, realistically, a compelling interest test
4, at 848-74.
287. Smith, FreeExercise Doctrine, supra note 31, at 527.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 533.
290. See supra part II.
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cannot do that either. What the accommodationist doctrine does
is orient the debate about free exercise problems in terms of
accommodation or, to use what I will argue is in this context a
practically equivalent term, of tolerance.2'1
2

Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univeristy of Virginia 9
illustrates both the use of a principled approach and the effect the selection
of principles can have on the framing of the discourse and the effect that
it, in turn, can have on the outcome. In Rosenberger the Court explicitly
used a principled approach. As stated most clearly by Justice O'Connor
in her concurring opinion, "the [Everson] decision reflected the need to
rely on careful judgment-not simple categories-when two principles, of
equal historical and jurisprudential pedigree, come into unavoidable
And again, "When two bedrock principles so conflict,
conflict. " '
understandably neither can provide the definitive answer. Reliance on
categorical platitudes is unavailing. Resolution instead depends on the
hard task of judging-sifting through the details and determining whether
the challenged program offends the Establishment Clause." 2'
The majority opinion first framed the discourse around free speech,.
and then considered whether the Establishment Clause afforded a
compelling state interest to not support the religious speech. 295
O'Connor's concurrence on the other hand framed the discourse around
two conflicting "bedrock principles" and resolved the conflict by subtle,
Souter's dissent approached the problem
fact-specific judgment. 2'
by framing the discourse as a separationist problem where the state was
clearly supporting religion by paying for the publication. Souter then
looked to determine if there were other principles which would override
the violation. He found neutrality to be lacking in force to overcome the
clear violation.298 Rosenberger thus provides not only another example
of nuanced use of principles in the area of religious freedom, but also an
example of just how affected the discourse is by the principles one chooses
to emphasize, and ultimately an example of how the result is affected by
the discourse-framing concepts.

291. Smith, FreeExercise Doctrine, supra note 31, at 534.
292. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).

293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

Id. at 2526 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
Id. at 2525-26.
Id. at 2516-25.
Id. at 2525-28.
Id. at 2533.
Id. at 2535.
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B. The Principles
The five principles that I suggest should drive judging Title VII cases
involving religious secular employers, i.e., accommodation, equality,
neutrality, tolerance, and inclusion, are interrelated and are not always
distinguishable from one another in the course of a carefully nuanced
analysis. These words stand for ideas which in turn are never full
reflections of reality. Neither the words nor the ideas they represent
should be treated as talismans whose invocation will lead to fully
consistent, predictable, and just results. Instead, these principles should
be used as Justice O'Connor used the neutrality principle in Rosenberger,
i.e., as guides for analyzing the details of each case and doing the hard
job of judging. 2' If these principles are accepted as the ones to be used
to discuss the problems, then an acceptable level of predictability should
follow. Given this understanding, the descriptions of the principles below
ought not be taken as a full exploration of each of them applicable to all
situations. This is not an attempt to make a Grand Unified Theory of the
religion clauses; it is an attempt to develop from prior law a principled
approach to resolving a major conflict in the current law in a way more
respectful of those who do not separate their lives or themselves into the
sacred and the profane.
Before corralling the meaning of the principles, an examination of
why certain current rule-level doctrines are not adequate for evaluating the
Title-VII/religious freedom problem is in order. The Lemon300 approach
is not fully satisfactory in evaluating Title VII situations. Lemon relies
heavily on neutrality (neither advance nor inhibit) and separation
(entanglement) and is designed for laws which are facially neutral with a
secular purpose as in the case of mandatory schooling. 3 ' Title VII has
a secular purpose (furthering inclusion and equality), but it is not religionneutral. That is, in singling out religion for special treatment in
employment settings and for special treatment within the law itself, it does
not have a strictly secular focus. 3" For example, Title VII exempts
religious organizations from the general non-discrimination
requirement. 03 Even more telling for the topic of this article, by
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of religion and by requiring
299. Id. at 2525-28.
300. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).

301. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
302. This special treatment may be compelled by First Amendment considerations,
but that is not the point. The point is that prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
religion is not religiously neutral.
303. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2) (1988).
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employers to accommodate religious needs of employees, Title VII
specifically addresses and limits actions of individuals based on
religion."
Thus to an extent Title VII entangles the government (in
administering the law and in judging cases) in religious issues including
the nettlesome problem of what is and what is not religion.
Ideas of coercion and separation can be found in Title VII's treatment
of religion. 5
It arguably "coerces" employers to accommodate
employees with different religious beliefs. That is, it compels employers
to consider religious factors in employment decisions (accommodation),
or compels them not to consider religious factors in employment decisions
(non-discrimination). Thus, it can, similar to requiring students to say the
pledge of allegiance, compel conduct which a person (in this case an
employer) might find contrary to his or her beliefs.
The idea of separation underlies the structure of Title VII's treatment
of religion. Title VII extends the idea of separating government from
religion into the private marketplace. In requiring nondiscrimination on
the basis of religion, the law presumes the separability of the religious
from the secular and presumes, at least as interpreted, the ability and
propriety of separating religious beliefs and actions from secular ones.
Requiring an employer to accommodate an employee's religious practices
presumes that the employee and employer can or are willing to separate
them from the workplace. Barring discrimination on the basis of religious
beliefs assumes an ability to separate the religious beliefs from the
marketplace beliefs.
This sort of assumed separateness does not
adequately respect the employer who does not separate religion from other
parts of life.
On the free exercise side, the idea of substantial burden is very
important in weighing governmental requirements. Title VII burdens all
employers who bring religion to work. Indeed, it is because of this
burden and the substantiality of it that the religious secular employer cases
arise. But burden analysis with the categorical focus on substantiality,
compelling state interest, and least restrictive alternative is not sufficiently
subtle for resolving these disputes in a sound, just, and consistent way.
The burden on the employer confers a benefit on the employee and yet
they both have free exercise rights. The approach I suggest recognizes the
balance and does not seek to decide cases in the all-or-nothing fashion that
current separation-based and burden-based analysis does.
The ideas of coercion, separation, and burden have roles to play in the
Title VII setting, but they are not sufficient and should not be central.
The principles which work better and which, as shown above, have a long
pedigree in religious clause jurisprudence (as do the concepts of coercion,
304. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2 (1988).

305. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1988).
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equality,

1. Neutrality and Equality
Neutrality is, of course, a central concept in establishment clause
jurisprudence, 3" and closely related is the idea of equality. 3 7 Indeed,
in some respects neutrality is merely an implementation of certain aspects
of the notion of equality. In particular, the idea of evenhandedness
underlies the constitutionality of the provision of certain governmental
benefits to religious institutions in contravention of notions of strict
separation. 30 8 Notions of equality in this evenhandedness sense underlie
prohibiting government from favoring or establishing one religion or
another and from unduly restricting the exercise of one religion or
another.
The idea of neutrality ostensibly extends to being neutral as between
religion and non-religion as well. However, this sort of neutrality is not
possible to achieve. In prohibiting discrimination on the basis of religion
and in requiring accommodation of religious needs of employees, Title VII
itself is not "neutral" in this sense. Indeed, the Constitution is not
neutral-religion has a favored place over non-religious ethical and
philosophical beliefs. 3°
A major problem with an attempt to use a pure neutrality-based
approach is that no government action is truly neutral."' For example,
anytime the state chooses to limit government-sponsored prayer or curtail
the teaching of creationism, some religion is being affected. Even the acts
of choosing texts and teaching tolerance necessarily result in favoring one
religious position or another. 311 Treating religion specially in Title VII
or in the tax code is not treating it "neutrally," in the sense of special
treatment. In a sense, the government promotes religious observance by
306. E.g., Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. 2510; McConnell, Neutrality, supra note 247.
307. See Paulsen, supra note 280, at 311; Sekulow, supra note 280, at 351.
308. E.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct.
2141 (1993) (making school space available to Christian groups on an equal basis as it
is available to secular groups).
309. See generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
310. See Foley, supra note 281, at 972-78.
311. Certain religions, particularly the three Western ones, Judaism, Christianity,
and Islam, teach that they have a lock on the truth and that other religions are therefore
wrong. Some strains of Christianity go so far as to consider teaching any morality aside
from Christian-based morality as wrong and thus see the teaching of tolerance as
decidedly not neutral. The ongoing dispute over teaching creationism is another example
of this sort of problem.
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extending protections in employment to employees who seek to practice
their religions. Thus, the mere inclusion of religion as a grounds upon
which to base a Title VII claim shows a lack of neutrality as between the
religious and the non-religious.
Neutrality beyond evenhandedness is chimerical for another reason as
well: evenhanded allocation of benefits and burdens still results in
governmental actions promoting certain behaviors and discouraging others.
Exempting charitable, educational, and religious organizations from taxes
appears to be evenhanded in its treatment of religion as being like
educational and charitable institutions rather than commercial ones, but
such a benefit clearly would tend to promote certain behaviors. Such
"neutral" governmental actions will affect behavior, but will do so based
primarily on civic, social, economic, and political ideas rather than
explicitly religious ones."'
Neutrality is largely an Establishment Clause principle, but it lives in
the Free Exercise side as well. Seemingly neutral governmental actions
run afoul of the Free Exercise Clause when they substantially burden
religious exercise without a compelling state interest and when the least
restrictive means are not chosen to accomplish the end sought.313 A law
which is not neutral, i.e., one which targets the exercise of religion, has
an even greater burden to overcome." 4
Not only do the ideas of neutrality and equality have currency in cases
involving the religion clauses, but they also undergird antidiscrimination
laws like Title VII. The idea of non-discrimination is certainly a part of
the idea of equality. And the core idea of according all persons equal
respect despite differences is the basis of the prohibition of certain types
of discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment.
Despite their limitations the principles of neutrality and equality are
valuable, especially in exposing actions of the government which could
otherwise evince hostility toward religion. Thus the idea of neutrality is
a sound one at least as a corrective for such misguided (socially,
politically, and constitutionally) actions as school boards prohibiting only
religious organizations from using campus facilities for religious meetings
while permitting the same access to a host of other organizations." 5
312. This is the secular purpose prong of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612

(1971).
313. RFRA, supra note 222. To the extent that Employment Div., Or. Dep't of
Human Resources v. Smith is still good law, the test for generally applicable neutral laws
is one of reasonableness, not compelling state interest. 494 U.S. 872 (1989).
314. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct.
2217, 2227 (1993).

315. See generally Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113
S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
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2. Accommodation
Like the principle of neutrality, the idea of accommodation has solid
footing in both the religion clauses and Title VII, although they do not
mean quite the same thing in the different settings. Accommodation under
the religion clauses generally refers to the ability of the government to
take steps which benefit religion by allowing it room to exist and extends
to steps which differentially benefit religion.316 For example, granting
tax-exempt status to religious organizations benefits them by relieving
them from a burden that commercial concerns experience heavily.
Similarly the government accommodates religion through the various
provisions of Title VII which exempt religious organizations from certain
forms of employment discrimination claims and through requiring
employers to take special steps with respect to meeting the religious needs
of employees.3 17 Accommodation under the religion clauses grants
broader latitude than mere neutrality or evenhandedness would. 318
While the principle of accommodation under the religion clauses
relates to limits on what the government may permissibly do to benefit
religion,1 9 in Title VII the idea of accommodation relates to the
relationship of the employer to the employee. 31 Because the settings are
so different (government-governed; employer-employee) the same term has
somewhat different meanings, though there remains an underlying
similarity. In the employment setting, the term accommodate is explicitly
used to create an affirmative duty on an employer to do something extra
to meet the religious needs of the employee.3
The government has no
similar duty of doing something extra to meet the religious needs of the
governed. 3 1 Under Title VII, the duty of accommodation (with the case316. I am using the term "accommodation" as a principle in much the way the
Court has used it. See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v.

Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994); see supratext accompanying notes 245-50. I am not
using it as an overarching organizing principle, or in precisely the way a number of
commentators have used it. See, e.g., Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, supra
note 248; Lupu, Reconstructing, supranote 248; McConnell, Accommodation, supranote
248; McConnell, Accommodation Update, supra note 248.

317. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2) (1988).
318. See Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2481.
319. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2656 (1992).
320. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
321. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1988).
322. Employment Div., Or. Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990), is a prime example of the government not accommodating the religious needs of

Native Americans. The government could have accommodated the needs but chose not
to do so. This choice was held constitutional. Id. at 890. That is, the right of free
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law gloss) has become a rule with relatively discrete factors and standards
to be applied more than a discourse-framing, direction-pointing
principle. 3'
The employer needs to meet the needs of the employee
only if the burden placed on the employer is de minimus.32 4 The
employer has a duty to accommodate the employee, but an employee
cannot unreasonably refuse a reasonable accommodation. 3'
I am using the principle of accommodation in a general sense. When
I suggest that the courts use the idea of accommodation to help resolve the
tension between the statutory obligations and the free exercise rights of
religious secular employers and their obligations, I am not using the term
in the narrow Title VII sense. Nor am I necessarily using it as it has
come to be used in religious freedom cases. Instead, I am using it in the
more ordinary sense of the word of simply making room for the needs
(and in this setting, the rights) of another. The connotations of
"reconciling," "harmonizing," and "making room for" are what is
intended.
3.

Tolerance and Inclusion

The fourth and fifth principles are closely related to each other. The
principle of tolerance applies both in state action and in private conduct.
There must be official tolerance of religion; this much at least is required
by the Free Exercise Clause.3' Official tolerance requires the state to
permit a wide range of religious actions, even when those actions are
antithetical, to some extent, to the general welfare. Though one would
normally like to see tolerance exercised by the legislative and executive
bodies, the principle of tolerance can guide courts as well. Although
Smith may have been decided correctly as a matter of Constitutional law
(though many of us think not), many would be more comfortable with a
exercise did not overcome the generally applicable, religion-neutral law. Id. at 885.
323. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 71-75 (1977)
(tracing statutory and case law history surrounding employee's discrimination claim that

airline should have accomodated his request for days off for Sabbath).
324. Id. at 84; see part lI.A.1.d for further discussion of the law on this point.
325. Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1085 (6th Cir. 1987) ("Although

the burden is on the employer to accommodate the employee's religious needs, the
employee must make some effort to cooperate with an employer's attempt at
accommodation."); see also Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 145-46 (5th

Cir. 1982) ("[Blilateral cooperation is appropriate in the search for an acceptable
reconciliation of the needs of the employee's religion and the exigencies of the
employer's business.").

326. See Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 4, at 879-91, for a discussion of colonial
religious intolerance.
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legislative exception which is more sensitive to and tolerant of the
religious needs of small, minority sects. 3" Tolerance would perhaps
avoid the paranoid antipathy which leads school boards to so completely
exclude religion from school so as to move from neutrality to hostility.
Official tolerance justifies the special treatment of religion and
religious organizations in Title VII. The toleration shown by excluding
religious organizations from the prohibition of discrimination on the basis
of religion is quite obvious. Perhaps less obvious is the fact that tolerance
provides a sound justification for including religion among the prohibited
grounds for discrimination along with race, sex, national origin and color.
By including religion in the list, the government has taken a non-neutral
position with respect to religion-it has said religion cannot matter in
employment decisions. This favors religion; it is not neutral toward it.
Furthermore, at least with respect to religious secular employers of the
type focused on in this article, the requirement not to discriminate on the
basis of religion is coercive insofar as it coerces an employer to hire
someone the employer would otherwise exclude on the basis of religion.
Both neutrality and coercion fail to justify the Title VII ban on religious
discrimination. In contrast, accommodation and the idea of official
tolerance do justify the state's mandating nondiscrimination, on the basis
of religion. By including religion as an illegal grounds of discrimination,
the state has furthered the principle of tolerance enshrined in the First
Amendment and has itself "tolerated" and accommodated religion.
In addition, the idea of encouraging private tolerance provides a
justification for the inclusion in Title VII by encouraging tolerance in the
workplace. That is, the state has declared an interest in extending the
constitutionally mandated tolerance of religion to the market place in the
private relationships between employer and employee. The employer is
told to tolerate people with different religious views, or face Title VII
sanctions. This sort of tolerance is appropriate in a diverse society such
as the United States. Encouraging private tolerance is a good thing and
a legitimate state interest. Preventing employment discrimination based
on religion furthers this interest.
Because of the manifold conceptions about the meaning of the word
"tolerance," a few notes about it are in order. Dictionary definitions of
tolerance include "not narrow or conservative in thought, expression, or
conduct" and "not strict or severe." 32
The connotations are of
openness and almost welcoming. The connotations of the verb form
(tolerate which denotes "to put up with," and "to neither forbid nor
327. In Employment Div., Or. Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872

(1990), an exception could have been made for religious use of certain controlled

substances, a common element in Native American religions.

328. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1993) (CD-ROM).
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prevent"329) are quite different. They are more condescending and
reflect a dismissive attitude. Tolerance as a legal principle involves
permitting others with different beliefs and practices to have and act upon
those beliefs and practices.
It does not mean acceptance of or
encouragement of those beliefs or practices. But neither does it mean a
condescending permission exemplified by an attitude found in "you are
crazy, but, because I am so superior, I will allow you to be crazy."
Tolerance, as a legal principle, and as noted by Smith, properly involves
both charity toward the other and humility toward one's own
correctness."'
A concept closely related to tolerance is the fifth principle of
" ' One of the central principles in our entire political system,
inclusion.33
at least since the Civil War Amendments, is inclusion. A fundamental
underpinning of Brown v. Board of Education332 was the idea that
excluding African Americans from equal access to education was
unconstitutional. The doctrine of separate but equal was rejected in
recognition that separate meant unequal.333 Exclusion and separation
represent the flipside of inclusion and by banning exclusion and
separation, the value of inclusion was advanced. The aim of including
everyone, of granting access to the goods of our social, economic, and
cultural system, is a legitimate factor to consider when interpreting and
applying antidiscrimination laws. Indeed, inclusion is at core a necessary
support for achieving actual equality. Thus the principles of inclusion and
equality are intimately related to one another.

329. Id.
330. Smith, Free ExerciseDoctrine, supra note 31, at 526.
331. There is a large body of literature surrounding this idea, particularly in
connection with ideas of enhancing diversity. See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL
THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN LAW (1990); Paul D.
Carrington, Diversity!, 1992 UTAH L. REv. 1105 (1992); Ken Feagins,

Wanted-Diversity: White HeterosexualMales Need Not Apply, 4 WIDENER J. PUB. L.
1 (1994); Sheila Foster, Difference and Equality: A CriticalAssessment of the Concept
of "Diversity," 1993 Wis. L. REV. 105 (1993); Christian M. Keiner, A CriticalAnalysis
of Continuing Establishment Clause Flux as Illustrated by Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct.
2640 (1992) and Graduation Prayer Case Law: Can Mutual Tolerance Reconcile
Dynamic Principlesof Religious Diversity and Human Commonality, 24 PAC. L.J. 401
(1993); Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understandingof the Free Exercise Clause and
Religious Diversity, 59 UMKC L. REV. 591 (1991).
332. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
333. Id. at 495.
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C. The Proposal Restated
I propose that in employment discrimination cases where the
employer's religious beliefs or practices are a cause of the employee's
complaint, the standard discrimination theories should be applied, but they
should be interpreted and applied within the framework of the central
principle of accommodation tempered by principles of tolerance, inclusion,
equality, and neutrality. Building on these principles, as distinguished
from attempting to apply relatively rigid rules in a syllogistic fashion, will
help resolve religious discrimination employment disputes in a fair,
principled manner for all three concerned groups, i.e., the employer, the
employee, and society. Indeed, if these principles are followed, many
disputes may be avoided or mediated before they reach the level of
adversely affecting terms and conditions of an employee's employment.
The more traditional decisional rule-based approach has many
problems. Attempts at developing legal rules to be applied in a syllogistic
fashion to the broad range of settings which implicate religious freedom
have not been very successful in general and are even less effective for
religious employment discrimination. One reason for the ineffectiveness
in general stems largely from the complexity and subtlety of the issues and
interests involved.
The ineffectiveness of the hard-rule approach (versus the principle
approach) in the employment setting has the same difficulty as in other
settings plus the added complication of involving more than two parties'
interests. In a typical religion case the primary interests are the state's
interest and the adherent's interest. In a religious secular employment
setting there are three groups-the state, the employer, and the employee.
The problem becomes more difficult because the religious exercise by one,
either the employer or the employee, will affect the room available for
religious exercise by the other. The rules designed for the two-party
model just do not handle this setting well.
For example, the free exercise rules assume a state action burdens just
one individual's (or a like-minded group of which that person is a
member) expression and are designed to minimize that burden. The preSmith free exercise decisional rules have been codified in The Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 199311 as follows: (1) Any burden on the
exercise of must be substantial before the First Amendment free exercise
guarantee applies; and (2) a state may substantially burden religious
exercise (a) provided the state can show a compelling state interest being
served by the action, and (b) provided that the state has chosen the least
334. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.).
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restrictive means of meeting its compelling interest.

5

In the

employment setting a state may have a compelling interest in eliminating

discrimination but, in doing so it is favoring one person's exercise, the
employee's, over another's, the employer's. This result runs afoul of
principles of equality or "neutrality" (as between the affected parties), of
tolerance (for the employer's views), and of accommodating (as a society
and as an employee) the employer's views.
The approach actually taken by the courts to solve the religious
employment discrimination problem is to functionally dismiss or ignore

any claim of religious rights by the employer in favor of such claims by

the employee.336 The courts have too easily found a compelling state
interest in the statute sufficient to overcome the employer's claim founded
on the First Amendment. 337 This sort of analysis misses the true nature

of the problem.338

My proposal attempts to validate and give effect to both the
employer's and employee's religious beliefs and needs to the fullest extent
possible. This approach is premised primarily on the principles of
tolerance and accommodation. Under my approach, not only is the
employer to tolerate and accommodate the employee; but the employee is
to tolerate and accommodate the employer as well.
IV. APPLYING THE PRINCIPLED APPROACH
This section tests the utility of analyzing religious employment
discrimination problems using the principles of accommodation, inclusion,
tolerance, neutrality, and equality. This section is organized on the basis
of the nature of the employer's use of religion in business and in
335. Id. Deciding what burden is substantial causes a great deal of difficulty when
viewed from many angles, including the basic problems of: who is to judge
substantiality-the burdened person or the state; what degree of state interest is
compelling; and, if any less restrictive alternative is available, to what extent does the
cost of that alternative affect the analysis?
336. See generally Blalock v. Metals Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d 703 (6th Cir. 1985).
337. See infra part IV.B.
338. Professor Underkuffler-Freund proposes an approach which removes the
employer's motivation from the employee's prima facie case but which requires the
employee to show with some particularity just which of the employee's religious status
or beliefs (or lack thereof) are offended or not accommodated by the employer. She
argues that for the employee's prima facie case the employer's religious beliefs are not
relevant; the question is whether the particular practices, expressions, and conduct of the
employer, regardless of the motivation or source of those actions, are causing adverse
terms and conditions for the employee. The employer's motivation or the religious
reasons for the employer's actions are relevant only with respect to defenses such as
statutory exemptions or constitutional rights. Underkuffler, supra note 17, at 611-16.
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employment decisions. Focusing on the attributes of the employer is
consistent with the statutory scheme under which general employers are
distinguished from certain religious employers. However, in another
sense this approach turns Title VII on its head because in general Title VII
is intended to protect the interests of the employee, not the employer.339
The statute clearly contemplated secular employers and it works fairly
well for such employers. The statute also contemplated the special nature
of some employers as being either religious organizations or organizations
so closely tied to a religion as to require them to discriminate against nonlike-minded people in order to maintain their identity. But the statute did
not separately address a third type of employer-the employer who is
engaged in secular business activity, but who nonetheless considers the
business to be a religious enterprise. This sort of employer often does not
distinguish between those activities that are secular and those that are
sacred. My argument is that the characteristics of the employer are
relevant for all Title VII cases, not just for those involving religious
institutions.
The three employment settings are: (1) "Pure" secular employers; (2)
religious secular employers; and (3) statutorily-recognized religious
entities such as churches and parochial schools.'
Naturally not all
cases fit neatly within these categories, but the typology is useful
nonetheless. The characteristics and problems associated with the first
two categories will be explored in some depth. The most interesting and
difficult category is the second one. The third category is considered only
briefly in order to highlight contrasts among the categories. 4'
A. "Pure" Secular Employers
Pure secular employers occupy one end of a continuum from secular
to religious employers. This category is composed of employers who do
not consciously incorporate particular religious beliefs and values into the
339. This is particularly true of accommodation claims where it is the employer, not
the employee, who is required to be accommodating.
340. The explicit exclusion of religious institutions, without according special

treatment by "religious secular employers" who want to act on their religious beliefs in
their employment relationships, is one of the arguments against recognizing their special
status. See EEOC v. Townley Eng'g and Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 617-19 (9th Cir.
1988). But the argument being advanced in this article is premised not on The Civil
Rights Act as it has been interpreted, but rather on how it should be interpreted or
modified in light of the First Amendment and competing interests.
341. For a thorough treatment of these employers see Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise
Exemption and ReligiousInstitutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U.
L. REv. 391 (1987) [hereinafter Lupu, Free ExerciseExemption].

1996]

ACCOMMODATING RELIGION AT WORK

workplace. Such an employer may well demand dertain values and beliefs
of employees, e.g., honesty and fidelity to the employer, but the employer
does not base these values explicitly on religious precepts or does not use
a religious basis to support using those values in employment decisions.
These employers emphasize business, narrowly considered; i.e., money,
deals, and the production and delivery of goods and services. These
commercial, secular settings present no truly vexatious problems of
conflicting religious claims between the employee and the employer since
the employer is not claiming religious grounds for its actions. Instead, the
Title VII issues arising under this category in general present a relatively
straightforward problem of balancing an employee's religious interest
against a typical employer's commercial efficiency claim.'2
Nonetheless, as will be seen, there are still interesting issues because the
discrimination can be based on an employee's beliefs and exercises, not
only on status.
The great majority of employers are pure secular employers. From
large public corporations to small private shops, most employers do not
attempt to impose their religion on the workplace or the workers. In most
settings in American society the distinction between the secular and the
religious, between the realm of the marketplace and the realm of the
sacred, seems clear. Business is concerned with money, goods, and deals,
with production and distribution. Religion is concerned with relationships
between people and the divine, with non-economic values, with truth, with
otherworldly concerns, and with souls. Consequently the religious
interests are frequently easy to separate from the secular interests.
Although the distinction between the sacred and the profane is often
valid and is generally easy to make, even in the most secular business
environments arguably "non-economic" values are present. For example,
many businesses value honesty, fair dealing, personal discipline,
teamwork, and cheerfulness. Although these values could possibly be
traced to religious doctrine, they cannot be said to be exclusively from or
properly resident only in either the domain of religion or the marketplace.
A sullen receptionist ought to be discharged or reassigned regardless of
whether the employer requires a cheerful, prompt, polite greeting because
of the employer's religion, or because the employer just wants it that way,
or because it is just plain good for business.
For the typical secular business, the moral or ethical basis for an
employer's employment decision is not relevant to the issue of
342. In an accommodation claim, an employer needs to do very little to
accommodate before the business efficiency concerns outweigh the accommodation
sought. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977). See supra
part II.A.l.d.
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discrimination. 3 A non-productive employee need not be retained
regardless of race, color, sex, or religion. As long as the employer is
using regular, traditional criteria of performance in the manner in which
that performance is traditionally defined in business, including subjective
criteria and values or attitudinal criteria, then most religious discrimination
cases should be quite straightforward from a legal or theoretical
standpoint. For example, a law firm which never hired Jews or one
which only hired Jews would be guilty of status-based discrimination the
same as though the terms "women" or "African Americans" were
substituted for the word "Jews." Similarly, overt harassment based on
religious status would generally be actionable under the same standards as
harassment on the basis of sex.
But even secular employers are affected by the distinct nature of
religious discrimination as potentially arising not from birthright but from
belief. For example, a secular employer does have one extra duty in the
area of religious discrimination: accommodate an employee's religious
needs. Thus a failure to try to accommodate a sabbatarian would violate
the law. No other grounds for discrimination presents this sort of beliefbased duty.
The typical disparate treatment, disparate impact, and harassment
theories apply with few quirks attributable to the fact that the basis for the
discrimination is religious.'
Though the claim may be difficult to
prove, an intentional discrimination (disparate treatment) claim (excluding
for now harassment claims) does not present any theoretical difficulties in
the secular employer situation. For the secular employer there is no
justification for treating an employee worse on the basis of the employee's
religion. Claims of customer comfort levels should have no more
credence here than in sex- or race-based claims. For example, a claim
that all of the customers are Christians should not justify refusing to hire
or promote a Muslim any more than a claim that all customers are white
justifies hiring only whites.
One case which involves direct disparate treatment by a mostly secular
employer is Blalock v. Metals Trades, Inc.'
Although in Blalock the
employee wanted to work in a "Christian company," and one of the
owners of Metal Trades represented it to be one,' the company did not
343. See Underkuffler, supra note 17, at 588-625 (discussing the value-free
workplace).

For these situations, i.e., secular employers and religious employees,

Professor Underkuffler-Freund's proposal of not inquiring as to the source of the
employer's values makes sense and could generally work well.
344. See supra part II.A (detailed description of these theories).

345. 775 F.2d 703 (6th Cir. 1985), aff'd on appealafter remand, 833 F.2d 1011
(6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1064 (1989).
346. Id. at 704.
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have a policy of being a purely Christian environment and was generally
a secular company. After a time Blalock and one of the two main owners
of the company developed theological disagreements. 3 7 Ultimately
The court held that
Blalock was fired because of those disagreements.'
such an action based on a difference of religious belief was actionable
religious discrimination. "
The disparate impact theory is more problematic in religion cases. In
some cases the disparate impact theory is viable where there is no need for
statistical proof. In instances where a seemingly innocent policy itself
excludes members of a religious group, the disparate impact theory works
well. Nonetheless, there is at least one significant difference between a
disparate impact case based on birthright and one based on religion.
Normally an employment policy which excludes people by race or sex
In contrast, an
must be changed with respect to all employees.
employment policy which adversely affects a particular religious group can
be retained in general by the simple expedient of making exceptions as
needed for various religious needs. The principle of accommodation
works well in understanding and resolving these problems. In effect, a
disparate impact case becomes an accommodation case with the religious
employee receiving special treatment, i.e., treatment based on an
This use of
exception to a general policy still kept in force.
accommodation furthers the interests of tolerance on the part of both the
employee and the employer.
For example, a requirement that men not wear headgear and that they
not have beards, a seemingly neutral policy not targeted at any particular
A fairly simple
religious group, would ipso facto exclude Sikhs.
accommodation would eliminate the discriminatory effect of these
otherwise neutral policies-the employer need not abandon the general
policy in order to comply with the law; the employer need only
accommodate the particular need of the Sikhs. 3 ° The employer in this
347. Id. at 705.
348. Id. at 705-06.
349. Admittedly, this case is somewhat atypical of purely secular employers.
Nonetheless, it fits within the first category, although it would be placed on the

continuum toward the second category since one of the employers acted on the basis of
religious values. Id. at 705, 708.
350. EEOC v. Sambo's of Ga., Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86 (N.D. Ga. 1981). See also
United States v. Board of Educ. for Sch. Dist. of Phila., 911 F.2d 882 (3rd Cir. 1990);
EEOC v. Reads, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1150 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (holding that Muslim woman
improperly denied position as third grade counselor because her religion required her to
wear a scarf covering her head); cf. Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 4J, 723 P.2d 298
(Or. 1986) (upholding a state statute that prohibits the wearing of religious clothing while

teaching in a public school in the face of a Sikh woman's free exercise challenge), appeal
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example could require neatness of appearance and, in the case of a
restaurant, the use of a hairnet to avoid potential health hazards from long
hair or facial hair.
Another common example arises from sabbatarians who are required
by their religion not to work on the sabbath. 5 In most employment
situations an employer should be able to accommodate that employee
despite general requirements that employees work on Saturday (or Sunday,
depending on which day the sabbatarian observes). For example,
requiring the worker to find another employee with whom to swap
workdays has been held a reasonable accommodation. 2
If no
accommodation were possible, then this otherwise neutral job requirement
should withstand a discrimination challenge. Similarly, allowing members
of a religious sect to take that particular sect's religious holidays off is a
simple accommodation for the secular employer to do. Thus the disparate
impact of seemingly neutral policies can be handled effectively as
accommodation claims.
The legal rules for these sorts of disparate impact claims comport well
with the principled approach advocated here and there is little impetus to
revise them significantly. Requiring employers either to modify policies
or to make exceptions to seemingly neutral employment policies which
have the effect of excluding whole classes of employees on the basis of
religion furthers the aims of inclusion and equality. Demanding inclusion
is fully consonant with furthering tolerance.
However, disparate impact cases which would need to be proven by
demonstrating a statistical imbalance in a workforce present significant
conceptual and proof problems. In general, statistics can be used to
establish that the overall employment policy has a discriminatory impact
dismissedfor lack of a substantialfederal question, 480 U.S. 942 (1987).

351. In 1980, the EEOC issued regulations which create a presumption of religious
discrimination if the employer inquires into the availability of a prospective employee for
work. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.3(b)(2) (1995). The employer has the burden of production
and of persuasion to demonstrate that such inquiry did not affect the employment
decision. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.3(b)(3) (1995).
352. See, e.g., Brenerv. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 145 (5th Cir. 1982);

United States v. Albuquerque, 545 F.2d 110, 114 (10th Cir. 1976). But see Smith v.
Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081 (6th Cir. 1987) (requiring employee to find another
with whom to trade shifts was not adequate accommodation where employee's religious
beliefs prevent him from aiding another to sin by working on Sunday). See also Brown
v. General Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956 (8th Cir. 1979) (stating that where employer
would not have incurred any actual cost in accommodating employee's refusal to work
on the Sabbath, refusal to so accomodate was unreasonable); Redmond v. GAF Corp.,
574 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding employer's actions were unreasonable where
employer made no effort to accommodate employee's religious needs and failed to
demonstrate that it would suffer undue hardship).
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where the particular offending employment practice cannot be
articulated.35 One problem with a statistical case is choosing which
group should be a legitimate group for purposes of comparison. Should
the comparison be between all Jews, Christians, and Muslims as one
group (all western religions based on shared stories-all "people of the
book")? Or should Jews, Christians, and Muslims be treated as three
groups? If so, then why not further splintering-Orthodox, Reform, and
Conservative Jews; Catholics and Protestants; Shiite and Sunni Muslims.
And even further-among the Christians for example: Catholics,
Anglicans, Eastern Orthodox, Presbyterians, Methodists, Lutherans,
Baptists, AME, Jehovah's Witnesses, Seventh Day Adventists, Mormons,
and so on. Or why not group sects by certain like characteristics, e.g.,
Papists, Evangelicals, Ecstatics, Mainstream, or New Age.
For statistically small sects (in the United States) like B'Hai's,
Unitarians, Quakers, and Muslims proof of discrimination by the statistical
disparate impact theory would be nearly impossible. In a statistical
disparate impact claim the comparison is to be between the number from
the aggrieved group actually employed compared to the number from the
group who are qualified for the position in the relevant market. Because
there are not likely to be enough qualified members of the particular
religious sect in the applicant pool to make a statistically meaningful case
for comparison, such claims should not be allowed for small groups.3 '
But one ought not rule out the statistical-imbalance theory for all
religious discrimination claims. If the particular, relevant market has
sufficient numbers of the excluded group to make the statistical approach
valid, it should be allowed. For example, the (hopefully) past practice of
some law firms of excluding Jews, without explicitly having a policy to
do so, could well be challenged using the statistical disparate impact
theory in some markets where there are a sufficiently large number of
Jewish lawyers and job applicants.
The aims of the statistical imbalance approach are to prevent
employers from masking intentional discrimination behind seemingly
neutral policies and to uncover hidden bias even in the absence of an
353. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i), (1)(B)(i) (1988 & Supp. 11 1991).
354. This practical difficulty of proof exposes the fundamental flaw in alarmist
responses to hypothetical affirmative action programs based on religion, such as that
raised in John E. Sanchez, Religious Affirmative Action in Employment: Fearful
Symmetry, 3 DEr. C.L. RaV. 1019 (1991). The same argument can be made for national
origin discrimination. If Sanchez's point is that either voluntary or imposed affirmative
action is not appropriate to redress religious discrimination, he proves too much. Just
as racial diversity can be an aim, so religious diversity can be an aim. And one cannot
justify exclusion on the basis of religion just because an affirmative action program runs
into a problem with too many sects from which to choose.
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improper overt motive. These aims are fully consonant with the principles
of inclusion, equality, and tolerance. If the cases were decided directly
on these principles (plus the accommodation principle) then the statistics
would be used only to show exclusion and inequality. That is, an absence
of members of a sect from employment may indicate a violation of the
principles of inclusion, equality, and tolerance. For large enough groups
the EEOC and the courts should attempt to decide cases to include
qualified of members of the excluded group in the particular employment
setting. Principles of tolerance and equality would also thereby be
furthered.
The accommodation principle would work as the
accommodation rule now does-the employer need not throw out an
otherwise viable employment policy. Instead, the employer can modify
or make exceptions to the policy to accommodate the religious needs of
the excluded group. Note that under any circumstances the statistical
approach would still not work for small groups.
In most cases, the harassment theory of discrimination presents no
particular difficulties in the secular employer environment. Harassment
based on religion is often the same as harassment based on sex or race or
national origin insofar as it targets one's status as a member of a different
group.35 But there is one significant distinction between a "typical"
harassment claim and a religion-based one: One must be careful to draw
the line between permissible religious discourse on the one hand and
harassment on the other. This line is akin to the difference between a
serious discussion of gender roles and insulting sexual comments and
innuendo; it is not always easy to draw, but it does exist.356 Naturally,
to the extent the discrimination moves from status-based (i.e., religion or
religious group affiliation) to belief-based, the line becomes much more
fuzzy. But it is not too much for an employer to enforce civility, to
referee conduct and to curb an abusive style of comments relating to
religion in the same way employers are required to do for sex and race.
Nonetheless, courts ought to tread quite cautiously in cases of employees
claiming harassment based on words and even arguments. That is, civil
liability ought not follow from mere incivility or even sharp exchanges of
views or even passionate arguments. But at some point the line is crossed
and the argument becomes abuse and the incivility becomes harassment.
At that point the employer must act or else must be liable for the failure
to act.
355. E.g., Goldberg v. City of Phila., No. CIV.A. 91-7575, 1994 WL 313030,
(E.D. Pa. June 29, 1994).
356. See Volokh, supra note 33 (discussing the problem of drawing the line between
permissible speech (including religious speech) and harassment).
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Though drawing the line in such cases will never be an easy task, the
general rules of law in this area are now fairly well developed." The
harassment complained of must be severe or pervasive.358 A few
discrete episodes of hurtful language or "practical jokes" are not
sufficient. Harassment is to be determined from the totality of the
circumstances. Numerous small slights generally ought not add up to a
harassment claim, particularly in a religious-belief or conduct claim. If
these slights are from an employer (as distinguished from co-employees)
and if they affect the employee's terms and conditions of employment,
then a disparate impact claim exists. But, if they are simple insensitivity
by an employer or intolerance by co-employees, then the harassment ought
not be too easily found. The desirability of vigorous discourse about
deeply important things ought to give pause to one seeking to stifle
expression of disagreement based on beliefs. As stated by the Supreme
Court in Cantwell,
To persuade others to his own point of view, the pleader, as we
know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men
who have been, or are, prominent in church or state, and even to
false statement. But the people of this nation have ordained in the
light of history, that, in spite of the probability of excesses and
abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to
enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens
of a democracy. 359
Courts should consider the extent to which their decisions will enhance
societal goals of inclusion, tolerance, and respect for equal claims to
human dignity in deciding when vehemently uncivil discourse becomes
harassment.
Despite the well-developed statements of the legal rules, drawing the
line between callousness and an actionable harassing environment is not
easy. In one case an employee with certain religious sensibilities was
357. See supra part II.A.
358. Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 WL 5436 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992);
Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 577 (2d Cir. 1989); Lipsett v.
University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 897-98 (1st Cir. 1988); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co.,
833 F.2d 1406, 1413 (10th Cir. 1987); Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210,
213 (7th Cir. 1986); Lambert v. Condor Mfg., Inc., 768 F. Supp. 600 (E.D. Mich.

1991) (finding an employer in violation of an employee's right to be free of religious
discrimination by refusing to accommodate the employee's religious beliefs by removing
offending nude photos of women from the workplace).
359. Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
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taunted by his more vulgar fellow employees. 3 ° The employer took
little action until it ultimately agreed to transfer him to another
department. But the transfer was delayed and because of the continued
harassment, the employee quit before the transfer occurred. One issue
was whether the use of vulgarities around an employee with known
religiously-derived sensitivities to such language is religious harassment.
The court stated the test for whether the harassment was religious to be
"[wIhether a comment occurred because of an individual's religious beliefs
or would not have occurred but for an individual's religion . . .. 61
The court reversed the summary judgment for the employer and remanded
the case.
In another case, Turner v. Barr, the court listed the following to
support its finding of religious harassment:
(1) The Plaintiff was required to suffer reference to the
Holocaust by one of the supervisory Deputies. The Deputy
related a joke about the Holocaust. The Deputy stated that the
cost of Germany's reconstruction after World War II was high
because of its high gas bill during the War.
(2) When the Plaintiff was assigned to collect for a charity
drive, he was subjected to comments about the appropriate nature
of the assignment, because Jews were supposedly skilled in
dealing with money.
(3) On another occasion, when the Plaintiff was assisting in
the execution of a writ at a jeweler's store, the Plaintiff was told
that he should have been running the store. The clear and
indisputable thrust of the comment was that being a jeweler was
something for Jews. 362
This group of three items taken together, though certainly morally
improper and likely to be hurtful (as they were to the plaintiff), do not
seem to be in themselves sufficient to support a finding of religious
harassment under the "severe and pervasive standard." Probably because
of this concern, the court did note that its opinion did not contain a
complete list of all of the incidents and did not detail the full factual basis
for the court's decision. Furthermore, this case included racial epithets
and other evidence of disparate treatment on the basis of race and perhaps
the decision should be understood in that light. This case also involved
direct, targeted harassment based not on a difference of beliefs, but solely
on the basis of an employee's status as a member of a particular sect. As
360. Finnemore v. Bangor Hydro-Elee. Co., 645 A.2d 15, 16 (Me. 1994).
361. Id. at 17.
362. Turner v. Barr, 806 F. Supp. 1025, 1028 (D.D.C. 1992).
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a general proposition, it is easier (and properly so) to convince a court to
find liability for even a few outrageous, targeted items than for more
vague, general actions.
As a remedy, the court ordered that "the Defendant, its agents,
servants, and employees, shall be and hereby are directed to hereafter
refrain from any racial, religious, ethnic, or other remarks or slurs
contrary to their fellow employees' religious beliefs."363 This sort of
broad sweep would seem to prohibit even reasoned, measured discussion
about religious beliefs whenever those "remarks" were religious in nature
and "contrary to their fellow employee's religious beliefs." Someone who
sought to explore theological issues such as why Jews consider themselves
the chosen people and Christians do not so consider them, or why
Christians believe in Christ as a Messiah, but Jews and Muslims do not,
would be making remarks "contrary" to the other's beliefs. It would
seem that such discussion would be protected from governmental
interference on the grounds of both Free Exercise and Free Speech.
Even in a case with such an overly broad injunction, the principles of
tolerance and according dignity to another person regardless of differences
in belief underlie the court's decision insofar as it attempted to
accommodate the employee and to encourage tolerance of the employee
by other employees. But tolerance and accommodation ought not mean
that employers and employees cannot talk about matters of central
importance in their lives. Instead it should mean that they should discuss
the matters with civility, respect, and reason. 3" Of course this "should"
is not a legal must. The line between liability and nonliability would be
drawn much further from the dispassionate, civil, reasoned discourse pole
and much closer to the emotional, abusive, epithet-slinging discourse pole.
But the idea of civil, reasoned discourse need not be abandoned merely
because the line of liability moves to toward the nasty end of the
spectrum.
The focus in this article is on what the state can or should mandate,
not on what private employers can or should do in this area. A private
employer could implement work rules which limit or even nearly eliminate
religious discussion; such private action is not state action and so is not
363. Id. at 1029.
364. According respect on the basis of tolerance of another's viewpoint does not
mean acceptance of that viewpoint. One can and should still make judgments about what
is right and true and better, but one ought not be dismissive of those with other ideas.
Smith, FreeExerciseDoctrine, supra note 31, at 526-27. Female circumcision is wrong
regardless of cultural-religious norms and one need not change this view to respect, as
fellow human beings, those who hold another view. Similarly, one can be tolerant of
those on the other side of the abortion issue (whichever side one is on) without adopting

that view.
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reached by the Constitution. But the reason the employer could not
completely ban religious discussion is that it would seem that at some
point an employee's statutorily protected right would permit some
discussion and expression under the accommodation theory. For example,
an outright ban would not accommodate the interests of all employees,
particularly those for whom witnessing is a religious requirement.
Furthermore, the principles which underlie the area and which this article
argues should be placed even more to the front would not support such a
ban. Banning all religious expression may further equality in a weak
sense (non-tested, non-diverse) and may further superficial tolerance, but
it would not deepen respect and tolerance and encourage acceptance of
diversity which can only come about through fuller exploration of the
values and beliefs of another.
A business enterprise may have an interest in banning religious
expression because doing so may (a) reduce exposure to suits for religious
harassment, and (b) may increase workplace harmony. But the employer
will then have the problem of deciding what is religious expression.
Certain obvious actions like explicit discussion of religious beliefs and
Biblical interpretation may present easier cases. But a discussion about
Israel's legitimacy may well be more religious than political though
expressed in political terms.
The particular extent to which one can comment and the extent to
which the court can create a remedy in the nature of a gag order are in
practice difficult. It is doubtful that either Congress or the courts can
create pristine work environments by passing laws and issuing orders.
Because excluding all religious speech and expression lacks viability, an
opinion like Turner v. Barr puts employers on notice of the need to take
specific actions to encourage tolerance of religious diversity and to
encourage inclusion of those with different religious views. Thus, despite
its weaknesses, Turner v. Barr furthers two of the core policies of this
area of the law, tolerance and inclusion. Since the option of excluding all
religious speech and expression appears unworkable, and possibly illegal
under Title VII under certain circumstances, employers would be well
advised to establish traditional liberal values of tolerance and reasoned
discourse in employees in order to avoid liability.
The fourth theory, the duty to accommodate, was designed for the
secular employer and presents no problems other than those identified
above. 365 The duty to accommodate is obviously tightly tied to
principles of tolerance, accommodation and inclusion. However, to be
consistent with the aims of the law and the goals of inclusion and
tolerance, the duty to accommodate should be raised above its current
"more than a de mininimus cost" standard. Perhaps the level articulated in
365. See supra notes 316-25 & 342-52 and accompanying text.
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the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)36 which requires
employers to do more than show that they would suffer "more than a de
minimus cost" by accommodation would be adequate.367 Though the
ADA uses the same general test, i.e., the employer must make
"reasonable accommodation" unless to do so would cause "undue
hardship,"3 61 the clear thrust of the language and the examples in the
statute make the duty meaningful and raise the de minimus standard to one
of reasonability under all of the circumstances.369
366. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213

(1988 & Supp. II 1990)).
367. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).
368. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1988) (accommodation of religion) and
Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84, with 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3), (9) (Supp. IV 1992) (examples
of reasonable accommodation for disabilities) and 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10),
12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. IV 1992) (undue hardship defined and factors identified for
disability accommodation).
369. The overall approach advocated in this Article ultimately contemplates that
employers and employees would typically work out practical solutions rather than taking
a rights-based approach in court. This approach of seeking a negotiated accommodation
is similar to the approach contemplated by the Americans With Disabilities Act under
which a pragmatic approach to meeting the needs of the employer and employee is
preferred to a more absolutist rights-based approach. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (Reasonable
Accommodation); 29 C.F.R. § 1630, App. § 1630.9 "The determination of which
accommodation is appropriate in a particular situation involves a process in which the
employer and employee identify the precise limitations imposed by the disability and
explore potential accommodations that would overcome those limitations." Id.
Process of Determining the Appropriate Reasonable Accommodation. Once
a qualified individual with a disability has requested provision of a reasonable
accommodation, the employer must make a reasonable effort to determine the
appropriate accommodation. The appropriate reasonable accommodation is
best determined through a flexible, interactive process that involves both the
employer and the qualified individual with a disability. Although this process
is described below in terms of accommodations that enable the individual with
a disability to perform the essential functions of the position held or desired,
it is equally applicable to accommodations involving the job application
process, and to accommodations that enable the individual with a disability to
enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment. See Senate Report at 3435; House Labor Report at 65-67. When a qualified individual with a
disability has requested a reasonable accommodation to assist in the
performance of ajob, the employer, using a problem solving appr.oach, should:
(1) Analyze the particular job involved and determine its purpose and essential
functions; (2) Consult with the individual with a disability to ascertain the
precise job-related limitations imposed by the individual's disability and how
those limitation could be overcome with a reasonable accommodation; (3) In
consultation with the individual to be accommodated, identify potential
accommodations and assess the effectiveness each would have in enabling the
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Instead of letting employers off with a showing of merely de minimus
hardship, employers should be required to show that the hardship is real
and "undue" and not a mere inconvenience. The guiding principles
should be tolerance and inclusion, not maximum economic efficiency.
The societal values here outweigh mere claims of economic hardship,
unless that hardship is serious enough to be "undue." If analysis is
premised on encouraging tolerance and promoting accommodation in
general, then the secular employer ought to be required to shoulder some
of this burden. As stated by the Sixth Circuit:
[A]n employer does not sustain his burden of proof merely by
showing that an accommodation would be bothersome to
administer or disruptive of the operating routine. In addition, we
are somewhat skeptical of hypothetical hardships that an employer
thinks might be caused by an accommodation that never has been
put into practice. The employer is on stronger ground when he
has attempted various methods of accommodation and can point
to hardships that actually resulted.370
Despite the general theoretical simplicity of the pure secular employer
setting, not all cases involving secular employers would be so clear-cut.
Many employers develop a corporate culture to which the employees must
conform. The culture may be open and non-hierarchical like the early
Apple Computer company or rigidly hierarchical and formalistic like IBM
or Ross Perot's EDS. Whichever corporate culture exists, that culture
will be based upon the extra-economic values of management as well as
on the judgment of management as to what will generate profits. Painted
most broadly, some employers want employees to have balanced lives and
some want employees to have their lives revolve around work."' An
ill fit between a particular employee and a particular corporate culture can
often be traced to the difference between the values of the management
and the employee. 3" Sometimes those conflicts in values will be based
on life-style choices which may not be founded upon religious ideas, e.g.,
value of family and community over corporation and profit. But
individual to perform the essential functions of the position; and (4) Consider
the preference of the individual to be accommodated and select and implement

the accommodation that is most appropriate for both the employee and the
employer.
Id.
370. Draper v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 520 (6th Cir. 1975).
371. See Burges, supra note 161.
372. Some incompatibilities are based on disputes as to business goals and means
of accomplishing those goals. Id.
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sometimes the conflicting values are directly the result of the employee's
religious beliefs.
Where the employer is making the same demand on all employees and
so is not treating some employees differently from others, and where a
neutral policy functionally excludes not only members of a religious group
but also others who do not fit the corporate culture for what could be
purely secular or philosophical or "life-style" choice reasons, the theory
of failure to accommodate ought to be applied with great care. The
statutory text of Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of
differences in values, but on the basis of religion. However, Title VII
interpretation has not followed the Yoder approach which would protect
the Amish and their values because of the religious sources of them, but
which would not so protect a follower of Thoreau. In fact the EEOC and
the courts have broadened the term "religion" to include atheists and the
rights of the non-religious such that the employee need not show a
particular religious value which is being affected." 3
The EEOC regulations do not distinguish between values-based
decisions and religious-based decisions.374 The regulations define as
religious a broad range of secular values as long as those values are
somehow central to the employee's core belief system. Though as a
philosophical and even religious proposition this approach seems sound,
as a legal one, particularly in the employment context, it seems too broad
for at least two reasons.
First, the inconsistency with the First
Amendment
can cause unnecessary
problems and analytic
complexities;37 5 and second, as so well-exposed by Professor
373. 29 C.F.R. § 1605 (1994); EEOC v. Townley Eng'g and Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d
610, 620-21 (9th Cir. 1988).
374. The EEOC Guidelines contain the following basic definition of what is meant
by a religious practice or belief: "[I]n those cases in which the issue [of whether or not
a practice or belief is religious] exist[s], the Commission will define religious practices
to include moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held
with the strength of traditional religious views." 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1994). The
EEOC cites United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) and Welsh v. United States,
398 U.S. 333 (1970) in support of this expansive interpretation. It does not cite the
decision in Yoder which distinguished religion from philosophy. The constitutional
limitation is not coextensive with the statutory obligation as developed in the EEOC
regulation.
375. For example, how does an evangelical religious employer who displays
religious symbols accommodate an employee who believes as a matter of moral and
ethical belief that religious, moral, and ethical beliefs are an intensely personal matter
not to be discussed, as a matter of principle, in the workplace. Is this the sort of belief
the act was intended to protect and shield? To the extent the employee is asserting an
ethical basis and not a religious basis, it would seem that, under Yoder, the conflict is
between a constitutional right on the one hand and a statutory or regulatory right on the
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Underkuffler-Freund, the goal of achieving value-neutrality is illusory at
best.376
The source of the employee's conflicting beliefs ought not to change
commonplace incompatibility into a viable religious discrimination claim.
If an employer requires 100% commitment from employees to the
exclusion or diminution of employee involvement in family and
community and the employee's religious beliefs put family first, this
incompatibility of beliefs ought not be actionable under Title VII. In this
sort of case the principle of equality or non-discrimination in treatment of
the employees seems to override a claim for accommodation.
The belief component of religious discrimination which distinguishes
it from the other types is visible even in the "pure" secular setting.
Courts need to recognize this and carefully distinguish between statusbased and belief-based discrimination, particularly in cases involving
values and in cases involving a religious adherent seeking beneficial
treatment, i.e., seeking accommodation. Firing an employee because of
a difference in belief in the infallibility of the Pope would not seem to be
justified. Firing an employee because of a difference in belief about the
relative importance of work and family would seem to be legal under of
Title VII.
B. Religious Secular Employers
This group of employers is very difficult to corral and is quite
The essential common feature is that the employer
heterogeneous.
intentionally imports religious values into the secular business world.
Some employers create religiously infused environments,3 n others
require certain religious-type conduct such as attendance at Bible study
meetings,378 others make employment decisions on the basis of beliefs
and values explicitly derived from religious sources, and still others make
the decisions explicitly on the basis of religious status or on the nature of
the compatibility or "rightness" of the employee's beliefs and
practices.379
Religious secular employers create several issues touching central
tenets of our conceptions of liberty. One cluster of issues surrounds the
other. The balance in such a case may shift somewhat in favor of the religious claim

since the claims of the two sides are no longer premised on the same fundamental law.
376. Underkuffler, supra note 17.
377. State v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844, 846 (Minn. 1985),
dismissedfor lack ofjurisdiction, 478 U.S. 1015 (1986).
378. EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 612 (9th Cir. 1988).

379. Dayton Christian Sch. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 766 F.2d 932, 934 (6th
Cir. 1985).
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intractable problem of distinguishing religion and religious activity from
secular activity. For example, when an employer uses the Bible as the
company's business manual, 3" what distinguishes use of that book from
On a Clear Day You Can See GeneralMotors,381 or How to Win Friends
and Influence People382 or any other business manual, published or
private? The source of the information is, according to adherents,
different: the Bible comes from the mind of God and the other books from
the pens of people. The main purpose is different: one is concerned with
eternal verities while the others are concerned with earthly wealth. But
these distinctions are not based on the use to which the book is put, i.e.,
running the business. If one is to tell an employer that the use of the
Bible as a guide to business is improper, then one is clearly sending the
message that the Bible is only religious. To make that judgment requires
one to determine what is and what is not religious. Furthermore, this
distinction is based solely on the religious content and source of the Bible.
Consequently, even secular use (running a business) of a religious item
(the Bible) can be found, quite improperly, to offend Title VII.
A closely related problem arises from the necessity to decide which
business purposes are proper and which are not. An employer who
dedicates his business to the glory of God and runs it as a discipleship to
be used to witness for God and Jesus ought not have the court rule that
such a purpose is not a legitimate business purpose. An employer who
intends to use the business both as a secular platform for making money
and as a religious platform for spreading the word seems to have a
legitimate claim to access to the marketplace under principles of equality
and inclusion. The Free Exercise clause would seem to support such a
claim and the courts have so recognized. But the courts have always ruled
that Title VII restricts the religious aspects of the
employer in favor of the
3
employee whenever the employee complains.I u
The effect of such rulings is to diminish the ability of certain types of
Christians to be employers. That is, if a religious person seeks to be an
employer and seeks to bring the religion into the workplace, the law will
severely limit that person's ability to do so. Despite the Ninth Circuit's
comments about mutual accommodation in Townley, 3 4 that court also
wrote: "Where the practices of employer and employee conflict, as in this
380. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d at 847.
381. ROBERT A. WRIGHT, ON A CLEAR DAY You CAN SEE GENERAL MOTORS

(1968).
382. DALE CARNEGIE, How TO WIN FRIENDS AND INFLUENCE PEOPLE (Pocket

Books 1982) (1936).
383. E.g., Townley, 859 F.2d 610; Brown Transp. Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 578 A.2d

555 (Pa. 1990).
384. Townley, 859 F.2d at 621.
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case, it is not inappropriate to require the employer, who structures the
workplace to a substantial degree, to travel the extra mile in adjusting its
free exercise rights, if any, to accommodate the employee's Title VII
rights."" The Townley court acknowledges that "Title VII . . .could

not, require individual employers to abandon their religion."386 But it
can and does favor the employee over the employer; it is the employer

who must accommodate under the statute.
Most of the free exercise defenses to employment discrimination
claims have been raised by employers who are evangelical, fundamentalist
Christians who believe that everything they do is done as a "discipleship
for the Lord." 3" In all of the reported cases the employer who brought
religion into the business was found to have violated Title VII or similar
state laws and to not be protected by the First Amendment.388 In most
of the cases there is little discussion of the employer's right of free
exercise and the constitutionality of the statute as applied against such an
employer.389 As pointed out by Professor Underkuffler-Freund, the
courts have assumed that religion in the marketplace is discriminatory. 3"

A common problem which complicates analysis is that cases can
involve not just religious discrimination, but also discrimination on the
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. E.g., State v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844, 859 (Minn.
1985), dismissedfor lack ofjurisdiction478 U.S. 1015 (1986); Townley, 859 F.2d 610.
388. E.g., Blalock v. Metals Trade Inc., 775 F.2d 703 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that
an employee discharged after theological dispute with his supervisor who wanted the
employee to defer to him on religious matters was discrimination under Title VII); Young
v. Southwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that
employer's refusal to excuse an employee from the religious portion of the weekly
business meetings was a failure to accomodate the employee's religious beliefs). But see
Meltebeke v. Bureau of Labor and Indus., 903 P.2d 351 (Or. 1995) (employer not liable
under state law because of lack of notice or knowledge of hostile or intimidating effect
of employer's witnessing of employee and labelling him as a sinner). See infra notes
460-65 and accompanying text for a fuller discussion of the Meltebeke case; see also
Brown Transp. Corp., 578 A.2d at 555 (finding religious harassment where an employer
published religious articles in its newsletter and printed Bible verses on paychecks).
The United States Supreme Court has avoided deciding this issue each time it has
been presented the opportunity. Dayton Christian Sch., 766 F.2d 932 , rev'd on other
grounds, sub nom. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S.
619 (1986) (not ripe); Sports & Health Club, Inc., 478 U.S. 1015 (1986) (lack of
jurisdiction); Townley, 859 F.2d 610.
389. E.g., Townley, 859 F.2d 610.
390. Underkuffier, supra note 17.
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basis of sex or marital status.39' Religious secular employers have
sought to justify even their non-religious discrimination on free exercise
grounds." Further complicating the analysis is that freedom of speech
and freedom of association interests and claims are also often present.
The complex jumble of complementary and competing rights and the
subtle, difficult nature of the problem are illustrated in the cases briefed
below. First an accommodation case is presented because it is simpler
than the others and because it is the one which most fully addresses the
Title VII-Free Exercise tension. Next considered are disparate treatment
cases including offensive environmental cases and harassment cases. Then
the disparate impact theory is analyzed for these types of employers.
1. Accommodation Cases
In perhaps the most comprehensively written opinion to date, the
Ninth Circuit decided a case in which a manufacturer required employees
to attend mandatory devotional services as a condition of their
employment. 3" The court held that the employer was not a religious
institution for purposes of being exempt from Title VII, that the employer
had not adequately accommodated the employee's religious needs, and that
the constitutional right of free exercise of religion did not invalidate
application of Title VII.
At the start of business in 1963, the owners of the Townley
Manufacturing Co., Inc., had "made a covenant with God that their
business 'would be a Christian, faith-operated business. '" 3 4 The
owners are born again Christians who "'are unable to separate God from
any portion of their daily lives, including their activities at . . . [their]

company. "39

In 1979 a machinist named Pelvas was hired at a Townley plant in
Arizona where, at that time, there were no devotional services. In
December 1982 the employees were issued an employee handbook which
stated that they were required to attend the devotional services as a
condition of continued employment. However, services were not begun
at the plant where Pelvas worked until April 1984. In June 1984 Pelvas
objected to the requirement and asked to be excused from attending. He
391. E.g., State v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985),
dismissedfor lack ofjurisdiction, 478 U.S. 1015 (1986); Dayton Christian Sel. Inc. v.
Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 766 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, sub

nom. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986).
392. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844; Townley, 859 F.2d 610.
393. Townley, 859 F.2d at 612.
394. Id.
395. Id. (quoting from Appellant's Brief p.6).
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was not excused. In December 1984 Pelvas left the company. In July
1986 the EEOC brought an action against Townley claiming that Pelvas,
an atheist employee, was discriminated against on the basis of religion,
that Townley failed to properly accommodate Pelvas, and that Pelvas was
constructively discharged. In May 1987 the district court granted partial
summary judgment, ruling for the EEOC on the first two issues, and
issued a permanent injunction prohibiting mandatory devotional services
at the plant. The court denied summary judgment on the constructive
discharge issue which was eventually tried with a result in favor of the
employer. The employer appealed the summary judgments and the
injunction.
The employer had also raised the hardship defense to the
accommodation claim. On appeal the majority opinion of the Ninth
Circuit expressly rejected the employer's assertion that spiritual hardship
meets the standard of undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's
business.396 The court focused exclusively on whether excusing the
employee from the meetings would have a significant adverse affect on the
money-making aspect of the business and concluded it would not. The
majority completely discounted, for purposes of Title VII analysis, the fact
that the business was run as part of the owner's covenant with God. The
court rightly held that the religious organization exemptions in the act did
not apply because the manufacturing business did not qualify as a religious
organization. It also held that whether the owners made the distinction or
not, the law distinguishes between business and secular purposes on the
one hand and religious purposes on the other. Hardship analysis ignores
the latter.
In its split decision, the Ninth Circuit held that the compelling state
interest in prohibiting discrimination overrides the employer's First
Amendment rights of freedom of religion. 3" However, the court did
conclude that the district court's injunction was too sweeping.
Consequently, the court ordered the injunction to be modified to be as
narrowly tailored as possible to meet the needs of employees. The court
wrote:
The district court simply enjoined all mandatory services at
Townley's Eloy plant. We believe the district court's decree was
too broad. The goal of Title VII is served by protecting only
those who have religious objections to the services. To protect
those who do not have such objections is not necessary. Nor do
we think that to require that the service be voluntary as to all
employees, whether that is their wish or not, is necessary to
396. Id. at 615.
397. This case was decided before Smith, and before the RFRA was enacted.
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further the purposes of Title VII. Following this decision, it is
not likely that fear of intimidation will suppress requests to be
excused on religious grounds. Obviously such requests must be
honored by both Townley and the Townleys.3 98
Thus the injunction could be tailored to have attendance mandatory for
everyone who does not object on religious grounds. This would more
closely meet the religious needs of the employer. In explaining its
decision the majority wrote:
The transcendent principle in cases of this sort is accommodation.
Where the religious practices of employers, such as the
Townleys, and employees conflict, Title VII does not, and could
not, require individual employers to abandon their religion.
Rather, Title VII attempts to reach a mutual accommodation of
the conflicting religious practices. This is consistent with the
First Amendment's goal of ensuring religious freedom in a
society with many different religions and religious groups.'"
The dissenting judge disagreed factually with the majority and, disagreed
on the core principle to be followed. First, the dissent noted that
accommodation had in fact been attempted in the form of requiring
attendance, but allowing the employee to ignore the goings-on. The
employer explicitly permitted the employee to wear ear plugs, read a
book, or even sleep at the meetings, as long as he physically attended.
According to the dissent, such accommodation was enough because it
permitted the employee to shut out and disassociate himself from the
worship service and religious indoctrination. To the dissent such an
accommodation was sufficient under the law because the employee had no
right to any particular form of accommodation.
The more significant disagreement was over the standard to be used
in weighing the competing rights. The majority used an accommodation
and tolerance standard while the dissent sought to premise the analysis on
coercion. The dissent felt that there was no coercion to force the
employee "to practice the company's religion or to give up his own. " '
The dissent conceded that if the circumstances were such that an employee
were to be penalized or ostracized for conduct such as reading or wearing
earplugs, then a claim would exist. But such was not the case in Townley.
The Townley case explicitly rejected any free exercise claim of the
employer. Using traditional free exercise rules which permit the state to
398. Townley, 859 F.2d at 621.
399. Id.

400. Id. at 622.
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burden the employer provided there is a compelling state interest in doing
so and, provided that the least intrusive means is chosen, the court held
that Title VII was properly applied to limit the employer's exercise.
Essentially the majority latched onto the idea of accommodation, both in
the statutory sense and in the principle sense to justify burdening the
employer. However, I think the case should have come out differently
using the same basic principle. Essentially, the court placed the entire
burden of accommodation on the employer and held that whenever there
was a conflict, the employer's interest must give way. But the law need
not be applied in such a draconian or one-sided manner, especially since
it is not written as such. The employer has a statutory duty to
accommodate. But the duty is to accommodate identifiable religious needs
of an employee, not the desire not to be exposed to ideas. What if the
employer were conducting civics classes on the duty to vote? How does
one distinguish an employee request to be excluded from such classes
from the employee in Townley. If an employee claims that to vote is
either a meaningless act, or is antithetical to his principles because he
believes the government to be so corrupt that any collaboration, such as
voting, is immoral, then that claim seems to be of a similar nature to the
religious one insofar as it is untestable, a matter of faith, a life-ordering
concept, and such. Why should only required exposure to religious ideas
be banned?
In Townley the employee was not seeking to have a religious need of
his accommodated; he was merely seeking to fulfill his desire to avoid
exposure to unpleasant religious indoctrination. The unpleasantness was
not due to such exposure being against his religious beliefs; he merely
disagreed with the views being presented. The employee was permitted
to assert non-religion as a ground for accommodation under the statute.
On the other hand, the employer believed that its actions were not only
part of religious practice, but were part of his doing business, i.e., part
This secular
of the business purpose was to witness for Jesus.
employee/religiously-motivated employer situation is not what the statute
was originally aimed at. While I think it proper that the statute reach this
far, I think the religious action by the employer ought not give a per se
claim to the employee.
To this extent I agree with Professor
Underkuffler-Freund.
Though the Townley court used one of the major principles of the
religious freedom cases, accommodation (which is also one of the major
principles to be used under my proposal), it did not consider the other
principles and did not adequately weigh the employer's interests. The
court mentioned that both the employer and employee must accommodate
each other. But this was said in the very limited context of negating the
ability of an employee to force the employer to accept a particular type of
accommodation. That is, the employee can suggest an accommodation,
but an employer is free to try to meet the employee's needs another way.
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Only in this limited sense must the employee "accommodate" the
employer. The court justified placing the burden on the employer because
the employer has greater control over structuring the workplace. Unstated
but implied from that comment is concern over the relative power of the
parties. An employer has significantly greater power in the relationship
with an individual employee than does the worker. Antidiscrimination law
is premised in part on this disparity in power and antidiscrimination laws
help equalize the relationship in this critical area. In general disparity in
bargaining power ought to be recognized and weighed in any decision, but
it is not so heavy as the court seemed to indicate and the scope of
protection granted seems much more than is necessary to counterbalance
that weight.
Ultimately, the Townley court did not really grant the employer's right
to religious freedom sufficient weight. The dissent noted that the
fundamental flaw in the EEOC's argument and in the position of the
majority was in treating the defendant in this sort of religious
discrimination case "as though the defendant was simply one more racist
bigot.""' The court did not give equal dignity to the employer's claim.
The court did not explain why the proposed accommodation (Pelvas
attending, but not paying attention) was so burdensome on Pelvas'
religion.
For the employer's rights to be treated with equal dignity,
accommodation must become a two-way street. If we seek to encourage
tolerance, requiring an employee to attend a Bible study meeting may help
that employee understand that with which he disagrees and may help the
employer be more tolerant of different views held by employees. Simply
separating the two is a weak form of tolerance. Allowing employers like
Townley greater latitude than was evident in this case furthers tolerance
not only on the employee-employer level but also on the societal level.
Court toleration of marginal religious groups even as employers may help
affect society's willingness to tolerate and include sects in a positive way.
If the case had been decided by framing the relevant discourse around
the principles of tolerance, equality, inclusion and accommodation, then
a better result could well have been achieved. By taking a more limited
rules-based approach and by focusing on only one limited aspect of only
one principle, the court failed to treat the employer with sufficient regard.
The second case to be examined, State of Minnesota v. Sports &
Health Club, Inc.,4 2 is much more complex with many more suspect
activities involved than in Townley. In Sports & Health Club, Inc.,
401. Id. at 624. This is also the tone of the EEOC regulations concerning religious
discrimination. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605 (1994).
402. 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985), dismissedfor lack of jurisdiction, 478 U.S.
1015 (1986).
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fundamentalist Christians implemented their religious beliefs and practices
in their business, a closely-held corporation, which owned and ran a group
of exercise and recreation facilities. Several aspects of the employment
relationship were challenged by the Minnesota Department of Human
Rights under the state law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
employment. 403 The challenged policies and practices included the
conduct and content of employment interviews, the holding of Bible study
groups on the premises during business hours, the prohibition against
promoting into management anyone who was not a "growing Christian,"
and certain disciplinary actions taken based on employees' private conduct
away from the premises.
During employment interviews prospective employees were questioned

about their marital status (particularly women applicants), were asked
about their religious beliefs, and were advised about the religious nature
of the business.
Although Catholics, Jews, Muslims, mainstream
Protestants, and atheists were hired at all levels except management, all
employees regardless of faith had to demonstrate a "disciplined lifestyle"
in accordance with the employer's interpretation of the Bible. For
example, employees could not have pre- or extra-marital sex and could not
cohabitate with a member of the opposite sex out of wedlock.'
The environment at the workplace was intended to be a disciplined,
Christian one in which religion was discussed freely and frequently, in
which cheerful, obedient attitudes were required, and in which a proper
attitude was a constant requirement. Management employees were
required to attend weekly Bible study meetings; the Bible was their
management manual. Other employees were invited to attend Bible study
meetings, but were not required to do so.
The State of Minnesota brought a class action against Sports and
Health Club and its owners and principals claiming that they had violated
the Minnesota Human Rights Act by unlawfully discriminating on the
basis of religion, sex, and marital status. The defendants admitted many
of the practices and defended primarily on the grounds that their religious
beliefs required them to so act.
The Minnesota Supreme Court willingly conceded the genuineness of
the employer's beliefs and the religious nature and source of them, and
noted that despite all of the alleged actions of discrimination, the
defendants had always employed, and through the various trials continued
to employ married, divorced, and single men and women, as well as
people of various faiths, "so long as such other persons [were] not
offended by the owners' faith, [were] not antagonistic toward the Christian
403. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.04 (West 1991). For purposes of this article, the
requirements of the state law are virtually the same as the federal law.
404. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d at 847.
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gospel, and [would] comply with the management's work rules in a
Nonetheless, in a split decision, the
cheerful and obedient spirit."'
court affirmed the findings and conclusions of the administrative law
judge, enforced the injunction, and remanded the case for 4 the
determination of damages to be awarded the various class members. 0
The dissenters questioned the adequacy of the majority's analysis in
several respects. For example, one dissenter, Justice Peterson, queried
how one could distinguish between an impermissible inquiry during an
employment interview about reading the Bible from a presumably proper

inquiry about reading a modem anthology of literature.'

Justice

Peterson also noted that, "[t]o say as the [administrative law judge] said,

that '[t]he essence of the employer's business is not a 'discipleship for
Christ' . . . but rather the operation of an exercise emporium' is
impermissibly to substitute the examiner's business judgment for [the
defendants'] business judgment."" Justice Peterson rightly pointed out

that the majority's decision mandates that religion does not belong in

Under the majority opinion religion is worse than
commerce. 4°
irrelevant in the marketplace; it is banned. 41° There was to be no
relationship between "praying on one's knees on Sunday [and] preying on
other persons in the marketplace on Monday . . . ."'I
The other dissenter, Justice Yetka, noted the irony that the law

intended to protect minority religions discriminates against the majority
405. Id. at 848.
406. In a later case, Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990), decided after
Smith, the Minnesota Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion, but did so under
the Minnesota Constitutional protection of free exercise rather than under the Federal
Constitution, because Smith eliminated any federal free exercise challenge. (One of the
dissenters in Sports and Health Club wrote the majority opinion in Cooper.) The court
held that a person renting a house could discriminate on religious grounds against
prospective renters on the basis of their marital status. This precise issue was decided
the other way in Sports andHealth Club. Furthermore, the court accepted the economic
necessity argument of French while it rejected a similar claim by the Sports and Health
Club, i.e., French was not told to get out of the business or comply with the law while
the Sports and Health Club was. The court reached for any distinguishing characteristic
and relied most heavily on the difference between employment relationships and renting
places of accommodation. The court did not convincingly explain why they were
different under free exercise analysis, it just stated that they were.
407. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d at 870.
408. Id. at 859.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id.
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religion, Christianity, and that "[t]his decision would deny a Christian the

right to practice his belief in the marketplace."4"

The defendants appealed to the United State Supreme Court.4" 3

After sitting on the case for over nine months the court refused to hear the
case on the unexplained

grounds that the Court did not have

jurisdiction. 4
By not dismissing for lack of a substantial federal
question nor addressing the petition for certiorari, the Court dismissed the

case in a manner which gave no guidance on the merits of the claim. 1 5
Although many of the actions of Sports and Health Club would be
illegal under the test proposed here, the overriding antagonism toward the
owners as evinced in the decision of the administrative law judge,416 in
the language of the Minnesota supreme court's opinion,4Q 7 and in the
overly broad sweep of the rulings would be curtailed under my proposal.
To the extent decisions were made on the basis of sex, and on the basis
of beliefs about sex and sex roles, Sports and Health Club's owners'
412. Id. at 876. This insight is incomplete, however, because it fails to distinguish
between the status of the claimant as employee or employer. A Christian seeking
employment from a Jewish employer is protected under the Civil Rights Act.
413. They also petitioned for certiorari in the event that the appeal was somehow
considered to be improper. Under the law at the time, the appeal was proper and as of
right since the Minnesota Supreme Court had upheld that state statute against a First
Amendment challenge. State v. Sports and Health Club, Inc., 478 U.S. 1015 (1986).
During that period the Court also refused to handle another case raising similar issues.
See Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schs., Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986).
414. Id. The Dayton Christian Schools case was appealed about the
same time
Sports & Health Club. Sports & Health Club was dismissed the week following the
decision that Dayton ChristianSchools would not be decided on the merits at that time.

415. However, lower courts on occasion have attempted to glean some meaning
from dismissals such as this. One such attempt occurred in the Third Circuit's discussion
of the Supreme Court's dismissal of Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 4J, 723 P.2d 298
(Or. 1986), appealdismissed, 480 U.S. 942 (1987). The Third Circuit wrote:
The Supreme Court dismissed Cooper's appeal for want of a substantial federal
question. [compared to a lack ofjurisdiction in the Sports & Health Club case]
Summary dispositions by the Supreme Court of appeals by right have the
controlling effect of Supreme Court precedent with regard to "the specific
challenges presented in the statement ofjurisdiction," assuming, of course, that
there have been no subsequent doctrinal changes that cast doubt on the
continued vitality of the holding. However, "[a] summary disposition affirms
only the judgment of the court below, and no more may be read into [the
Supreme Court's] action than was essential to sustain that judgment."
United States v. Board of Educ. for the Sch. Dist. of Phila., 911 F.2d 882, 888 (3d Cir.
1990) (citations and footnote omitted).
416. Sports & Health Club, 370 N.W.2d at 846.
417. Id.
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interest in applying their interpretation of the Bible in the workplace must
give way. Legal rules regulating treatment of women are the sort of limits
on free exercise which must be permitted to stand, as was decided a
century ago in the Reynolds418 case in which a law banning polygamy,
though then a religious requirement for the Mormons, was held
constitutional.4 19 And the distinction between status-based discrimination
and belief-based discrimination would support a distinction under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act42 between the two cases. That is,
there is a compelling state interest in eradicating sex-based discrimination
and there is no less restrictive alternative than imposing sanctions for
violating women's rights. Even if the interest is deemed to be less
compelling for belief-based discrimination than for sex or race
discrimination, (an arguable point), many less restrictive alternatives to
outright prohibition of employer speech, conduct, and decision-making on
religious grounds are possible.
The use of a religious status test for promotion into management, at
least management below the control group, seems problematic, though it
is a closer call than the sex-based actions. Freedom of association, and
freedom to create a Christian work environment, requires some control
over who would be responsible for that environment. Thus at some level
it would appear that limiting policy-level management to like-minded
people would be proper, if we are to recognize the legitimacy of the
employer's claim to free exercise at all. The employer should be open to
external scrutiny to ferret out sham and subterfuge, but the employer
should be able to control who controls the business. For relatively small
operations like Sports and Health Club and Townley Engineering the
social interest and the employee's interest do not seem so pressing. The
employee who can rise no further can find another exercise club or
machine shop in which to pursue a career.
A number of things done by the employer should have been permitted
and should not have formed the basis of a finding of discrimination. The
employer should be able to explain to a prospective employee what the
environment is like. Not only was the topic forbidden in interviews, but
even distributing a one-page form which disclosed the employer's
Christian approach to business was banned. The employer should be able
to distribute literature and discuss religion on the premises. And the
418. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).

419. Id.
420. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat.
1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb).
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employer should be able to hold Bible-study meetings at which attendance
is open to, but not required of, all employees. 4"
These activities undeniably create a "Christian environment" which
some employees would find uncomfortable. But value-based discomfort
is not illegal and ought not be made so just because the values are
religiously based. A religion-infused environment may present genuine
practical problems for the non-Christian employee who feels
uncomfortable in the workplace because of it.4' But discomfort is not
or ought not be actionable until it rises to a significant level which is not
merely discomforting to an employee, but which affects the conditions of
employment in a significant way beyond that caused by a disagreement
about ideas. Under current law, to prove religious discrimination on the
basis of a hostile environment, an employee must establish: (1) that the
employee suffered intentional discrimination because of his religion; (2)
that the discriminatory conduct was pervasive and regular; (3) that the
discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff's terms and conditions
of employment; and (4) that the discrimination would detrimentally affect
a reasonable person of the same religion in that position. ' Where the
employer and employee both assert Free Exercise rights, the current
standard of detriment is too low. Unlike racial or sexual harassment
cases, or cases where the work environment is racially or sexually
oppressive, even if the environment does not directly attack or target any
particular person, or race, or gender, a Christian work environment which
some would find offensive or even oppressive, but which does not directly
harass or attack any particular person or group, should not be illegal.
Even though there is conduct and speech which would be out of bounds
in the employment setting, but which would be entirely permissible in
many other fora, there should be room for the employer's religion as well
as the employee's.
An employee who is merely uncomfortable at the job because of the
Christian work environment has no more claim for discrimination than an
employee who does not want to work eighty hours per week in a whitecollar sweatshop. An employee who finds certain religious doctrines and
421. As noted in EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir.

1988), an employer can even go further and require attendance of all those who do not
object on religious grounds.
422. E.g., Meltebekev. Bureau of Labor and Indus., 903 P.2d 351 (Or. 1995). In
Meltebeke the employer "witnessed" a non-Christian employee who was severely
distressed by the employer's actions, but did not mention it because he thought it might
affect his employment prospects with the company. See id.
423. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993); Meritor Say. Bank
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986); Goldberg v. City of Phila., No. CIV.A. 91-7575,
1994 U.S. Dist. WL 313030, at *10 (E.D. Pa., June 29, 1994).
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practices distasteful and intrusive, e.g., Christian witnessing, should not
have an unfettered veto of such conduct. The source of the corporate
culture and the nature of it ought not be the test for legality. The
employee should have no claim based merely on discomfort because of a
difference in religious beliefs.
Looked at from the perspective proposed in this article, an employee
must tolerate and accommodate the religious expression and beliefs of the
employer. Granting equal dignity to the values of two religious parties
would seem to require this. The justification for burdening the employer
as opposed to the employee, i.e., the difference in the power relationship,
takes too cramped a view. If such a rule were followed, then no employer
could create a Christian work environment, and adherents to that brand of
Christianity found in Sports & Health Club42 4 would be excluded from
being employers. 4'
A simpler case than Sports & Health Club4' is Brown Transport
4 27
Corp. v. Pennsylvania.
Brown Transport, though less than a full
Christian environment case because of the relatively few things done by
the employer, illustrates aspects of both religious exercise and free speech
issues.'
In Brown Transport the employer engaged in religious speech
to its employees through publishing Bible verses on paychecks and through
occasional religious articles in the company newsletter.429 A Jewish
employee was offended and communicated his displeasure to his
supervisor.430
The supervisor responded that he should take the
paychecks and not complain. 43 The employee's "main contention with
the sporadic religious connotations in 'Brownie Sez' and continual Bible
verses being typed on his checks was that, in his opinion, religion should
not be part of business affairs."4 3 Soffer, the employee, said that he
"also would have been offended if the same perceived religious matters he
found objectionable had discussed or highlighted aspects of his own
424. 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985).
425. This same result could happen where the beliefs require subordinating women,
but such status-based discrimination is different from discrimination based on belief, and
such a consequence is more acceptable.
426. 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985).
427. 578 A.2d 555 (Pa. 1990).

428.
429.
430.
431.

Id.
Id. at 557-58.
Id. at 557.
Id.

432. Id. at 561 (quoting Finding 20 of the Pennsylvania Human Rights

Commission).
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Despite excellent performance evaluations, Soffer
religion. " '
The court accepted Soffer's claim that the
eventually was fired.4'
employer's Christian speech made him reasonably believe that nonChristian employees would not be treated equally.435
In Brown Transport the employee suffered consequences not because
of his status as a Jewish person in a "Christian" company, and not
because of his particular religious beliefs.436 That is, the employer took
no actions against the employee based on the employee's beliefs. Instead,
the employer made its beliefs known in ways that made the employee
uncomfortable and in ways that the employee felt were inappropriate.437
Ultimately it was not the difference in beliefs which precipitated the
discharge, but the breakdown in the relationship between the employee
Had the employee not made a point about the
and the supervisor."
employer's religious speech, then the relationship between his employer
and him would probably not have soured. Had the employee accepted the
propriety of the employer expressing religious views on paychecks and in
a company newsletter, i.e., had the employee shown tolerance and
accommodation of the employer's beliefs and speech, then the problem
would not have arisen.
But the record as reported by the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
does show a likelihood of retaliation by the employer in response to the
employee's complaints.439 So the employer could and should have
shown greater tolerance and been more accommodating. The employee
ought not be put in the position of "put up or shut up" which seems to
But the employer ought not to be
have been the supervisor's attitude.'
silenced because an employee believes such speech does not belong at
work. The law of employment discrimination ought not extend so far into
regulating speech and expressions of belief.
Brown Transport is perhaps a case where the law regarding work
environments emboldened an employee to the ultimate detriment of both
The court seems to have held that the
employer and employee.
employer's mere communication of religious beliefs violated the law
against discrimination on the basis of religion." This should not be the
433.
434.
435.
436.

Id. (quoting Finding 21 of the Pennsylvania Human Rights Commission).
Id. at 558.
Id. (quoting Finding 23 of the Pennsylvania Human Rights Commission).
See generallyBrown Transp. Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 578 A.2d 555 (Pa. 1990).

437. Id. at 557-58.
438. Id. at 558.
439. Id. at 562.

440. Id. at 557.
441. Id.
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law, but it appears to be, as was seen in Sports & Health Club, 2 and
as will be seen in other religious environment cases.
In Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 443 a woman employee
considered having an abortion.'
Her mere contemplation of this option
and her mentioning it at work offended her co-workers." 5 Ultimately,
Turic did not have an abortion."6 However, she claimed that her
employer fired her:
to protect the religious sensibilities of the rest of the staff, and
that their religion was impermissibly forced upon her. Plaintiff
asserts that, in essence, a religious test was established as a
condition of employment with defendant. She contends that
because her views on the morality of abortion differed from those
of the Christian staff, she was treated differently than they were
on the basis of religion." 7
Ms. Turic did not claim that her religious beliefs were being affected
by what the employer did."
Instead, the discrimination happened
because of a difference between her non-religious beliefs which allowed
her to consider abortion, and the religious sensibilities of most co-workers
which did not." 9 Ultimately the court found against the plaintiff on the
religious environment theory because of a lack of sufficient proof, but
found for the plaintiff on the theory of intentional sex discrimination
arising out of the abortion issue. 4 0
This is really a relatively straightforward harassment case. An
employer's religion or a dominant religion among co-workers ought not
excuse intolerance and abuse or shunning by employers or co-workers
toward another of a different faith. But this case may not be a religious
discrimination case at all because abortion, though certainly a religious
issue to many, is also a political and moral and social issue. Title VII
442. 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985).
443. 849 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Mich. 1994).

444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.

Id. at 546.
Id.
Id. at 557.
Id. at 551.
Id.
Id. at 556.
Id.
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does not reach employment actions based solely on differing conceptions
of morality.45
Another case, Brown v. Polk County, 452 presents additional issues
because it involves the government as an employer, and because the
conduct objected to by employees was done by an intermediate-level
governmental employee who was their immediate supervisor.453 The
supervisor's religious-based statements and actions had created a divisive
atmosphere in the county department offices which he oversaw, and the
tensions rendered the office dysfunctional. 4'
The county eventually
required him to stop holding Bible study meetings, not to express his
religious opinions in the workplace, and not to confront the employees he
supervised about religious beliefs or practices. 45 5 The county also
instructed the employee to remove all religious paraphernalia in his private
office. 56 The court upheld the county's actions in all respects,
including the removal of religious items from his office.4 7
The court was probably correct in finding the county's interest in
providing effective service through its various departments to be strong
enough to limit its supervisory employee's religious statements and
conduct toward his employees.4 8 But the prohibition against displaying
religious icons and symbols in his office45 9 must be a full step too far
and does not comport with ideas of tolerance and accommodation. To put
it perhaps too broadly, one employee's beliefs and practices are not being
accommodated and tolerated largely because of his intolerance and failure
to accommodate the beliefs and practices of the employees he superivsed.
Another case arose in Oregon.' 6 John Meltebeke was a sole
proprietor running a painting business. Meltebeke is an evangelical
Christian whose beliefs compel him to "witness" for the lord by telling
others about Jesus and by denouncing the sins of others. Meltebeke
believes that he has these obligations at work as well as outside of work.
451. Id.
452. 37 F.3d 404 (8th Cir. 1994).
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.

Id. at 406.
Id.
Id. at 407.
Id.
Id.

458. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510,
2533 (1995) (Souter, J. dissenting) (Justice Souter disagreed with the majority's holding

that the denial of university funds to a student organization which published a newspaper
with a Christian viewpoint amounted to viewpoint discrimination).
459. Brown v. Polk County, 37 F.3d 404, 407 (8th Cir. 1994).
460. Meltebeke v. Bureau of Labor and Indus., 903 P.2d 351 (Or. 1995).
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Meltebeke hired someone to help him in his painting business. Naturally
Meltebeke witnessed to the new employee, called him a sinner, and
repeatedly invited him to attend his church. The employee declined the
invitations. After about six weeks Meltebeke fired the employee for poor
The employee sued under Oregon employment
job performance.
discrimination regulations alleging that the employer's conduct constituted
religious harassment, a form of religious discrimination in employment.
As summarized by the Oregon Supreme Court (quoting as noted from the
findings of the administrative agency and testimony of the principals

involved):
Complainant never informed Employer that he felt offended,
harassed, or intimidated by anything that Employer said to him or
to anyone else. He did not ask Employer to cease. Employer
"did not know that his comments were unwelcome or offensive
to Complainant," the agency found as fact. Employer did not
"criticizeo any religion by name" to Complainant or apply any
"religious slur" to Complainant or otherwise....
Complainant felt "embarrassed," "very uncomfortable,"
"humiliated," "bug[ged]," "reluctant to go to work each
morning," and "out of place" because of his perception that
Employer "was pushing God down his throat, and he did not
want to have anything to do with it." Complainant "would come
[H]e was coming home after work
home from work angry ....
Employer's comments caused
exploding.'"
and 'basically
Complainant to hate churches. Now he 'can't stand looking at
them' [and] 'can't stand' to talk about religion. He 'gets upset'
whenever religion is mentioned.
Complainant did not complain or request that Employer cease
inviting him or discussing religious topics, because "you don't
say that to your boss. I mean, at least I don't. I told him I
couldn't make it [to church] all the time. He should have got the
hint, and I ain't a rude person that tells someone that's his
religion, that's not mine." "Complainant thought his job might
He did not
be affected by his unwillingness to go to church ....
know what to do because [Employer] was his boss. . . . After
two weeks of employment with [Employer], Complainant began
looking for other work because he was so uncomfortable about
[Employer's] religious comments. " 46'

461. Id. at 353-54 (footnotes omitted).
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The Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industry (BOLI) found that the
proselytizing by the employer was unwanted and offensive to the employee
and that the conduct "was sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the
conditions of employment, and had the effect of creating an intimidating
and offensive working environment." BOLI found both that the employee
subjectively felt harassed and that using an objective standard, a
reasonable employee would find the work environment to be intimidating
and hostile. Consequently the employer was found liable. BOLI rejected
the religious freedom constitutional defenses raised by the employer.
The Oregon law applied by BOLI provides that:
[I]t is an unlawful employment practice:
(b) For an employer, because of an individual's ...religion.
. .to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in
terms, conditions or privileges of employment.' 2
In a previous case under the statute BOLI developed and applied the
following interpretation:
Harassment on the basis of religion is a violation of ORS
659.030. Unwelcome religious advances and other verbal or
physical conduct of a religious nature constitute religious
harassment when:
(1) submission to such conduct is made, either explicitly or
implicitly, a term or condition of the subject's employment;
(2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by the subject
is used as the basis for the employment decisions affecting the
subject; or
(3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with the subject's work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment.
In Sapp's Realty, BOLI was careful to state that "general expressions
of religious beliefs at the workplace, by themselves, [do not] constitute a
violation of ORS 659.030." 4 As summarized by the Oregon Supreme
Court, BOLI had further developed the rules to include the following:

462. ORS § 659.030(1) (1993).
463. Meltebeke, 903 P.2d at 355 (quoting In re Sapp's Realty, No. 11-83 at 79

(BOLI 1985)).
464. Id. at 355-56 (quoting In re Sapp's Realty, No. 11-83 at 80 (BOLI 1985)).
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(1) The "religious advances" or "other verbal or physical conduct
of a religious nature" must be "sufficiently pervasive as to alter
the conditions of employment." The employer's conduct will be
examined to determine whether, from the objective standard of a
"reasonable person," that conduct would actually create an
"intimidating, hostile, of offensive working environment."
(2) The conduct must in fact be unwelcome to the employee. As
to that factor, the test is subjective.
(3) The unwelcome conduct must have been directed at an
employee because of that employee's religion.
(4) Within the meaning of the rule, "religion" for both employer
and employee includes nonbelief, as well as belief. 46
Ultimately, the Oregon Supreme Court sided with the employer and
held that a subjective standard of the employer actually knowing that the
environment was intimidating or hostile or harassing to an employee was
required. The reasonable employer standard was not to be used in
religious expression or practice cases. The court did not find a hard
privilege or right for the employer which would trump the employee's
right.
Although the Meltebeke court seems to be the one most favorable to
the interests of employers, it falls far short of truly meaningful protections
for the employer. Had the employee in Meltebeke simply told the
employer that he was discomfited by the proselyzation, then the employer
would have had actual, subjective knowledge of the problem and, under
the Oregon rule, no protection. Merely allowing some religious speech
does not seem sufficient. Employees ought not have a veto power over
speech and work conditions to the extent BOLI and the Oregon Supreme
Court seem to contemplate.
Particularly in cases where a small business is involved and a close
working relationship is forced, as in Meltebeke, and where the actions
taken by the religious employer are to a large degree compelled by that
employer's faith, then the employer should be granted more latitude.
Perhaps a different rule would fit for Microsoft, but it is less likely
(though far from impossible) that such a large company would maintain
an intolerant religious environment.
The religious secular employer cases present a special problem of
scope. If the employer's requirements are treated as part of a corporate
culture or as values-based requirements, and if the terminology is changed
just slightly, from an employer creating a religiously informed work
environment, to an employer requiring each employee (1) to have certain
personal characteristics such as a teachable spirit and a disciplined
465. Id. at 356 (construing BOLI rule interpreting ORS § 659.030).
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approach to work and life, (2) to accept the hierarchical structure of the
company, and (3) to meet weekly to discuss the business manual, then the
matter becomes less easy.'
That is, if one focuses not on any special
religious status or source of the environment, but upon the functional
requirements, then if one is to find discrimination it must be some kind
other than religious. To find such things discriminatory one must look
behind the functional requirements to the source of them, to the genesis
of the values, to some external and internal criteria of what makes those
requirements improper. Conduct that is otherwise legitimate should not
be illegal because it is somehow tainted by being premised on the religious
beliefs of the employer.
The sort of cases where the employer has both a work environment
and employment policies ultimately based on religious notions implicates
First Amendment Free Exercise and Establishment concerns. If the
employer cannot operate the business as a "discipleship for the lord" we
are ultimately telling that employer that his or her religion has no place in
the marketplace. He or she may be an employee, but not an employer.
Essentially, the statute not only cuts out impermissible conduct with
respect to status-based discrimination, but also ideas about how best to run
a business from a business and ethical perspective. It encourages
businesses to become ever more amoral and focused on the bottom line,
on economics alone, on the "almighty dollar." Is not this itself a sort of
religion for some?
Employers in this category ought to be able to establish business
criteria from whatever source they deem fit. Those religious criteria for
promotion ought to have only some minimal relationship to the "business
of business" to pass muster. That is, the employer ought to be able to set
criteria for promotion and employment using whatever source or yardstick
the employer considers appropriate, provided the yardstick is not based on
status, on belief in a particular god or sect, or on religiosity in general.
The employer must still approach the individual based on values and
functional qualities. Thus, a requirement of employee acceptance of a
hierarchical structure would be acceptable, but a requirement of an
acceptance of Christ as savior would not.
In this arena justice seems hard to quantify universally. We have an
interest in allowing people to make a living by doing what they know.
This interest can cut in favor of employees in communities with few
employment options, but it also cuts in favor of an employer being able
to be religious and act on his or her religious beliefs.
466. These were the salient factors in State v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., with the
Bible being the business manual, 370 N.W.2d 844, 847-48 (Minn. 1985), dismissedfor
lack ofjurisdiction, 478 U.S. 1015 (1986).
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These work environment cases present several significant challenges
to the principled analysis and application of the law to achieve just results.
As shown above, one problem is that a religious work environment is, in
some sense, just another corporate culture, and as such is not
fundamentally different from any other corporate culture. To claim that
it is different brings one squarely to the problem of defining what religion
is, a definition which has never been satisfactorily made and which carries
establishment clause implications. Even if one decides just What a
religious environment is in the business setting, and if one can separate
religious from secular environments, then by necessity one is making
liability judgments based on the employer's beliefs. That is, judgments
are made not on the secular nature of the environment, but ultimately on
the source of those beliefs leading to the environment. Using the test of
legitimate business purpose related to economic aims itself may distort
what are proper aims of businesses and may chill altruistic behavior.
Ultimately, the decision to favor the employee must be founded upon
a sense of a fair, but unfortunate need to adjust the power balance between
the employer and employee. In general, employers have more power than
employees-economically, politically, and culturally. Should we adjust
the power balance to ensure that ideas of the less powered survive? What
of the circumstance where the minority group, such as fundamentalist,
evangelical Christians is the employer? The policy of attempting to
protect that expression is harmed by stifling it in favor of majoritarian
religions. The shield of the Civil Rights Act becomes a sword of
discrimination.
C. Religious Institutions' 7
Title VII contains some special provisions relating to religion in
partial recognition of the uniqueness of religious-based discrimination. As
discussed above, religious discrimination claims are governed by general
employment discrimination laws including the theories of disparate
In addition, a
treatment and disparate impact and harassment." 8
as well. As
claim
claimant in the right case can assert an accommodation
in other types of cases, employers have the benefit of the burden shifting
and the defenses of denial, business necessity, and bona fide occupational
qualification. 9
Among the other special provisions relating to religion in Title VII,
Congress exempted religious institutions from certain requirements of the
467. See Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption, supra note 341, for a more complete
analysis of this part of Title VII.
468. See supra part II.A.
469. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (Supp. V 1993).
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Act in an effort to balance the competing interests of protecting employees
from religious discrimination, of protecting the free exercise rights of
employers, and of avoiding establishment problems.47 Under Title VII
a religious institution is defined as a "religious corporation, association,
educational institution, or society."471 Such religious organizations may
employ persons of a particular religion provided the job is "connected
with the carrying on by such [religious entity] .. . of its activities." 4"
Courts have limited this exemption to discrimination based on religion;
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, color, or national origin is not
exempt. 4' Thus for example, a church could not prohibit an AfricanAmerican from becoming an employee provided the candidate met other
job-related criteria. However, the church could prohibit that same person
from employment if he or she did not subscribe to the tenets of the
church.
Originally the 1964 Act exempted religious organizations only for
"religious activities."'
The word "religious" before "activities" was
deleted in the 1972 amendments.47
Consequently, any activities,
regardless of their secular nature, are exempt under this religiousorganization provision.476 If the organization is a religious one, it is
exempt from Title VII religious discrimination claims. 4" The
constitutionality of this exemption has been upheld as applied to employees
of secular nonprofit activities of religious organizations.478 Whether it
would pass constitutional muster if applied to protect a religious for-profit
organization has not yet been decided.
Just what constitutes a religious organization for purposes of this
exemption is not clear from the statute itself.479 The statute contains no
definition of religion or religious organization (aside from defining
470. These special religious-employer exemptions normally do not apply to the types

of cases with which this article is primarily concerned.
471. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1982).

472. Id.
473. Id.
474. Title VII Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,

Sec. 702, 78 Stat. 241 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.).
475. This section has been upheld as constitutional as applied to nonprofit religious
organizations. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
476. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1982).

477. Id.
478. Id.
479. See EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 617-19 (9th Cir.
1988).
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religious discrimination to include the failure to accommodate an
employee's religious practices and beliefs and even that "definition"
assumes content for the word "religious"). On the one hand, traditional
entities such as mainstream churches and even splinter churches or sects
are quite clearly protected. On the other hand, organizations asserting no
religious nature and claiming to be merely commercial would not be
protected. In between these poles are myriad types of entities including
church-related charitable organizations, non-denominational religiously

based charities, non-profit charitable agencies not clearly religious in
nature, various community centers tied to certain religious groups,

essentially secular groups which are or were nominally or historically
religiously tied such as the YMCA and the YWCA, and businesses run as
"religions" or at least with overt religious foundations, e.g., Mary Kay
Cosmetics,' and various televangelists.
The religious organization exemption has been treated as a narrow
one, limited to exempting churches, synagogues, organized religions, and
Mere
religiously-related enterprises closely tied to such entities." s1
For example, the
affiliation and funding by a church is not enough.'
United Methodist Children's Home was held to have lost its possible
protection as a religious organization because on balance, its charitable
mission of providing a home for orphans and other children had become
The issue was whether the children's home was
secularized.'
480. See, e.g., Skip Hollandsworth, Hostile Makeover, TEx. MoNTHLY, Nov. 1,
1995, (quoting Mary Kay Ash, founder and president of Mary Kay cosmetics: "I feel that
God has led me to this position, as someone to help women know how great they really
are.")
481. See, e.g., Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh Day Adventists, 772
F.2d 1164 (4th Cir.) cert denied, 478 U.S. 1020, (1985) (defendant was exempt as a
church); EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453
U.S. 912 (1981) (college exempt because it was owned and operated by Baptist
churches). But see EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986)
(holding that a church-operated private school was not exempt from Title VII and the
Equal Pay Act when it gave insurance benefits only to head of household employees,
because this was interpreted by the school to mean that only single people and married
men received insurance benefits); EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 676 F.2d
1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that a publishing company was not exempt from
Title VII when it discriminated against a single female employee with regard to annual
monetary and automobile allowances. The court held that Title VII was intended by
Congress to be applied in this circumstance, and that Pacific Press's claims of entitlement
to express and implied exemptions were refuted by the legislative history of Title VII and
its amendments.).
482. See, e.g., Fike v. United States Methodist Children's Home, 547 F. Supp. 286
(E.D. Va. 1982), aft'd, 709 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1983).
483. Id. at 290.
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primarily religious or secular. 4
After reviewing all of the
circumstances, the court concluded that the primary mission of the home
was secular.' m The "day-to-day life [of] the children [was] practically
devoid of religious content or training . . . .
The reach of the exemption has been extended to religion-based values
and mores as a grounds for a religious institution to take action against an
employee.'
In Little v. Wuerl, 481 a non-Catholic employee of a
Catholic school was discharged because she remarried.489 (The Catholic
church generally bars divorce and remarriage.) The employment action
was taken not because of her status as a non-Catholic, but rather because
of her 49belief, and her actions on that belief, that remarriage was
proper. 0
In contrast, the Christian Science Monitor, a newspaper published by
the Church of Latter Day Saints, Christ Scientist, was held to be a part of
the religious organization for purposes of the Title VII exemption. 49'
Consequently the newspaper was permitted to use a religious test for
employment at the paper. 49' But the court had the following to say
about the crafting of the exemption:
The exemption presently afforded by Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-1, is a remarkably clumsy accommodation of religious
freedom with the compelling interests of the state, providing on
the one hand far too broad a shield for the secular activities of
religiously affiliated entities with not the remotest claim to first
amendment protection while on the other hand permitting
intrusions into wholly religious functions. 4 3
Many Christians, Jews, and Muslims, as well as others, believe that
their religion requires them to live their religion at work as well as at
home and in church. Indeed, a for-profit business engaged in commerce
in the marketplace could very well be considered a religious organization
484. Id. at 288.
485. Id. at 290.
486. Id.
487. See Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1991).

488. Id.
489. Id. at 946.
490. Id.
491. Feldstein v. Christian Science Monitor, 555 F. Supp. 974 (D. Mass. 1983).

492. Id. at 975.
493. Id. at 979 (quoting EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 495
F. Supp. 255, 260 (N.D. Tex. 1980)).
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by the owners.4"' However, the religious institution exemption has not
been extended to such typically secular businesses which have religioninfused work environments.
For example, in EEOC v. Townley
Engineering & Manufacturing Co., 9 the court held that "the beliefs of
the owners and operators of a corporation are simply not enough in
themselves to make the corporation 'religious' within the meaning of
section 702 [religious institutions exemption]."496 The court so held
despite conceding that the business was a "discipleship Jake and Helen
Townley have for the Lord Jesus Christ," and noting the various religious
activities including devotional services and financial support of Christian
radio broadcasts, missionaries, and churches. 4' The court found more
persuasive that the business was for profit, and that it manufactured
"mining equipment, an admittedly secular product," and that it lacked
support from or affiliation with a church.498 The court did not formulate
a test to distinguish the religious from the secular, 4' but merely listed
those facts which it considered religious and those which it considered
secular and made no allowance for the owners of the business to make that
determination themselves." °
Another special exemption protects church-affiliated educational
institutions and other educational institutions which have as their missions
the advancement of a particular religion."' As in the case of religious
institutions, all employees, even those employed in a secular capacity are
exempted from the protections of Title VI.: This exemption, like that
for the religious institutions, has not been broadly interpreted and would
not apply to a commercial enterprise run by Christians as a discipleship
for God, even though the commercial enterprise was deemed by them to
494. See, e.g., State v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985),
dismissedfor lack ofjurisdiction, 478 U.S. 1015 (1986); EEOC v. Townley Eng'g and
Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 617-19 (9th Cir. 1988).
495. 859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1988).

496.
497.
498.
499.

Id at 619.
Id.
Id.
Id.

500. Id.

501. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2) (Supp. V 1993); see, e.g., Pime v. Loyola Univ.,
803 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1986).
502. See EEOC. v. Kamehameha Sch./Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1993)
(school founded on will-based endowment requirement of religious orientation held not

to permit religious-based hiring of teachers in contravention of employment
discrimination law).
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be a form of witnessing for their Lord (and hence a form of worship and
a method of educating others).
An interesting case involving a religious educational institution is Ohio
Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools. 3 In Dayton
Christian Schools, a pregnant teacher's contract was not renewed because
of the school's religious doctrine that mothers of preschool-age children
should stay home with their children." °
As a result the teacher
contacted an attorney who threatened the school with litigation under state
505
and federal civil rights laws if the school did not change its decision.
The school officials then fired her for going outside of the "Biblical chain
of command" to resolve the dispute, i.e., contacting an attorney.5 6 The
teacher contacted the Ohio Civil Rights
Commission alleging sex
57
discrimination and retaliatory termination. 0
Dayton Christian Schools sought an injunction in federal district court
against the Ohio Civil Rights Commission on the grounds that the pursuit
of the action against it would violate its free exercise rights.508 The
district court held against the school, and the school appealed the
decision." 9 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
the free exercise clause required the Civil Rights Commission to be
enjoined.510 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Court
reversed in a five-four decision in which five justices said the district court
should have abstained' under Younger v. Harris,"2 and four said the
dispute was not ripe. 13
Much of the decision in Dayton Christian Schools514 seems relatively
easy. If one accepts the distinction between status-based discrimination
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.

766 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 934.
Id.
Id.
Id.

508. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schs., 578 F. Supp. 1004

(S.D. Ohio 1984).
509. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schs., 766 F.2d 932 (6th Cir.
1985).

510. Id.
511. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, 477 U.S. 619, 625
(1986).
512. 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (holding that a federal court cannot enjoin a pending state

criminal proceeding except when necessary to prevent great and immediate irreparable
injury).
513. Dayton ChristianSchools, 477 U.S. 619 (1986).
514. 766 F.2d 932 (6th Cir.1985).
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and belief-based discrimination, then the actions surrounding firing the
woman because she was pregnant seems an easy one of sex discrimination,
not religious discrimination. Even religious institutions are prohibited
from discriminating on the basis of race or sex except to the extent sex is
a BFOQ. 1 But the case still highlights the problem of determining the
extent to which the freedom of religion should insulate an employer.
Where the employment action is taken not on the basis of sex per se, but
rather on the basis of religious convictions about proper roles in society,
then it gets close to a belief-based claim of discrimination. Nonetheless,
allowing society to set limits on certain conduct, such as polygamy, seems
fair.
Dayton ChristianSchools raises one new interesting issue: The woman
was ultimately fired not because of gender, but because she appealed to
secular authorities for redress."1 6 That is, she went outside the chain of
Biblical command to air her grievance. On this issue too I believe the
school must lose. Unless the school qualifies as a religious institution and
the issue qualifies as a matter of theology, or is of such intimate
connection to the religion as to permit no severance, the school must be
subject to ordinary civil processes. The principles of accommodation and
tolerance require employer concessions as well as employee. The
employer must concede the power of the state to regulate certain types of
conduct, or the Reynolds5 17 risk of each becoming a law unto himself,
each person being able to effect a unit veto of general social welfare laws,
arises.
V. CONCLUSION

Employment discrimination on the basis of religion is not like
employment discrimination based on birthright. The most significant
differences arise from the real conflict between Title VII and the First
Amendment's guarantees of free exercise of religion and free speech. For
secular employers a co-employee harassment claim founded on religiousrelated discourse or taunting or arguments is a disquieting reality. Unlike
racial epithets and sexual innuendo, religious discourse can be deemed
denigrating merely because of difference of opinion.
To date courts have been largely dismissive of the employer's
interest."' 8 The statute itself requires employers, not employees, to
accommodate the other. And courts have not modified this requirement,
515. 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-2 (Supp. V. 1993).
516. Dayton ChristianSchools, 766 F.2d at 934.
517. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).

518. See id.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

even when employers raise free exercise, or undue hardship,
objections." 9 The religious secular employer has been treated as almost
a per se violator of the law."W Even in circumstances where an
employee can show no religious belief of the employee which has been
infringed or not accommodated courts have found mere employee dislike
or discomfort enough.5"2' The theory is that the right to be free from
religious discrimination, i.e., free from adverse employment consequences
because of one's religion, carries with it the right to be free from religious
influences.
Fashioning clear rules to be applied to the protean situations in a
syllogistic fashion is nearly impossible. Consequently I have proposed
moving to an explicitly principle-based analysis in which the discourse is
built around accommodation, tolerance, inclusion, neutrality and equality.
Ultimately, courts should give greater weight to the religious claims of
employers and attempt to reach more carefully honed solutions. The
injunctions issued to date have been broad and blunt. Employers should
be accorded the same human dignity as employees in any assessment. In
some cases the determining factor will still be the propriety of requiring
the employer to go the extra mile because of the employer's position of
power. But, that should not be the starting point.
The approach I have presented should be applied by courts with an
eye to achieving deeper, meaningful tolerance on all sides. Decisions
should be made which encourage the individuals involved to be more
tolerant of diversity. That is, the public interest, in the broadest sense,
should be explicitly used in reaching decisions and fashioning remedies.
Accommodation is the polestar; and equality its closest companion.

519. See, e.g., EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 615, 619 (9th

Cir. 1988).
520. EEOC v. Kameharneha, 990 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1993).
521. See, e.g., Townley Eng'g & Mfg., 859 F.2d 610; Brown Transp. Corp. v.
Pennsylvania., 578 A.2d 555 (Pa. 1990).

